Winnebago Cnty. v. C.S. (In re C.S.)

• Decision Date: 10 April 2020
• Docket Number: No. 2016AP1982,2016AP1982
• Citation: 391 Wis.2d 35,2020 WI 33,940 N.W.2d 875
• Parties: In the MATTER OF the mental COMMITMENT OF C.S.: Winnebago County, Petitioner-Respondent, v. C.S., Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

391 Wis.2d 35

940 N.W.2d 875

2020 WI 33

In the MATTER OF the mental COMMITMENT OF C.S.:Winnebago County, Petitioner-Respondent,

v.C.S., Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.

No. 2016AP1982

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oral Argument: January 15, 2020

Opinion Filed: April 10, 2020

For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs filed by Kaitlin A. Lamb, assistant state public defender. There was an oral argument by Kaitlin A. Lamb.

For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by Mary A. Mueller, Catherine B. Scherer, and Winnebago County office of Corporation Counsel, Oshkosh. There was an oral argument by Mary A. Mueller.

An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the Attorney General by Maura FJ Whenal, assistant attorney general; with whom on the brief is Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general.

An Amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Disability Rights Wisconsin by Todd G. Smith, Deborah Machalow, and Godfrey & Kahn, Madison.

ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.

¶1 This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Winnebago County v. C.S. , 2019 WI App 16, 386 Wis. 2d 612, 927 N.W.2d 576 (" C.S. III "), affirming the Winnebago County circuit court’s order of extension of commitment, order for involuntary medication and treatment, and order denying C.S.’s postcommitment motion.¹ C.S. suffers from schizophrenia and was an inmate in the Wisconsin prison system. While he was incarcerated, C.S. was committed and determined incompetent to refuse medication pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g) (2015-16)² and, therefore, was the subject of multiple involuntary medication court orders.

¶2 C.S.’s commitment and involuntary medication orders were not based upon a determination of dangerousness because neither Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(ar) nor Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g)3. require a determination of dangerousness. Rather, under § 51.20(1)(ar), C.S. was committed based on determinations that he was mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and in need of treatment. Then, under § 51.61(1)(g)3., C.S. was involuntarily medicated because he was determined incompetent to refuse medication. Accordingly, the crux of the issue in this case is whether § 51.61(1)(g)3. is facially unconstitutional when an inmate committed under § 51.20(1)(ar) is involuntarily medicated based on a determination of incompetence to refuse medication only—without any determination of dangerousness at any stage.

¶3 C.S. argues that Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g)3. is unconstitutional when it permits the involuntary medication of any inmate who was committed under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(ar) without a determination that the inmate is "dangerous" at any stage in the proceedings. Winnebago County argues the statute is facially constitutional and invokes the County’s parens patriae power. The County posits that it has a legitimate interest in the care and assistance of a mentally ill and incompetent inmate, thus eliminating any need for a determination of dangerousness with respect to an involuntary medication order of an inmate.

¶4 The court of appeals concluded that "the involuntary medication and treatment of a prisoner is facially constitutional as there is a legitimate reason for the [S]tate to medicate/treat even when there is no finding of dangerousness—the general welfare of the prisoner." C.S. III , 386 Wis. 2d 612, ¶8, 927 N.W.2d 576. We reverse.

¶5 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g)3. is facially unconstitutional for any inmate who is involuntarily committed under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(ar), which does not require a determination of dangerousness, when the inmate is involuntarily medicated based merely on a determination that the inmate is incompetent to refuse medication. Incompetence to refuse medication alone is not an essential or overriding State interest and cannot justify involuntary medication. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court with an order to vacate C.S.’s June 2015 order for involuntary medication and treatment.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE³

¶6 Because this is a facial challenge, the relevant facts are few. C.S. suffers from schizophrenia. In 2005 C.S. was convicted of mayhem as a repeat offender and sentenced to ten years of initial confinement and ten years of extended supervision. In 2012 Winnebago County petitioned to involuntarily commit and medicate C.S. C.S. has since been subject to multiple involuntary commitment orders, involuntary medication orders, and extensions thereof.

¶7 C.S. previously challenged his involuntary commitment before this court. He argued that an involuntary commitment statute, Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(ar) (2013-14), was facially unconstitutional because it allows the involuntary commitment of an inmate without a conclusion of dangerousness. We rejected that argument and concluded that § 51.20(1)(ar) is "reasonably related to the State’s legitimate interest in providing care and assistance to inmates suffering from mental illness." Winnebago County v. Christopher S. , 2016 WI 1, ¶24, 366 Wis. 2d 1, 878 N.W.2d 109 (" C.S. I "). C.S. did not challenge the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g)3. at that time. But he does now.

¶8 Relevant to C.S.’s current challenge to his involuntary medication, Winnebago County petitioned for an extension of C.S.’s commitment in May 2015.⁴ The petition asserted that it was the "opinion and recommendation of the Department of Human Services" that C.S. was mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and that there was a substantial likelihood that C.S. would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn. Winnebago County attached to the petition a letter from Dr. Kate Keshena. Dr. Keshena stated her opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that C.S. "continue[d] to have substantial disorders of thought, mood and perception" and was "incapable of expressing an understanding of the advantages" of his psychotropic medication "or appreciating how he benefits from them." Essentially, Dr. Keshena concluded that C.S. was mentally ill and incompetent to refuse medication.

¶9 C.S. objected to the extension and the circuit court held a jury trial in June, 2015. The jury found that the elements of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(ar) were met. Specifically, the jury found that: (1) C.S. was mentally ill; (2) C.S. was a proper subject for treatment and in need of treatment; (3) C.S. was an inmate in a Wisconsin state prison; (4) less restrictive forms of appropriate treatment had been attempted unsuccessfully; and (5) C.S. had been fully informed of his treatment needs, the mental health services available to him, and his rights, and he had an opportunity to discuss those matters with a licensed physician or psychologist. See § 51.20(1)(ar). On June 30, 2015, the circuit court entered an order of extension of commitment and an order for involuntary medication and treatment. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g), the order for involuntary medication stated that the order was "due to" "mental illness" and that C.S. was "not competent to refuse psychotropic medication or treatment because" he was "substantially incapable of applying an understanding of the advantages, disadvantages and alternatives to his condition in order to make an informed choice as to whether to accept or refuse psychotropic medications." Importantly, at no point in these proceedings did Winnebago County allege, the jury find, or the circuit court conclude that C.S. was dangerous. Thus, the circuit court order permitted Winnebago County to involuntarily medicate C.S. merely because he was mentally ill and incompetent to refuse medication—without any finding or conclusions regarding dangerousness.

¶10 In July, 2015 C.S. was released from prison and began extended supervision. After his release, C.S. was no longer subject to the involuntary commitment or involuntary medication orders. C.S. then filed a notice of intent to pursue postcommitment relief and a motion for postcommitment relief. He argued that Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g) is facially unconstitutional for any inmate involuntarily committed under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(ar) without a conclusion of dangerousness. On September 15, 2016, the circuit court held a hearing and issued an order denying C.S.’s postcommitment motion. The circuit court concluded that Winnebago County could involuntarily medicate C.S. pursuant to § 51.61(1)(g) because it was in the legitimate interests of both the County and C.S.

¶11 On October 6, 2016, C.S. filed a notice of appeal and the court of appeals stayed the appeal pending its decision in Winnebago County v. C.S. , No. 2016AP1955, unpublished slip op., 2017 WL 3525411 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2017) (" C.S. II ") (concluding that C.S.’s challenge to his June 2014 orders of extension was moot). Then, on March 27, 2019, the court of appeals affirmed in C.S. III . The court of appeals acknowledged that C.S. was no longer subject to the June 2015 involuntary commitment and involuntary medication orders. It stated, "Although this case is moot, for the reasons stated in C.S. I , 366 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶30-32, 878 N.W.2d 109, we will reach the merits of this appeal."⁵ C.S. III , 386 Wis. 2d 612, ¶2 n.4, 927 N.W.2d 576. It then concluded that "the involuntary medication and treatment of a prisoner [pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g) ] is facially constitutional as there is a legitimate reason for the State to medicate/treat even when there is no finding of dangerousness—the general welfare of the prisoner." Id. , ¶8.

¶12 On April 26, 2019, C.S. petitioned this court for review. We granted the petition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

1 ¶13 This case requires the court to review the constitutionality of portions of Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g)3. The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law we review de novo. State v. Wood , 2010 WI 17, ¶15, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63.

234 ¶14 C.S. brings a facial challenge to Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g)3. to the extent that it...