Winter v. Gnaizda

• Citation: 152 Cal.Rptr. 700,90 Cal.App.3d 750
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 23 February 1979
• Parties: Frank E. WINTER, M.D., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert GNAIZDA, etc., Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 43558.

Page 700

152 Cal.Rptr. 700

90 Cal.App.3d 750

Frank E. WINTER, M.D., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert GNAIZDA, etc., Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 43558.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

Feb. 23, 1979.

As Modified March 19, 1979.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen. of Cal., Winifred Younge Smith, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.

Hassard, Bonnington, Rogers & Huber, David. E. Willett, San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.

KANE, Associate Justice.

Defendant Robert Gnaizda in his capacity as Director of the California State Department of Health (hereafter appellant or DOH) appeals from a judgment rendered in an action for declaratory relief. The stipulated facts, along with the pertinent portions of the record, reveal the following background On or about April 8, 1972, John Roushkolb, a minor, was injured in an automobile accident. Roushkolb was eligible for medical care under the California Medical Assistance Program (Medi-Cal). He sought and received medical treatment from Dr. Frank E. Winter, a licensed California physician (hereafter respondent). Respondent presented a bill for $760 for the Medi-Cal services rendered. In accordance with the uniform fee schedule (Tit. 22, Cal.Admin.Code, § 51501, et seq.) respondent was compensated by Medi-Cal in the amount of $503.

Codefendant Henry O. Lienhard, a licensed attorney, who represented Roushkolb in the personal injury matter, recovered insurance proceeds for his client under an uninsured motorist claim. After the recovery was effected, respondent submitted a bill to Lienhard and Roushkolb for $257, the difference between the amount charged in the original bill and the sum paid by Medi-Cal.

Before honoring the new bill, Lienhard telephoned Blue Shield, the fiscal intermediary for the Medi-Cal program, seeking advice from an employee whether he should pay the differential sum of $257. When he was advised that respondent was not entitled to any additional amount under Medi-Cal regulations, Lienhard refused to pay the bill.

Thereupon, respondent initiated an action for declaratory relief against both Lienhard (who held the insurance proceeds in trust for the minor) and DOH, claiming that he was entitled to the difference between what he received from Medi-Cal and what his fee would have been had Roushkolb been a private patient. In his complaint, respondent did not demand any additional amount from Medi-Cal, nor did he challenge the application of the Medi-Cal fee schedule and/or the reasonableness of the sum that he had already received under said schedule. DOH was made a party defendant to the action solely on the basis that codefendant Lienhard refused to pay the disputed differential amount upon the advice of Medi-Cal's fiscal intermediary. ¹

Appellant filed a timely demurrer to the complaint, claiming Inter alia that declaratory relief was unavailable against DOH because respondent failed to allege the existence of an actual controversy between himself and DOH within the meaning of the declaratory relief statute (Code Civ.Proc., ² § 1060). The trial court overruled appellant's demurrer, and proceeded to trial against both defendants. After receiving evidence and hearing the arguments of the parties, the trial court held that respondent was entitled to recover the difference between his full fee and the lesser amount paid under the Medi-Cal program. In accordance therewith, judgment was entered ordering defendant Lienhard to deliver the sum of $257 to respondent. As to appellant, the court declared that "The State of California has no further claim to assert in this matter." ³

Although the parties address with considerable detail the substantive issues raised in, and decided by, the trial court, we are prevented from reaching those issues. Rather, we are compelled to dismiss the appeal for the following reasons:

At the very outset we emphasize that, pursuant to section 902, only an "aggrieved party" has a right to appeal. As the case law explains, a "party aggrieved" is one who has an interest recognized by law in the subject matter of the judgment and Whose interest is injuriously affected by the judgment (Buffington v. Ohmert (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 254, 255, 61 Cal.Rptr. 360; Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co. (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 80, 81, 41 Cal.Rptr. 597). In order to give rise to an appeal, the Interest of appellant must be immediate, pecuniary, and substantial and not nominal or a remote consequence of the judgment (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737, 97 Cal.Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953; Leoke v. County of San Bernardino (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 767, 771, 57 Cal.Rptr. 770).

When tested by the foregoing principles, the facts and the procedural history of the case eloquently demonstrate that the judgment appealed from here did not injuriously affect appellant's interest. Aside from the inconsequential sum of the cost of suit awarded to respondent, appellant suffered no pecuniary or any other loss as a result of the judgment. The only person whose pecuniary interest was adversely affected by the decision was Roushkolb, who was not even a party.

But even apart from the aforestated considerations, the appeal at hand must be dismissed upon the further ground that DOH was not (and is not) a proper party to the declaratory relief action brought by respondent.

Section 1060 sets forth in pertinent part that "Any person interested under a deed, will or other written instrument, or under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property, or with respect to the location of the natural channel of a watercourse, may, In cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action in the superior court or file a cross-complaint in a pending action in the superior, municipal or justice court for a declaration of his rights and duties in the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising under such instrument or contract." (Emphasis added.) "(A) ctual controversy" referred to in the declaratory relief statute is one which "admits of definitive and conclusive relief by judgment within the field of judicial administration, as distinguished from an advisory opinion upon a particular or hypothetical state of facts. The judgment must decree, not suggest, what the parties may or may not do." (Selby Realty Co. v. City of Buenaventura (1973) 10 Cal.3d 110, 117, 109 Cal.Rptr. 799, 803, 514 P.2d 111, 115; Silva v. City & County of San Francisco (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 784, 789, 198 P.2d 78; Conroy v. Civil Service Commission (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 450, 456, 171 P.2d 500.)

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