Winter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp.
Decision Date | 20 August 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 14–CV–2885 PKC.,14–CV–2885 PKC. |
Citation | 39 F.Supp.3d 348 |
Parties | Christine WINTER, Plaintiff, v. NOVARTIS PHARMACEUTICALS CORPORATION, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
John Julian Vecchione, Valad and Vecchione, Fairfax, VA, Terence John Sweeney, Law Offices of Terence J. Sweeney, Esq., New York, NY, for Plaintiff.
David Richman, Jacqueline Mecchella Bushwack, Rivkin Radler LLP, Uniondale, NY, Gregory S. Chernack, Katharine R. Latimer, Hollingsworth LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Pending before the Court are the cross letter-motions of Plaintiff and Defendant, respectively. Plaintiff moves to remand this action to state court on the basis that removal was improper because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this judgment enforcement action. (Dkt. 9.) Defendant moves to dismiss or, alternatively, to deem the underlying judgment satisfied. (Dkt. 8.) Because Plaintiff has not registered the judgment with this Court, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this removal action, and must remand it to state court.
Plaintiff Christine Winter obtained a judgment, following a jury verdict, on April 9, 2012, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.
(Dkt. 8–1.)1 On February 21, 2014, Plaintiff acknowledged that that judgment was satisfied in the Western District of Missouri. (Dkt. 8–1.) Plaintiff's acknowledgement of judgment, however, provided that “Plaintiff retains all rights to pursue the balance of the domesticated judgment in New York state court at the New York post judgment rate of 12% per annum.” (Dkt. 8–1 at 1.) Plaintiff registered the judgment in the Supreme Court of New York on January 23, 2014. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 1.) On April 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed an action in the Supreme Court of New York, Kings County, seeking post judgment interest at the New York statutory rate. (Dkt. 8.) Defendant timely removed that action to this Court on May 7, 2014. (Dkt. 1.) Critically, Plaintiff never registered the judgment with this Court.
On May 14, 2014, Defendant submitted a letter request for a pre–motion conference seeking permission to move to dismiss this action or to deem the judgment satisfied. (Dkt. 8.) On May 16, Plaintiff moved by letter to remand this action to state court on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Dkt. 9.) The Court held oral argument on the parties' respective motions and ordered the parties to submit additional argument in support of the motions. (See June 19, 2014 Minute Entry.) The parties did so, and the motions were fully briefed on July 7, 2014. (Dkts. 16, 17.)
I. Removal and Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1441, a defendant may remove a state court action to federal district court in the district embracing the state court in which the action originated where the district court has original jurisdiction over the matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). In other words, a defendant may remove an action that, in its present posture, could have been brought in federal court originally. See Freeman v. Burlington Broadcasters, Inc., 204 F.3d 311, 319 (2d Cir.2000) ( )(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) ).
Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction and “possess[ ] only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citation omitted). In a case removed to federal court from state court, the removal statute is to be interpreted narrowly, and the burden is on the removing party to show that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that removal was timely and proper. Lupo v. Human Affairs Int'l, Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 274 (2d Cir.1994) ; Wilson v. Rep. Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97, 42 S.Ct. 35, 66 L.Ed. 144 (1921). All doubts should be resolved against removability. Lupo, 28 F.3d at 274.
A federal court's jurisdiction generally may be predicated upon federal question jurisdiction, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or diversity jurisdiction, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In this case, diversity jurisdiction does not lie, as the amount in controversy does not, as a matter of law, exceed the $75,000 threshold. (See Dkt. 9 at 1.) Nor does Defendant contend that the amount in controversy meets that statutory requirement. This enforcement action also does not implicate a federal question. The parties point to no federal statute, constitutional question, or treaty that is implicated by this action.
Instead, Defendant asserts that this Court has ancillary jurisdiction over this matter because it involves the enforcement of another federal district court's judgment. (Dkt. 16 at 1.) Ancillary jurisdiction is, of course, a well-recognized exception to a district court's limited subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Epperson v. Entm't Express, Inc., 242 F.3d 100, 104–05 (2d Cir.2001) (describing ancillary jurisdiction). The Supreme Court in Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 116 S.Ct. 862, 133 L.Ed.2d 817 (1996) described a district court's ancillary jurisdiction as such: “[A] federal court may exercise ancillary jurisdiction ‘(1) to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.’ ” Peacock, 516 U.S. at 354, 116 S.Ct. 862 (quoting Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80, 114 S.Ct. 1673 ). The first category generally applies to cases in which a plaintiff brings related state law claims in addition to claims over which the court has original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 ( )(“the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution”).
The second category may be described as “enforcement ancillary jurisdiction.” Epperson, 242 F.3d at 105. Enforcement ancillary jurisdiction was born of the need for federal courts to enforce their own judgments. Id. The Supreme Court, however, has limited enforcement ancillary jurisdiction to rare circumstances. In Peacock, the Court stated: Id. at 356, 116 S.Ct. 862 (internal citations omitted). Enforcement ancillary jurisdiction remains a narrow exception to a federal district court's limited subject matter jurisdiction. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 551, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 104 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989) ( ).
Here, Defendant urges the Court to exercise enforcement ancillary jurisdiction over this action on the basis of the Court's alleged inherent jurisdiction to enforce a federal judgment. (See Dkt. 16) () (citing Peacock, 516 U.S. at 356, 116 S.Ct. 862 ). Defendant's argument, however, ignores a critical point.
In all of the cases cited by Defendant, including Peacock, the district court was enforcing a judgment it itself had entered. It is clear that the reasoning behind ancillary enforcement jurisdiction is to “enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees,” not the decrees of other federal courts. Epperson, 242 F.3d at 104–05 (citing Peacock, 516 U.S. at 354, 116 S.Ct. 862 ) (emphases added). Nothing in any of the authority cited by Defendant or located by the Court suggests that the purposes behind ancillary jurisdiction extend to judgments rendered by any federal court anywhere in the country.
In fact, 28 U.S.C. § 1963 suggests the opposite. Section 1963 provides, in relevant part:
A judgment in an action for the recovery of money or property entered in any court of appeals, district court, bankruptcy court, or in the Court of International Trade may be registered by filing a certified copy of the judgment in any other district or, with respect to the Court of International Trade, in any judicial district, when the judgment has become final by appeal or expiration of the time for appeal or when ordered by the court that entered the judgment for good cause shown.... A judgment so registered shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district court of the district where registered and may be enforced in like manner.
Section 1963 provides the mechanism by which a district court in one jurisdiction can enforce the judgment issued by a district court in another jurisdiction. The registration requirement in Section 1963 would be superfluous if, as Defendant posits, a district court has inherent authority to enforce the judgment of any other district court. Accordingly, because Plaintiff chose not to register her Western District of Missouri judgment in this district, the Court has no authority to enforce it. See, e.g., Weininger v. Castro, 462...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
New York v. International Joint Commission
...the removing party to show that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that removal was timely and proper." Winter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp. , 39 F. Supp. 3d 348, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Lupo v. Human Affairs Int'l, Inc. , 28 F.3d 269, 274 (2d Cir. 1994) ); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian ......
-
Cityview Towne Crossing Shopping Ctr. Fort Worth Tx. Ltd. P'ship v. Aissa Med. Res. L.P., 6:20-CV-06002 EAW
...the removing party to show that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that removal was timely and proper." Winter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp. , 39 F. Supp. 3d 348, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Lupo v. Human Affairs Int'l, Inc. , 28 F.3d 269 (2d Cir. 1994) ). A court will "generally evaluate a ......
-
Pate v. City of Rochester
...the removing party to show that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that removal was timely and proper." Winter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp. , 39 F. Supp. 3d 348, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Lupo v. Human Affairs Int'l, Inc. , 28 F.3d 269 (2d Cir. 1994) ). A court will "generally evaluate a ......
-
Doe v. Starpoint Cent. Sch. Dist.
... ... resolved ... against removability.” Winter v. Novartis Pharms ... Corp. , 39 F.Supp.3d 348, 350 (E.D.N.Y ... ...