Winnebago Cnty. v. C. S. (In re Mental Commitment of C.S.), Appeal No. 2016AP1982

• Court: Court of Appeals of Wisconsin
• Citation: 2019 WI App 16,927 N.W.2d 576,386 Wis.2d 612
• Docket Number: Appeal No. 2016AP1982
• Parties: In the MATTER OF the Mental COMMITMENT OF C.S.: Winnebago County, Petitioner-Respondent, v. C. S., Respondent-Appellant.
• Decision Date: 27 March 2019

386 Wis.2d 612
927 N.W.2d 576
2019 WI App 16

In the MATTER OF the Mental COMMITMENT OF C.S.:

Winnebago County, Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
C. S., Respondent-Appellant.^†

Appeal No. 2016AP1982

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs: January 10, 2019
Opinion Filed: March 27, 2019

On behalf of the respondent-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Kaitlin A. Lamb assistant state public defender of Milwaukee.

On behalf of the petitioner-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of James A. Kearney of James A. Kearney Law Office, S.C., Neenah.

A non-party brief was filed by Maura FJ Whelan, assistant attorney general, and Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.

Before Neubauer, C.J., Reilly, P.J., and Gundrum, J.

REILLY, P.J.

386 Wis.2d 615

¶1 C.S. was found not competent to make informed decisions as to the advantages and disadvantages of accepting particular medication or treatment while a prisoner and was involuntarily

386 Wis.2d 616

medicated per WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g) (2017-18).¹ C.S. argues that § 51.61(1)(g) is facially unconstitutional as it does not require a finding of dangerousness before involuntarily medicating prisoners who are committed under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(ar). We affirm as § 51.61(1)(g) is reasonably related to the state’s legitimate interest in providing care and assistance to prisoners suffering from mental illness who are found not competent to refuse medication and treatment.²

BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2005, C.S. was convicted of mayhem as a repeater and sentenced to twenty years in prison (ten years’ initial confinement, ten years’ extended supervision).³ C.S. was diagnosed with schizophrenia. Involuntary commitment and medication orders were obtained in 2012 and those court orders have been extended on several occasions. The petition at issue in this case was filed on May 22, 2015. Within the

927 N.W.2d 579

petition, a psychologist affirmed C.S.’s schizophrenia diagnosis and opined that C.S. satisfied the statutory criteria for an extension of commitment and for

386 Wis.2d 617

involuntary medication. C.S. objected, and a jury trial was held in June 2015. The jury, addressing the elements of WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(ar), found that (1) C.S. was mentally ill; (2) C.S. was a proper subject for treatment and in need of treatment; (3) C.S. was an inmate of a state prison; (4) less restrictive forms of appropriate treatment had been attempted and were unsuccessful; and (5) and (6) C.S. had been fully informed of his treatment needs, the mental health services available, and his rights, and he had an opportunity to discuss these matters with a licensed physician or psychologist. The circuit court entered an order extending C.S.’s commitment under § 51.20(1)(ar) and an order for involuntary medication and treatment under WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g).⁴

¶3 In a postcommitment motion, C.S. challenged WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g) as "unconstitutional for all prisoners committed under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(ar)" as it allows prisoners to be involuntarily medicated without a finding of dangerousness. The circuit court denied the motion.⁵ C.S. appeals.

386 Wis.2d 618

¶4 We begin by noting that C.S. previously made a facial challenge to his commitment in Winnebago County v. Christopher S. (C.S. I) , 2016 WI 1, ¶3, 366 Wis. 2d 1, 878 N.W.2d 109, on the ground that WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(ar) violates substantive due process as it allows the involuntary commitment of a prisoner without a finding that he or she is dangerous. Our supreme court rejected this argument, finding that § 51.20(1)(ar) is constitutional as "it is reasonably related to the State’s legitimate interest in providing care and assistance to inmates suffering from mental illness." C.S. I , 366 Wis. 2d 1, ¶24, 878 N.W.2d 109. In this appeal, C.S. challenges the intertwined issue of involuntary medication of prisoners under WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g), without a finding of dangerousness.

Standards of Review

¶5 "The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo." State v. Wood , 2010 WI 17, ¶15, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63. We presume every statute is constitutional. Id. A party challenging a statute must "prove that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Cole , 2003 WI 112, ¶11, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328. C.S. presents a facial challenge to the constitutionality of WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g).⁶

927 N.W.2d 580

See Wood , 323 Wis. 2d 321, ¶13, 780 N.W.2d 63. "Under such a challenge, the challenger must show that the law cannot be enforced ‘under any circumstances.’ " Id. (citation omitted). If

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the party succeeds, "the law is void ‘from its beginning to the end.’ " Id. (citation omitted).

¶6 We discern an individual’s substantive due process rights from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Wood , 323 Wis. 2d 321, ¶17, 780 N.W.2d 63. "The right to substantive due process addresses ‘the content of what government may do to people under the guise of the law.’ " Id. (citation omitted). "An individual’s substantive due process rights protect against a state action that is arbitrary, wrong, or oppressive," id. , and "forbids a government from exercising ‘power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective,’ " State v. Luedtke , 2015 WI 42, ¶74, 362 Wis. 2d 1, 863 N.W.2d 592 (citation omitted).

¶7 A challenge to WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g) is subject to rational basis review. See C.S. I , 366 Wis. 2d 1, ¶42, 878 N.W.2d 109 ; see also Washington v. Harper , 494 U.S. 210, 223-26, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990). "A law subject to rational basis review will be upheld ‘unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.’ " C.S. I , 366 Wis. 2d 1, ¶36, 878 N.W.2d 109 (citation omitted). "When faced with a substantive due process challenge, we examine ‘whether the statute is a reasonable and rational means to the legislative end.’ " Luedtke , 362 Wis. 2d 1, ¶76, 863 N.W.2d 592 (citation omitted).

386 Wis.2d 620

DISCUSSION

¶8 C.S. argues that " WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g) violates substantive due process because it does not require a finding of dangerousness at any point to involuntarily administer medication to prisoners." We conclude that the involuntary medication and treatment of a prisoner is facially constitutional as there is a legitimate reason for the state to medicate/treat even when there is no finding of dangerousness—the general welfare of the prisoner.

¶9 The involuntary commitment of a person (not in prison) requires a petition that satisfies three elements: (1) that the person is mentally ill, (2) is a proper subject for treatment, and (3) is "dangerous." WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a). If the person is a prisoner, § 51.20(1)(ar)"carves out a special" procedure that replaces the third element of "dangerousness" with four additional elements. See C.S. I , 366 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶26-27, 878 N.W.2d 109. The elements under § 51.20(1)(ar) are as follows: (1) the individual is an inmate of the Wisconsin state prison system; (2) the inmate is mentally ill; (3) the inmate is a proper subject for treatment and is in need of treatment; (4) appropriate less restrictive forms of treatment were attempted with the inmate, and they were unsuccessful; (5) the inmate was fully informed about his treatment needs, the mental health services available, and his rights; and (6) the inmate had an opportunity to discuss his treatment needs, the services available, and his rights with a psychologist or a licensed physician.⁷ C.S. I , 366 Wis. 2d 1, ¶27, 878 N.W.2d 109.

927 N.W.2d 581

¶10 A prisoner who has been committed for treatment under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(ar) is a "patient"

386 Wis.2d 621

entitled to certain rights under WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1), including the right to refuse medication. At issue in this case is § 51.61(1)(g), which states that a patient has "the right to exercise informed consent with regard to all medication and treatment unless the committing court ... makes a determination, following a hearing, that the individual is" (1) not competent to refuse medication or treatment or (2) "unless a situation exists in which the medication or treatment is necessary to prevent serious physical harm to the individual or others," i.e., the person is dangerous to himself or others unless medication or treatment is administered. Sec. 51.61(1)(g)3. (emphasis added). C.S. challenges only the first component, which allows a prisoner to be involuntary medicated based on a finding that he or she is not competent to...