Winney v. Ransom & Hastings, Inc., 85-031
Decision Date | 15 January 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 85-031,85-031 |
Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Parties | John H. WINNEY v. RANSOM & HASTINGS, INC.; Paul H. & Rebecca Barnard, Individually & in Their Capacity as Owners, Officers & Directors of Ransom & Hastings. |
Gale, Gale, Barile & Corum, Thomas W. Costello, and Ardith L. Baldwin, Brattleboro, for plaintiff-appellant.
Carbine, Pressly and Seager, Rutland, for defendants-appellees Howard and Quarter Moon, Inc.
C. Nicholas Burke of Baker & Hayes, Lebanon, N.H., for defendants-appellees Mozier.
Before ALLEN, C.J., PECK, J., and BARNEY, C.J. (Ret.), KEYSER, J. (Ret.) and SPRINGER, District Judge (Ret.), Specially Assigned.
This is an interlocutory appeal from the granting of defendants' motions to dismiss by the Windham Superior Court, pursuant to V.R.A.P. 5(b). Two issues are presented for our review: first, whether the remedy provided by Vermont's Dram Shop Act, 7 V.S.A. § 501, precludes a common law action for the negligent sale or furnishing of intoxicating liquor and second, whether such a common law action exists. We affirm.
For purposes of this appeal, we must assume as true all of the facts alleged by plaintiff in his amended complaint, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Association of Haystack Property Owners, Inc. v. Sprague, 145 Vt. 443, 444, 494 A.2d 122, 123 (1985) (citing Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 563, 409 A.2d 581, 582 (1979)). Defendant, Ransom & Hastings, Inc. (R & H), leased premises owned by defendants, Everett J. Mozier and Angeline Mozier (Mozier), and operated a bar on those premises called "Ransom & Hastings." Defendant Quarter Moon, Inc. (QM), leased premises owned by defendant James L. Howard (Howard), and operated a bar on those premises called "Quarter Moon."
On November 27, 1981, R & H and QM sold or furnished intoxicating liquor to Dana Shippee while he was apparently under the influence of liquor. Thereafter, Mr. Shippee, while driving on Route 142 in Vernon, Vermont, lost control of his vehicle, went off the road, and crashed into a tree. As a result of the impact, plaintiff, John Winney, a passenger in Mr. Shippee's vehicle, was injured.
Plaintiff commenced this action in Windham Superior Court. His amended complaint set forth causes of action against each of the defendants under 7 V.S.A. § 501 (the Dram Shop Act), and under common law negligence. Defendants filed motions to dismiss plaintiff's negligence actions, on the grounds that the rights and remedies provided by 7 V.S.A. § 501 are exclusive and that no common law remedy exists. The superior court granted defendants' motions to dismiss, and plaintiff filed a motion for permission to take an interlocutory appeal, which the court granted.
We first address the issue of whether Vermont's Dram Shop Act preempts a cause of action in common law negligence.
It is a general rule of construction in Vermont that "[w]here a statute confers a remedy unknown to common law, and prescribes the mode of enforcing it, that mode alone can be resorted to." Thayer v. Partridge, 47 Vt. 423, 428 (1875). See also Gregory v. Kurtis, 108 Mich.App. 443, 449, 310 N.W.2d 415, 418 (1981) (); Snyder v. Davenport, 323 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Iowa 1982) ().
Under traditional common law principles, no remedy existed against the seller or furnisher of intoxicating liquor for injuries to third persons. A tavern owner or operator was not liable for injuries sustained off-premises by third persons as a result of an intoxicated person's acts, even though the owner or operator contributed to the accident by negligently serving the patron. Megge v. United States, 344 F.2d 31, 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831, 86 S.Ct. 69, 15 L.Ed.2d 74 (1965). The reason usually given for this rule is that human beings, drunk or sober, are responsible for their own torts, and no proximate cause existed between a sale of liquor and a tort committed by a buyer who has drunk the liquor. Id.
The Vermont legislature recognized the common law rule of nonliability, and enacted a Dram Shop Act to create a cause of action against one who furnishes intoxicating liquor to a person who thereafter voluntarily becomes intoxicated and injures the person or property of third parties. In Healey v. Cady, 104 Vt. 463, 161 A. 151 (1932), this Court discussed the predecessor statute to 7 V.S.A. § 501, and described that statute as creating a "remedy for wrong where there was none before...." Id. at 466, 161 A. at 152. The Court went on to say, "this statute by necessary implication changed the common-law rule of proximate cause which obtains in other tort actions." Id. Under the new Dram Shop Act, it was no longer necessary to prove that the act of furnishing liquor proximately caused the injury to third parties. A fair reading of the language from Healey quoted above indicates that: 1) no common law action for the negligent sale or furnishing of intoxicating liquor existed in Vermont at the time the Dram Shop Act was enacted; 2) the legislature created a new tort; 3) the legislature chose not to include in the new tort a proximate causation requirement. Vermont's Dram Shop Act thus created a remedy which was unavailable under traditional common law principles, and it prescribed a specific method of enforcement. Under the principle of law enunciated by this Court in Thayer, 47 Vt. at 428, it follows that Vermont's Dram Shop Act provides the exclusive remedy for cases falling within its scope, and preempts a cause of action in common law negligence.
We therefore hold that where the particular facts of a case fall within the scope of Vermont's Dram Shop Act, the act affords the exclusive remedy. Other jurisdictions share this view of their respective dram shop acts. See Cunningham v. Brown, 22 Ill.2d 23, 30-31, 174 N.E.2d 153, 157 (1961) ( ); Snyder v. Davenport, 323 N.W.2d at 227 ( ); Gregory v. Kurtis, 108 Mich.App. at 450, 310 N.W.2d at 418 ( ); Robinson v. Lamott, 289 N.W.2d 60, 65 (Minn.1979) ( ).
In Langle v. Kurkul, 146 Vt. 513, 510 A.2d 1301 (1986), we viewed Vermont's Dram Shop Act in the specific context of social host...
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