Winston v. Woods

• Decision Date: 30 April 2013
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 2:11-CV-10659
• Parties: STEVEN DEMAR WINSTON, #513304, Petitioner, v. JEFFREY WOODS, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

STEVEN DEMAR WINSTON, #513304, Petitioner,

v.JEFFREY WOODS, Respondent.

CASE NO. 2:11-CV-10659

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

DATED: April 30, 2013

HONORABLE PAUL D. BORMAN

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS. DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY,

AND DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL

I. Introduction

Michigan prisoner Steven Demar Winston ("Petitioner") has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging that he is being held in violation of his constitutional rights. Petitioner was convicted of torture, Mich. Comp. Laws §750.85, assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder, Mch. Comp. Laws §750.84, and domestic violence, Mich. Comp. Laws §750.81(2), following a bench trial in the Wayne County Circuit Court. He was sentenced as a third habitual offender, Mich. Comp. Laws §769.11, to concurrent terms of 15 to 40 years imprisonment on the torture conviction, 13 years 4 months to 20 years imprisonment on the assault conviction, and three months in jail on the domestic violence conviction in 2007.

In his pleadings, Petitioner raises claims concerning the validity of his jury trial waiver and the effectiveness of trial counsel. Respondent has filed an answer to the petition contending that it should be denied. For the reasons set forth, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claims and denies the petition. The Court also denies a certificate of appealability and denies leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

II. Facts and Procedural History

Petitioner's convictions arise from the beating of his girlfriend at their residence in Detroit, Michigan on April 22, 2007. Petitioner was charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct, torture, assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder, two counts of felonious assault, domestic violence, and malicious destruction of property.

During pre-trial proceedings, Petitioner waived his right to a jury trial and agreed to proceed with a bench trial. The following colloquy occurred:

The Court: Well, is your client interested in a waiver trial?

Mr. Cripps: I'd have to talk to him about that, Your Honor.

The Court: Because I could give you a quicker date on that on a Friday if we knew. Can you talk to him now?

Mr. Cripps: Yes.

***

(At 11:32 a.m. off the record)

(At 11:36 a.m. on the record)

The Court: The People v. Steven Winston. Any objection by the People for a waiver trial?

Mr. Ehlfeldt: I have no problem with it, Your Honor.

The Court: Raise your right hand please, sir. Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

The Defendant: I do.

(At 11:36 a.m. Defendant sworn)

The Court: Okay. What is your name sir?

The Defendant: Steven Winston.

The Court: And do you read, write and understand English?

The Defendant: Yes.

The Court: You understand, sir, that you do have a right to have a trial by jury, correct?

The Defendant: Yes.

The Court: And that you have a right to have twelve people from the community hear the evidence and decide whether you're guilty or not guilty, right?

The Defendant: Yes.

The Court: It's my understanding that you wish to waive your right to have a jury trial and proceed with a bench trial, where I will be deciding whether you are guilty or not guilty instead of a jury, right?

The Defendant: Yes.

The Court: And is that what you want to happen?

The Defendant: Yes.

The Court: Are you making this objection -1 mean, are you making this voluntarily of your own free will without any threats or promises?

The Defendant: Yes.

The Court: And you have signed the waiver of trial by jury form. I find that the waiver of jury is made knowingly and voluntarily, and we will proceed with a waiver trial.

Final Conf. Tr., 7/13/2007, pp. 12-14.

Petitioner subsequently wrote a letter to the trial court and spoke with trial counsel indicating that he changed his mind and wished to withdraw his jury trial waiver. The trial court held a hearing, found that Petitioner's waiver was knowing and voluntary, and denied the request. Hrg. Tr., 7/30/07, pp. 3-4. The case proceeded to trial.

The Michigan Court of Appeals described the facts, which are presumed correct on habeas review, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009), as follows:

Defendant's convictions arose from an incident at a home shared by defendant and the victim, who had lived together in a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship for three years. While in bed on April 22, 2007, the victim woke up and found defendant standing over her. Defendant hit the victim with an open hand and with a table leg that had been broken off an end table. He forced the victim to perform oral sex on him and used a butcher knife to cut her hair. He also had the victim cut her fingernails and toenails with a pair of nail clippers. Defendant told the victim that she needed to repent for her sins and called her derogatory names. The victim estimated that defendant's abuse lasted for over four hours. After the victim went to work in the morning, she was taken by ambulance to a hospital for treatment. She made a police report later in the day while at a relative's house.

Defendant presented an insanity defense, but also challenged the victim's credibility and claimed that she gave an exaggerated account of the incident. The trial court found that defendant tortured and assaulted the victim but, upon considering the victim's failure to report that she was forced to perform oral sex to the police or anyone else, determined that the prosecutor failed to prove an additional charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct beyond a reasonable doubt.

People v. Winston, No. 283055, 2009 WL 1441738, *1 (Mich. Ct. App. May 21, 2009) (unpublished).¹

Following his convictions and sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals raising claims concerning the validity of his jury trial waiver, the trial court's findings regarding his insanity defense, and the scoring of his sentencing guidelines. While his appeal was pending, Petitioner filed a motion to remand to develop a claim that defense counsel was ineffective for promising him that he would get only one year in prison if he agreed to a bench trial. The court denied the motion to remand in a standard order. The court subsequently affirmed Petitioner's convictions, but amended the judgment of sentence to correct a sentencing error. Id. Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied. People v. Winston, 485 Mich. 971, 774 N.W.2d 695 (2009).

Petitioner thereafter filed his federal habeas petition raising the following claims:

I. He was denied his constitutional right to a jury trial by the trial court's clearly erroneous denial of the motion to withdraw the waiver of jury trial.

II. He was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of trial counsel by counsel's false guarantee of a one-year sentence in the event of a waiver trial.

Respondent has filed an answer to the petition contending that it should be denied because both claims lack merit and the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not properly exhausted in the state courts.

III. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") governs this case because Petitioner filed his petition after the AEDPA's effective date. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (1996).

"A state court's decision is 'contrary to' ... clearly established law if it 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]' or if it 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.'"Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). "[T]he 'unreasonable application' prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to 'grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of petitioner's case." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. However, "[i]n order for a federal court find a state court's application of [Supreme Court] precedent 'unreasonable,' the state court's decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court's application must have been 'objectively unreasonable.'" Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (citations omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, _ U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333, n. 7); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).

The Supreme Court has held that "a state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter,...