Winnetka v., In re

Decision Date18 December 1980
Docket NumberCr. 21142
Parties, 620 P.2d 163 In re WINNETKA V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WINNETKA V., Defendant and Appellant. In re WINNETKA V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. WINNETKA V., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY, Defendant and Respondent.
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court

Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Charles M. Sevilla, Chief Asst. State Public Defender, and Jonathan B. Steiner, Deputy State Public Defender, for plaintiff and appellant and defendant and appellant.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler and Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Attys. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Shunji Asari, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Jack T. Kerry and Sharlene A. Honnaka, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

No appearance for defendant and respondent.

NEWMAN, Justice.

These are consolidated appeals from orders declaring the minor to be a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 602) 1 and committing her to the California Youth Authority (CYA), and from a subsequent order denying her petition to modify that commitment order (§ 778).

The wardship was predicated on findings that she committed acts of attempted robbery and assault with a deadly weapon. On this appeal she does not question the sufficiency of the evidence to support those findings; nor does she complain of the conduct of the adjudication (jurisdictional) hearing. Accordingly, for present purposes it is enough to note that she was engaged in shoplifting in a clothing store when the owner became suspicious and investigated. She then attempted unsuccessfully to rob him with an empty handgun and, in the ensuing struggle, struck him on the head with the gun.

On March 29, 1978, a disposition hearing was held before a juvenile court referee. He noted that he had read and considered the probation officer's report recommending commitment to the CYA. He declined, however, to adopt that disposition. After weighing the seriousness of the offenses against a number of mitigating circumstances 2 he found that CYA commitment would be inappropriate and unwarranted. He ordered that the minor instead be taken from her parents and put in the custody of the probation department for "suitable placement"; i. e., in a county-operated juvenile facility rather than the CYA. There remained, however, some question as to whether a suitable placement could be found since the minor was believed at the time to be pregnant.

On April 11, 1978, Judge Smith, the presiding judge of the juvenile department of the superior court, acting assertedly on his own motion, ordered a rehearing on the referee's disposition. The matter was assigned to another superior court judge; a second disposition hearing was held; and the court considered evidence and arguments substantially similar to those previously presented to the referee. It was stipulated, however, that the minor was not pregnant; and there was undisputed testimony that Camp Holton, a juvenile facility operated by the county probation department, was likely to accept her. Nonetheless the court found that a local placement would not be adequate and therefore committed her to the CYA.

She does not contend that the evidence at the second hearing was insufficient. Nor does she claim that Judge Smith lacked authority to order the rehearing. Rather she complains that the process via which rehearing was ordered violated her statutory and constitutional rights. The contentions focus on the fact that the judge's order came after the district attorney's office sent a letter urging that there be a rehearing.

The first contention is that the letter was improper because statutes prohibit the People from seeking rehearing. The argument proceeds as follows: The Welfare and Institutions Code permits rehearing of a referee's disposition only on (1) application by the minor or the parent or guardian (§ 252), or (2) a juvenile judge's "own motion" (§ 253). 3 The letter here was an application for rehearing by the People; yet the right to apply is not granted the People by statute and so does not exist. (Cf., Pen.Code, § 1238; People v. Drake (1977) 19 Cal.3d 749, 754, 139 Cal.Rptr. 720, 566 P.2d 622.) The order to rehear was not on the court's own motion because it was prompted by the letter. Hence, rehearing was granted improperly.

Section 252 does confer a right to "apply ... for a rehearing" only on the minor or one acting on behalf of the minor. We see nothing in section 253, though, that prohibits the court from receiving outside communications before deciding to order rehearing on its own motion. (Cf., Pen.Code, § 1204; In re Calhoun (1976) 17 Cal.3d 75, 83-84, 130 Cal.Rptr. 139, 549 P.2d 1235.)

Regular procedures by which referees' decisions are screened for "own motion" rehearings are desirable. However, the law neither compels those procedures nor makes them exclusive means of deciding to rehear in the absence of a minor's application.

Indeed the 1961 revision of the law, seeking to reduce workload, eliminated the requirement that all referees' decisions be submitted to a judge for approval. Provisions for discretionary rehearing on the minor's or the court's motion, similar to those now in effect, were substituted; and no limitation was placed on considerations that might lead the judge to order rehearing. (In re Bradley (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 253, 261, 65 Cal.Rptr. 570; see Stats.1937, ch. 369, § 576, p. 1022; Stats.1961, ch. 1616, § 2, pp. 3466-3467.)

The workloads of the juvenile courts lead us to doubt that the Legislature intended to confine "own motion" rehearings to cases the judge has investigated on his own initiative. The impetus to action sometimes will come from others-the referee or other interested observers such as the district attorney. The words and aims of section 253 do not support an inference that letters to the judge from a prosecutor or anyone else are proscribed.

It is incorrect here to assume that the district attorney invoked a right to "apply ... for a rehearing." We agree that the People have no such right, but there is no indication that the trial court thought otherwise. 4

When on a minor's behalf rehearing is sought the application must be considered. It cannot be denied without review of the transcript and if not acted on within the specified time is deemed granted. (§ 252; see in re Edgar M. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 727, 737, 122 Cal.Rptr. 574, 537 P.2d 406.) But a mere communication from the district attorney or other interested person has no official status, and the court is free to reject it informally. That the letter here may have influenced the judge does not make it a nonstatutory "application for rehearing." 5

We therefore conclude that the order for rehearing was not improper on the ground that it was preceded and may have been prompted by a letter from the district attorney's office.

It is next argued that the minor was denied due process because the judge ordered rehearing without giving her notice and an opportunity to respond to the letter. 6

In Donald L., supra, 7 Cal.3d 592, 102 Cal.Rptr. 850, 498 P.2d 1098, a referee found the minor fit for treatment as a juvenile. It was contended that an "own motion" rehearing of the referee's finding actually had been granted at the informal, ex parte request of the district attorney. That impropriety, it was urged, invalidated the judge's subsequent determination of unfitness. This court did not decide the issue because the factual basis for the minor's claim seemed unclear. The presiding judge of the juvenile court was criticized, however, for his "stated policy" of acting on informal requests for rehearing "without giving the parties an opportunity to be heard...." Indeed, said Donald L., "(s)uch action ... may well be of doubtful constitutionality" because significant steps in the juvenile court process cannot be taken without affording the minor notice and opportunity for hearing. (P. 599, 102 Cal.Rptr. 850, 498 P.2d 1098, citing In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 30, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1445, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, and Kent v. United States (1966) 383 U.S. 541, 562, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1057, 16 L.Ed.2d 84.)

We now endorse the rule that Donald L. suggests. A decision to order a rehearing not sought by the minor is a step affecting his substantial interests. It voids a favorable referee's decision already won, which would otherwise become final and binding. It subjects the minor to de novo reconsideration of the disposition and creates the risk of a harsher decision affecting his liberty. It is true that the law prescribes no limitations on the judge's discretion to order rehearing sua sponte. Nonetheless, due process means that decisions to deprive individuals of substantial interests should not be made arbitrarily or by unfair procedures. (People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 267-268, 158 Cal.Rptr. 316, 599 P.2d 622; see Cal.Const., art. 1, §§ 7, 15.)

Communications from the People made without formal opportunity for response by the minor raise the danger that inaccuracies may affect the decision to rehear. 7 The right to respond enables the minor to point up flaws in the prosecutor's arguments, emphasize favorable portions of the record, and suggest why discretion should be exercised in favor of leaving the referee's decision untouched. (Ramirez, supra, at pp. 273-274, 158 Cal.Rptr. 316, 599 P.2d 622; cf., In re Calhoun, supra, 17 Cal.3d 75, 84, 130 Cal.Rptr. 139, 549 P.2d 1235; In re Minnis (1972) 7 Cal.3d 639, 650, 102 Cal.Rptr. 749, 498 P.2d 997.) Recognition of the right promotes an appearance of fairness and supports the "important dignitary values that underly due process...." (Ramirez, supra, at p. 275, 158 Cal.Rptr. 316, 599 P.2d 622.)

The state, on the other hand, has no legitimate interest in denying the minor a fair...

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