Winters v. Greeley

• Decision Date: 29 September 1989
• Docket Number: No. 1-87-3513,1-87-3513
• Citation: 545 N.E.2d 422,189 Ill.App.3d 590
• Parties: , 136 Ill.Dec. 898, 16 Media L. Rep. 2352 James WINTERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Andrew M. GREELEY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 422

545 N.E.2d 422

189 Ill.App.3d 590, 136 Ill.Dec. 898,

16 Media L. Rep. 2352

James WINTERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Andrew M. GREELEY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 1-87-3513.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Fourth Division.

Sept. 29, 1989.

William D. Maddux and Ellen L. Spahr, William D. Maddux & Assoc., Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Richard J. Phelan, Maryann Hayes and Amy R. Kaufman, of Phelan, Pope & John, Ltd., Chicago, for defendant-appellee.

Justice McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (107 Ill.2d R. 308) from an order of the circuit court of Cook County striking plaintiff's claim for punitive damages in a libel action, and certifying the following question of law for our review:

"[Whether] [w]here the Court has found as a matter of law that the plaintiff is a limited purpose public figure, the plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages."

On July 21, 1982, plaintiff, the managing editor of a university magazine, instituted this libel action against defendant, an author and syndicated columnist. In his two-count amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant made statements in a press release and during the taping of a television interview which falsely accused him of lying, of having committed various criminal offenses and of lacking the integrity required of a writer, reporter and editor actively in pursuit of a career in journalism. Plaintiff further alleged that defendant was aware that the statements were false when made, and that he intended them to be published without regard to their truth or falsity. According to plaintiff, defendant's statements caused him damage to his reputation and standing in the community and to his reputation and integrity as a managing editor and aspiring journalist, personal humiliation, mental anguish, and hindered him in the pursuit of his chosen profession. Count I of the complaint alleged libel per se; count II alleged negligence in the making of the statements. Each count sought $1 million in compensatory damages and $2 million in punitive damages.

The trial court found plaintiff to be a public figure for a limited purpose, and denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court granted defendant's motion to strike plaintiff's claim for punitive damages on the basis of the decision in Costello v. Capital City Communications, Inc. (1987), 153 Ill.App.3d 956, 106 Ill.Dec. 154, 505 N.E.2d 701, wherein the fifth district appellate court held that where actual malice is the gist of an action for libel, an award of both compensatory and punitive damages constitutes an impermissible double recovery. (153 Ill.App.3d 956, 974, 106 Ill.Dec. 154, 505 N.E.2d 701.) On November 6, 1987, the trial court entered an order striking plaintiff's punitive damage claim, and certified the question of law quoted above.

OPINION

The certified question presents the issue of whether a public figure plaintiff is precluded, as a matter of law, from recovery of punitive damages in a libel action because the threshold of liability, i.e., "actual malice," which must be proved to support a punitive damage award, is the same as the threshold of liability which is necessary for recovery of compensatory damages.

The current state of the law of defamation evolved from the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan (1964), 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686. In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that protection of first and fourteenth amendment rights (U.S. Const., amends. I, XIV) precludes a public official from recovering damages for publication of a defamatory statement, except where it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that the defamatory statement was made with "actual malice." The showing of "actual malice" required to permit recovery was defined by the New York Times court as "knowledge of the statement's falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it is false or not." The New York Times rule was extended to libel actions brought by persons who may not have been public officials but who were, in some sense, "public figures." (Curtis v. Butts (1967), 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094.) The Curtis Court further held that where a public figure proves that the defamatory matter was published with knowledge of or reckless disregard for its falsity, punitive damages are not precluded by the first and fourteenth amendments. See also Fopay v. Noveroske (1975), 31 Ill.App.3d 182, 334 N.E.2d 79.

In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that plaintiff is a limited purpose public figure. Thus, the stringent requirements of New York Times are applicable, and, in order to recover any damages, plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted with "actual malice" by proving that the allegedly defamatory statements were made with knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard for their truth or falsity.

In the law of defamation "actual malice" has a unique legal meaning which differs significantly from the common law meaning of malice applied in other tort actions. The United States Supreme Court in Cantrell v. Forest Publishing Co. (1974), 419 U.S. 245, 95 S.Ct. 465, 42 L.Ed.2d 419, an invasion of privacy/false light action, stated:

" 'actual malice' [as defined in New York Times ] is a term of art created to provide a convenient shorthand expression for the standard of liability that must be established before a State may constitutionally permit public officials to recover for libel in actions brought against publishers.

As such, it is quite different from the common-law standard of * * * 'malice' generally required under state tort law to support an award of punitive damages. In a false-light case, common-law malice--frequently expressed in terms of either personal ill will toward the plaintiff or reckless or wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights--would focus on the defendant's attitude toward the plaintiff's privacy, not toward the truth or falsity of the material published." 419 U.S. 245, 251-53, 95 S.Ct. 465, 470, 42 L.Ed.2d 419, 426-27.

Where a public figure plaintiff establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with knowledge or reckless disregard of the falsity of the defamatory statement, it is unnecessary to additionally prove the existence of personal animosity, evil motive or intent to injure the plaintiff to recover damages for the defamation. The reverse, however, is not true. Proof that the defendant made the statement with rancor toward or intent to injure the plaintiff, without clear and convincing evidence of the defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard of the statement's falsity, is constitutionally insufficient to impose any liability upon the defendant. Rosenblatt v. Baer (1966), 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597; see Fopay v. Noveroske (1975), 31 Ill.App.3d 182, 334 N.E.2d 79.

We neither ascribe to the reasoning that New York Times "actual malice" is simply a more strict or higher version of the common law malice standard, nor do we ascribe to the theory that common law malice is encompassed within the New York Times standard. In our view, any such equation of the two concepts is, using a common metaphor, like comparing apples and oranges. Rather, in defamation cases, common law malice, denoting ill will or evil motive, and New York Times "actual malice," denoting "knowledge of or reckless disregard for the falsity of a defamatory statement" are distinct and incomparable standards requiring different proofs (e.g., Erickson v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co. (1984), 127 Ill.App.3d 753, 83 Ill.Dec. 72, 469 N.E.2d 679; Newell v. Field Enterprises, Inc. (1980), 91 Ill.App.3d 735, 47 Ill.Dec. 429, 415 N.E.2d 434; Durso v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. (1975), 33 Ill.App.3d 300, 337 N.E.2d 443; Carson v. Allied News Co. (7th Cir.1976), 529 F.2d 206; see generally, Note, Reports Upon Public Proceedings and Documents: Absolutely Protected by Constitutional Privilege, 1985 U.Ill.L.Rev., 1063, 1075-80).

As noted earlier, the trial court in the instant case struck defendant's claim for punitive damages on the basis of the fifth district appellate court holding in Costello v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc. (1987), 153 Ill.App.3d 956, 106 Ill.Dec. 154, 505 N.E.2d 701. Costello was an action tried under the New York Times "actual malice" standard of liability. The plaintiff filed suit against the owner of a local general circulation newspaper and an editor of the newspaper following the publication of an editorial which, he alleged, constituted libel per se. The jury awarded plaintiff both compensatory and punitive damages. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the judgment for plaintiff, but reduced the award of compensatory damages as being excessive and reversed the judgment awarding punitive damages in its entirety.

Relying on the supreme court cases of Dethloff v. Zeigler Coal Co. (1980), 82 Ill.2d 393, 45 Ill.Dec. 175, 412 N.E.2d 526, Hammond v. North American Asbestos Co. (1983), 97 Ill.2d 195, 73 Ill.Dec. 350, 454 N.E.2d 210, and Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill.2d 350, 95 Ill.Dec. 510, 489 N.E.2d 1374, the Costello court reasoned:

"It is with the teaching of the foregoing cases, and with consideration given to the policy regarding punitive damages, that we hold that where actual malice is the gist of an action for libel, as here, both compensatory damages and punitive damages cannot be recovered. In essence and in fact, the nature of the conduct that will justify a recovery of compensatory damages is the same as the conduct that must be shown in order to recover punitive damages. Accordingly, to allow both would constitute a double recovery." 153 Ill.App.3d 956, 976, 106 Ill.Dec. 154, 505 N.E.2d 701.

Plaintiff in the instant case urges that Costello v. Capitol Cities Communications, Inc. (1987), 153 Ill.App.3d 956, 106 Ill.Dec. 154, 505 N.E.2d 701,...