Winsett v. McGinnes
Decision Date | 30 December 1976 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 74-210. |
Citation | 425 F. Supp. 609 |
Parties | Thomas H. WINSETT, Plaintiff, v. F. Earl McGINNES et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
Arlen B. Mekler, and Eugene J. Maurer, Jr., of Mekler & Maurer, Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff.
Keith A. Trostle, Asst. Atty. Gen., Civ. Div., Wilmington, Del., for defendants.
This action was brought by Thomas Winsett, an inmate at the Delaware Correctional Center ("D.C.C."), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is that the denial by prison officials of his request for classification to the work release program at D.C.C. was based on constitutionally impermissible reasons, thereby depriving him of liberty without due process of law and of equal protection under law. Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as damages for the money he would have earned had he been working.
The Court on its own motion raised the question of subject matter jurisdiction and requested the parties to brief the issue. Defendants now question the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, contending that plaintiff's factual allegations, even if correct, cannot sustain a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but are cognizable, if at all, only on habeas corpus.1 Moreover, since plaintiff has failed to exhaust his state remedies on this claim, defendants maintain that it would be inappropriate for the Court to treat the complaint as a petition for habeas corpus. Before addressing the merits of defendants' contentions, a brief review of the factual background of plaintiff's claim is in order.
Plaintiff Winsett was convicted in 1964 of killing Robert Paris, a State police officer, during the commission of a felony (burglary), for which he received a life sentence. The public's reaction to Officer Paris' death can only be characterized as understandable and justifiable outrage.
On September 16, 1974, approximately ten years after his conviction and imprisonment, Winsett requested classification to work release status.2 On September 23, 1974, after considering the personal application of Winsett, and taking cognizance of the violent nature of the offense for which he was convicted,3 the Minimum Security Building Classification Team nevertheless determined that plaintiff satisfied the requirements for placement on work release status, and the Team Chairman so informed Winsett of its conclusion. The recommendation was then forwarded to the Institution Classification Committee ("I.C.C.") which concurred in the recommendation, and then forwarded it to Superintendent Anderson, a defendant herein, on September 24, 1974. The following day, Deputy Superintendent Donald Davis, also a defendant herein, issued and delivered a written denial of his application.
Winsett contends that the denial (and continuing denial) of his classification request was the product of fear of political repercussions from the state legislature if Winsett were to be placed on work release, because of the public's continued "sensitivity" to his killing of a State police officer. As evidence of this motive, Winsett references alleged statements of Superintendent Anderson characterizing him (Winsett) as a "political prisoner," and indicating that Winsett will never be placed on work release as long as he is the Superintendent at D.C.C. Winsett claims that such considerations constitute an unconstitutional basis for denying him participation in the work release program, where he has satisfied all other requirements for eligibility. He further alleges that likelihood of his eventual parole4 has been diminished by the denial, since participation in the work release program is weighed heavily by the parole board.
The instant jurisdictional question arose because of Parson v. Keve, 413 F.Supp. 111 (D.Del.1976).5 In Parson, the plaintiff had filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that he had been denied furlough, work release and educational release "because of intense public resentment against him for the crime which he committed and because of defendant's fear of potential reprisal which could adversely affect all of the correctional rehabilitative programs . . ." at the institution. Parson, supra, 413 F.Supp. at 112. Chief Judge Latchum, in granting defendant's motion to dismiss in Parson, held that plaintiff's action was:
"not properly brought to enforce § 1983 rights, but is in effect and intent an action to obtain conditional release from the fact of his present physical confinement for the purpose of participating in outside prison activities such as furloughs, work or educational release programs." Id.
The Chief Judge then concluded that since Parson was challenging the fact of his physical confinement as it presently existed, his suit "falls within the `core of habeas corpus.'" Id. at 113.
Defendants contend that Parson is controlling and should be followed in the instant matter. Plaintiff suggests that Parson can be distinguished on the grounds that Parson sought only equitable and declaratory relief, whereas here the plaintiff is seeking damages (in addition to equitable and declaratory relief). In support of this distinction, plaintiff points to two relatively recent Supreme Court decisions.
The first case cited by plaintiff is Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), also relied upon by Chief Judge Latchum in Parson as the decision initially demarcating the line between habeas corpus and section 1983 actions. Plaintiffs in Preiser were state prisoners who had participated in New York's conditional release program, through which a prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence could earn up to ten days per month "good-behavior-time credits" toward reduction of his maximum sentence. For various disciplinary reasons the good-time credits of each were canceled. Immediately thereafter, each plaintiff brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that his credits unconstitutionally had been canceled and seeking their restoration, which in each case would result in immediate release on parole. The Supreme Court rejected their claims, holding that "when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus," with the attendant requirement of exhaustion of state remedies. 411 U.S. at 500, 93 S.Ct. at 1841.
One of the objections raised by the prisoners to such a holding was that it might preclude a prisoner in states like New York from ever obtaining damages for constitutional deprivations for which habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy, since damages are not available in federal habeas corpus proceedings and New York law contains no provision authorizing a damages claim brought by state prisoners against state officials.
To this argument the Supreme Court gave the following response:
411 U.S. at 494, 93 S.Ct. at 1838.
The clear import of this language is that a non-frivolous damage claim falls outside the scope of relief which could be granted in federal habeas corpus.
The Court also explained the procedure to be employed if a prisoner were both to seek damages and challenge the fact or duration of his confinement:
411 U.S. at 499 n. 14, 93 S.Ct. at 1841.
Elaboration on the Preiser holding was forthcoming in the second case cited by the plaintiff, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). In Wolff the plaintiffs also claimed that they had good-time credits taken away in a manner not comporting with the requirements of due process, thereby giving rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for restoration of the good-time credits and damages. The Supreme Court, reaffirming Preiser, held that restoration of good-time credits may not be obtained under section 1983, but also made clear that damages and declaratory and other relief for improper revocation of good-time credits are cognizable under section 1983. As the Court explained:
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Brennan v. Cunningham
...admission into the program. The court held that habeas proceedings were the exclusive remedy under Preiser. See Winsett v. McGinnes, 425 F.Supp. 609 (D.Del.1976).5 Appellant seems to withdraw this argument in his appellate reply brief.6 This request also obviates any problems of exhaustion ......