Winters v. Cardarella
| Decision Date | 21 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:19-cv-1034-JAR |
| Parties | AARON T. WINTERS JR., Plaintiff, v. LAINE T. CARDARELLA and OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
In this removal action, Plaintiff Aaron T. Winters, Jr. alleges legal malpractice stemming from his vacated conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 40) based on the doctrines of sovereign immunity and official immunity. The motion is fully briefed and the Court is prepared to rule. As described more fully below, Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted.
This case was originally filed in Missouri state court and Defendants removed based on diversity of citizenship.1 Therefore, the Court applies federal procedural rules, but Missouri substantive law.2 The Court reviews a motion brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) under the same standard that governs Rule 12(b)(6) motions.3 To survive a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain factual allegations that, assumed to be true, "raisea right to relief above the speculative level" and must include "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face."4 "A pleading that merely pleads 'labels and conclusions,' or a 'formulaic recitation' of the elements of a cause of action, or 'naked assertions' devoid of factual enhancement will not suffice."5 The court must accept the nonmoving party's factual allegations as true and may not dismiss on the ground that it appears unlikely the allegations can be proven.6
The Supreme Court has explained the analysis as a two-step process. First, the court "must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, [but is] 'not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'"7 Thus, the court must determine if the allegations are factual and entitled to an assumption of truth, or merely legal conclusions that are not entitled to an assumption of truth.8 Second, the court must determine whether the factual allegations, when assumed true, "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief."9 "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."10
The following facts are alleged in Plaintiff's Petition and assumed to be true for purposes of deciding this motion.
On January 31, 2013, Plaintiff was indicted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri on a single count of felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).11 The charge was based solely on Plaintiff's prior Kansas conviction for possession of marijuana with no tax stamp under K.S.A. §§ 79-5204 and -5208. On February 5, 2013, the court appointed Defendants Laine Cardarella and the Office of the Public Defender, Western District of Missouri to represent Plaintiff.
Under Kansas law, Plaintiff's maximum sentence for possession of marijuana with no tax stamp was seven months in custody. A sentence of more than twelve months for a tax stamp violation under K.S.A. § 79-5204 is only available for recidivists with three or more felonies involving offenses against persons. Plaintiff did not have any prior felony convictions involving offenses against persons. At the time of indictment, Plaintiff could not have received a sentence of more than one year for the underlying Kansas conviction, and therefore could not be a convicted felon for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) under binding Eighth Circuit precedent.12 Plaintiff was therefore innocent of the charge in the January 31, 2013 indictment.
Defendants did not advise Plaintiff about the Eighth Circuit precedent in Haltiwanger, and instead advised Plaintiff that he had no defense to the charge. In reliance on this advice, Plaintiff pled guilty on July 2, 2013, without a plea agreement. He was sentenced to a 30-month custodial sentence on December 10, 2013.
On December 8, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, which the Government joined, arguing that he was not a convicted felon for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and that his conviction should therefore be vacated based on Haltiwanger. On February12, 2018, the district court granted the motion and ordered Plaintiff immediately released from confinement. Plaintiff served 28 months before he was released.
Plaintiff alleges a single count against both Defendants for legal malpractice under Missouri law.13 The Petition does not specify whether Plaintiff's claim against Cardarella is an official-capacity or individual-capacity claim. The Petition alleges that "Defendant Cardarella acted as the agent and employee of Defendant Office of the Public Defender, Western District of Missouri and acted within the course and scope of that agency and employment relationship."14 He seeks judgment "jointly and severally, against Defendants for the damages set forth above, for his costs, pre- and post-judgment interests, [and] for punitive damages."15
Defendants first move to dismiss the Office of the Public Defender ("FPD") and Cardarella under the doctrine of sovereign immunity—an immunity that "protects governmental entities from tort liability [that] can be invoked when a governmental official is sued only in his or her official capacity."16 Plaintiff responds that he does not allege an official-capacity claim against Cardarella and that if the Court construes his Petition otherwise, he should be entitled to amend and make clear that his claim against Cardarella is an individual-capacity claim. Yet Plaintiff does not dispute that his claim against the FPD is an official-capacity clam. Therefore, the Court must consider whether Plaintiff's claim against that Defendant is barred by sovereignimmunity.17 Any claim against Cardarella in his official-capacity would be subsumed by the claim against his employer, so there is no need to amend the Petition, or separately address an official-capacity claim against Cardarella.18 The Court therefore considers the sovereign immunity defense as to the FPD.
Confusingly, Defendants insist that the claim against Cardarella is an official-capacity claim only, yet they also move to dismiss Cardarella under the doctrine of official immunity—an affirmative defense that applies only to individual-capacity claims.19 An individual capacity claim alleges that liability arises from the discretionary acts or omissions of a government employee.20 The Petition plainly alleges that Cardarella, acting in the scope and course of his employment as a public defender, committed malpractice based on his discretionary acts and omissions. The Court therefore considers whether official immunity shields Cardarella from liability on the individual-capacity claim asserted by Plaintiff.
"Under settled principles of sovereign immunity, 'the United States, as sovereign, "is immune from suit, save as it consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit."'"21 Also, under Mo. Rev. Stat. §537.600, sovereign immunity applies to public entities as such immunity was available under common law before September 12, 1977, unless immunity has been waived, abrogated, or modified by statute.22 Sovereign immunity is not an affirmative defense under Missouri law; the plaintiff must plead specific facts "giving rise to an exception to sovereign immunity when suing a public entity."23
Federal Public Defender Organizations were created by the Criminal Justice Act to provide legal representation to persons financially unable to obtain adequate representation.24 There is no "sue and be sued" provision in the Criminal Justice Act that would constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity for the FPD.25 Plaintiff neither pleads specific facts giving rise to an exception to sovereign immunity for the FPD, nor offers an argument in response to the motion to dismiss the FPD. Accordingly, the Court finds that sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff's legal malpractice claim against the FPD, and, in turn, any official-capacity claim against Cardarella.
Defendants also move to dismiss under the doctrine of official immunity. Official immunity is an affirmative defense under Missouri law.26 Dismissal on the basis of an affirmative defense may be warranted "if the petition clearly establishes 'on its face and withoutexception' that the claim is barred."27 The doctrine 28 Courts must be careful not to construe the official immunity doctrine "too narrowly lest they frustrate the need for relieving public servants of the threat of burdensome litigation."29
Plaintiff argues that Cardarella is not entitled to official immunity for the following reasons: (1) the Missouri Supreme Court's recent decision in Laughlin v. Perry30 finding official immunity applies to state public defenders does not apply; (2) Cardarella's failure to research Plaintiff's underlying conviction was not a discretionary act; and (3) Cardarella acted with malice. The Court addresses these arguments in turn.
In urging official immunity for Cardarella, Defendants principally rely on the ...
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