Winslow v. Pulaski Acad.

• Decision Date: 20 March 2020
• Docket Number: 6:17-CV-83 (FJS/ATB)
• Citation: 448 F.Supp.3d 197
• Parties: Shari WINSLOW, Plaintiff, v. PULASKI ACADEMY and Central School District; Pulaski Academy Board of Education; and Brian Hartwell individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of Schools, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

448 F.Supp.3d 197

Shari WINSLOW, Plaintiff,

v.PULASKI ACADEMY and Central School District; Pulaski Academy Board of Education; and Brian Hartwell individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of Schools, Defendants.

6:17-CV-83 (FJS/ATB)

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

Signed March 20, 2020

GATTUSO & CIOTOLI, PLLC, The White House, 7030 East Genesee Street, Fayetteville, New York 13066, Attorneys for Plaintiff, STEPHEN CIOTOLI, ESQ.

BOND, SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC, 350 Linden Oaks, Suite 310, Rochester, New York 14625, Attorneys for Defendants, CURTIS A. JOHNSON, ESQ., JEFFREY F. ALLEN, ESQ., JOSEPH S. NACCA, ESQ.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

SCULLIN, Senior Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Shari Winslow ("Plaintiff"), the former Director of Special Services at Pulaski Academy and Central School District ("Defendant District"), brought this action based on gender and age discrimination against Defendant District, its Board of Education ("Defendant Board"), and its Superintendent of Schools ("Defendant Hartwell") seeking compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and costs. See generally Dkt. No. 1, Compl. Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Dkt. No. 34.

II. BACKGROUND

Defendant District hired Plaintiff as the Director of Special Services on July 1, 2005. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 11. She served in that capacity for ten years, having earned tenure and a promotion to Director of Special Services, Assessment and Data. See id. In September of 2014, Defendant District hired Defendant Hartwell as Superintendent of Schools. See id. at ¶ 14. Plaintiff contends that, immediately upon taking the position, Defendant Hartwell subjected her to hostile and offensive conduct, including yelling at her in the workplace in front of colleagues, demeaning her input, reducing or refusing to allow her to perform her job duties and responsibilities, and making fundamental changes to the essential elements of her job without prior notice or good cause. See id. at ¶ 15. Defendant Hartwell claims that he had learned of complaints and criticisms of Plaintiff's job performance from numerous sources soon after he started. See Dkt. No. 34-7, Defs' Stmt. of Material Facts, at ¶ 5. Plaintiff, to the contrary, alleges that she received excellent performance evaluations from her superiors throughout her employment and maintained an "impeccable" record of accomplishments. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 12.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hartwell's hostility towards her continued into early March 2015, when the events leading to this lawsuit culminated. According to Defendants, on March 2, 2015, Plaintiff assumed the responsibility for personally overseeing a new student with special needs. See Dkt. No. 34-7, Defs' Stmt. of Material Facts, at ¶ 45.¹ During that school day, the student ran away from Lura M. Sharp Elementary School and was "pursued through the streets" by school personnel. See id. at ¶¶ 46, 49. The elementary school principal allegedly emailed Defendant Hartwell that day about the student escaping from school while under Plaintiff's supervision. See id. at ¶¶ 47-48.

By happenstance, around 11:00 a.m. on the next day, March 3, 2015, Plaintiff finally complained about Defendant Hartwell's allegedly abusive conduct to Sheilla Roth, Defendant District's Business Administrator and Title IX Coordinator. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 19. According to Ms. Roth, Plaintiff stated that she felt Defendant Hartwell was "bullying" her because she was the "highest paid administrator" in Defendant District. See Dkt. No. 34-2, Roth Decl., at ¶ 6. Ms. Roth reported that conversation to Defendant Hartwell at some point over the next few days, though she could not recall precisely when. See id. at ¶ 11.

Later that very same day, March 3, 2015, Ms. Roth witnessed Plaintiff "yelling" into the phone at a parent. See Dkt. No. 34-6, Roth Depo, at 23:15-25:7; see also Dkt. No. 34-1, Hartwell Decl., at ¶ 41. Defendant Hartwell stated that Ms. Roth informed him via email at approximately 2:57 p.m. of a "loud conversation" that she overheard with the parent of a student. See Dkt. No. 34-1 at ¶ 41 (citing Dkt. No. 34-1, Ex. H).

The next day, March 4, 2015, Defendant Hartwell and Ms. Roth allegedly confronted Plaintiff together in her office. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 21. Defendant Hartwell allegedly threatened Plaintiff that he would bring § 3020-a charges against her;² and, Plaintiff claims, he told her to "get a lawyer." See id. at ¶ 22. Additionally, at that time, Defendant Hartwell placed Plaintiff on "administrative leave"; and Plaintiff alleges that he and Ms. Roth "publicly removed [her] from [Defendant] District premises in front of students and staff and ordered her to remain off school property." See id. at ¶¶ 23-24.

Defendant Hartwell contends that he first learned of Plaintiff's March 3rd conversation with Ms. Roth regarding his alleged harassment on March 5, 2015 – the day after he placed Plaintiff on administrative leave. See Dkt. No. 34-7 at ¶ 106. Plaintiff denies this, alleging that Ms. Roth told Defendant Hartwell about her complaints either the same day, after she spoke to Plaintiff, or in the morning before Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave. See Dkt. No. 35-3, Pl's Response to Defs' Stmt. of Material Facts, at ¶ 106. Plaintiff thus claims that she was placed on administrative leave because she complained to Ms. Roth; and Defendants claim that she was placed on administrative leave to investigate the incident with the student and parent.

On April 6, 2015, approximately one month after being placed on administrative leave, Plaintiff received a letter from Defendant Hartwell indicating that he was going to make a proposal to Defendant Board the next day, April 7, 2015, that her position as Director of Special Services be abolished. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 27 (citing Dkt. No. 1, Ex. C). Defendant Board subsequently voted to abolish Plaintiff's position, and her employment was terminated as of June 30, 2015. See id. at ¶¶ 28, 30.

(citing Dkt. No. 1, Ex. D). After abolishing the Director of Special Services position, Defendant Board created a new position, the Executive Director of Academic and Instructional Excellence. See Dkt. No. 34-7 at ¶ 33. Due to "budget constraints," Defendant District chose to eliminate one administrative position in order to implement the new one it intended to create. See id. at ¶ 34.

Plaintiff alleges that she suffered harm including monetary damages, lost wages, physical and psychological harm, emotional distress, and damage to her professional reputation as a result of Defendants' actions. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 41, 47, 53, 58, 64, 69, 75, 82, 91. She filed her complaint in this action on January 25, 2017, alleging ten causes of action. See generally Dkt. No. 1. After the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motion to dismiss, see generally Dkt. No. 18, Memorandum-Decision and Order, the following claims remain:

(1) Plaintiff's first cause of action for gender discrimination pursuant to Title VII against Defendants District and Board;

(2) Plaintiff's third cause of action for retaliation based on gender pursuant to Title VII against Defendants District and Board;

(3) Plaintiff's fifth cause of action for retaliation based on age pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") against Defendants District and Board;

(4) Plaintiff's eighth cause of action for gender discrimination and retaliation based on age and gender in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants; and

(5) Plaintiff's ninth cause of action for deprivation of a protected property interest in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants.

See Dkt. No. 18 at 22-23.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal standard

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary judgment. Under this Rule, the entry of summary judgment is warranted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When deciding a summary judgment motion, a court must resolve any ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citation omitted).

B. Plaintiff's Title VII gender discrimination claim

Employment discrimination cases are analyzed using the " McDonnell Douglas test," a three-stage, burden shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under the " McDonnell Douglas test," "a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: ‘(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she is qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination.’ " Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist. , 801 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Weinstock v. Columbia Univ. , 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817 )).

After a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, "a presumption arises that more likely than not the adverse conduct was based on the consideration of impermissible factors." Id. (citing Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 253-54, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981) ). At that point, the burden "shifts to the employer to ‘articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’ for the disparate treatment." Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817 ). "If the employer articulates such a reason for its actions, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's reason ...