Winston v. Daniels, Case No. 1:10-cv-74-SJM
Decision Date | 08 July 2011 |
Docket Number | Case No. 1:10-cv-74-SJM |
Parties | MICHAEL WINSTON, Plaintiff, v. KAREN DANIELS, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Plaintiff Michael Winston, a frequent litigator in this Court, has filed this civil action based on various proceedings against him in the McKean County Magisterial and Common Pleas Courts that arose out of an altercation with his sister, Karen Daniels. Named as Defendants are Daniels, John H. Pavlock (President Judge of the McKean County Court of Common Pleas), William Todd, (a McKean County Magisterial District Judge), Ray Learn (the McKean County District Attorney), "Trooper Palmer" (a Pennsylvania State Trooper), Bonnie Moore Howard1 (the McKean County Prothonotary), and Christopher Antalics (an attorney employed by Northwest Legal Services in McKean County). As grounds for this Court's jurisdiction, Winston purports to invoke various federal constitutional and statutory provisions. All Defendants other than Daniels have entered appearances and have moved to dismiss the complaint. Because Winston's federal claims are patently frivolous and incapable of a curative amendment, they will be dismissed with prejudice.
Pro se pleadings, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or the litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir.1969) ( ); Smith v. U.S. District Court, 956 F.2d 295 (D.C.Cir.1992); Freeman v. Department of Corrections, 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir.1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in the pleadings in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir.1997). See, e.g., Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir.1996) (discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Northeast Land Company, 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir.1990) (same). Because Winston is proceeding pro se in this case, the foregoing standards will be applied to his papers.
In reviewing a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the claims at issue must be viewed in the light most favorable to the complainant and all the well-pleaded allegations must be accepted as true. Erickson v.Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 95 (2007). A complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) ( ). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S., —, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (May 18, 2009) ( ).
A court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir.2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997)). Nor must a court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir.2009) () (quoting Iqbal, --- U.S. at —, 129 S. Ct. at 1949) (alteration in the original). A plaintiff's factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Although the United States Supreme Court does "not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, [the Court does require] enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570.
In other words, at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff is "required to make a 'showing' rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief." Smith v. Sullivan, 2008 WL 482469, at *1 (D. Del. February 22, 2008) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir.2008)). "This does not impose a probabilityrequirement at the pleading stage, but instead simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n. 3).
Recently, the Third Circuit expounded on the Twombly/Iqbal/Phillips line of cases:
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir.2009).
According to the complaint and materials appended thereto, this case stems from a dispute involving a family property which was gifted to Winston and Daniels. On November 21, 2009, an argument arose between Winston and Daniels which resulted in Daniels calling the 911 center and allegedly giving false statements to the police concerning Winston. This in turn resulted in a criminal citation and summons being issued against Winston by Defendant Palmer on December 1, 2009. Thecitation/summons alleges that Winston "with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm [Daniels] did strike, shove, kick or otherwise subject another to physical contact by pushing [Daniels] in the chest causing her to fall." (Complaint Appendix [1 -1 ] at p. 28.)
The complaint alleges that the police interviewed Winston and two eyewitnesses concerning this incident and that, despite their lack of evidence justifying an arrest, the aforementioned criminal citation was filed against him. On December 23, 2009, Defendant Todd issued a notice of trial on the summary harassment charge, to be held on January 13, 2010. (Complaint appendix [1-1] at p. 29.) According to the complaint, Daniels had told the police on the day of the incident that she had no injuries, but she went to the hospital several weeks later because someone told her to. Winston claims that this was "corruption" done to "harm " and "attack" him and that it was carried out in a manner "that would not be heard ... in front of a jury [or] eyewitnesses." (Complaint [1 -1] at p. 4.)
The complaint avers that, following the incident on November 21, 2009, Winston's parents contacted a Judge Steven Minor of Potter County and indicated that they wanted the property transferred back in their names because they would not tolerate Daniels' conduct. Daniels was subsequently contacted by Judge Potter and advised to come in and sign the property back to her parents. Allegedly, Daniels telephoned her parents on December 3, 2009 to inform them that she had "found someone to help [her] get [Winston] out from here." (Complaint [1-1] at p. 3.)
Although not directly stated in the complaint, this alleged statement by Daniels is presumably understood by Winston to be a reference to Daniels' efforts, undertaken that same day, to obtain a temporary PFA order against him. (Complaint Appendix [1-1]at pp. 20-26.) In fact, the complaint appendix shows that, on December 3, 2009, Daniels filed an application for a temporary PFA order, based on the following accusations:
On about Saturday, November 21, 2009 at approximately 12:00 PM [Daniels] and [Winston] had been arguing about the care of the farm animals. [Winston] grabbed [Daniels'] right arm and swung [Daniels] around. [Daniels] went to the ground on one knee. [Daniels] got up and started to leave. [Winston] started poking [Daniels] in the chest and told [Daniels] "you're going to listen to me.["] [Winston] wouldn't let [Daniels] go. [Winston] continued to poke [Daniels] very hard in the chest and pushed [Daniels] against the barn wall and [Daniels] fell to the ground again. [Winston] continued to yell at [Daniels]. [Daniels] told [Winston] to quit hitting her and knocking her to the ground. [Daniels] got up and [Winston] continued to yell at [Daniels][;] [Winston] was so close to [Daniels] that he was spitting on [Daniels]. [Winton] again pushed [Daniels] against the barn wall and [Daniels] fell to the ground. [Daniels] was able to get away. [Daniels] has gone to the...
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