Winters v. Maxey

Decision Date05 June 1972
Citation481 S.W.2d 755
PartiesEarl WINTERS, Appellant, v. Sarah C. MAXEY, Appellee. Gloria Yvonne WINTERS, a minor, by father and next friend, Earl Winters, Appellant, v. Sarah C. MAXEY, Appellee.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Branstetter, Moody & Kilgore, Nashville, for appellants.

B. J. Boyd, Ashland City, for appellee.

OPINION

DYER, Chief Justice.

The sole question for determination in this case is whether the lex loci delicti doctrine as applied in Tennessee should be continued or whether it should be repudiated in favor of a modern theory.

The plaintiff and defendant are now and were, prior to the accident giving rise to this suit, citizens and residents of Cheatham County, Tennessee. Defendant invited plaintiff to accompany her in defendant's automobile for a trip to Florida where they would have a short vacation and then return to Cheatham County, Tennessee. In the course of this trip, while driving in Chilton County, Alabama, defendant lost control of her automobile striking some parked construction equipment, resulting in injuries to plaintiff.

Plaintiff filed this suit against defendant in Cheatham County, Tennessee, alleging only ordinary negligence as causing her injuries and also alleging the law of Tennessee allowing recovery on showing of ordinary negligence would apply to the facts of this case. The parties here stipulated Alabama has a guest statute which, if Alabama law applies, would require a showing of willful or wanton conduct on the part of defendant before plaintiff could recover. The trial judge applying out lex loci doctrine has dismissed the case, resulting in this appeal by plaintiff.

In regard to torts the rule has long prevailed in Tennessee that absent public policy the law of the place where the tort occurred would control. East Tenn., V. & G.R. Co. v. Lewis, 89 Tenn. 235, 14 S.W. 603 (1890); Brown v. Hogan, 14 Tenn.App. 251 (1931); Parsons v. American Trust & Banking Co., 168 Tenn. 49, 73 S.W.2d 698 (1934); Kennard v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 177 Tenn. 311, 148 S.W.2d 1017, 134 A.L.R. 770 (1941); Sloan v. Nevil, 33 Tenn.App. 100, 229 S.W.2d 350 (1949); Schenk v. Gwaltney, 43 Tenn.App. 459, 309 S.W.2d 424 (1957); Glover v. Glover, 44 Tenn.App. 712, 319 S.W.2d 238 (1958); Patterson v. Smith, 57 Tenn.App. 673, 424 S.W.2d 204 (1966).

The public policy exception to this rule is where the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred is against good morals or natural justice, or for some other reason, its enforcement would be prejudicial to the general interests of our citizens. Whitlow v. N., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 114 Tenn. 344, 84 S.W. 618 (1904). This Alabama guest statute does not offend good morals or justice nor would its enforcement be prejudicial to the general interests of our citizens.

The lex loci doctrine had its conceptual foundation in the vested rights doctrine, namely that the right to recover for a foreign tort owes its creation to the law of the jurisdiction where the injury occurred and depends for its existence and extent solely on such law. Such has been the rule in most all jurisdictions in this country until in recent years some jurisdictions have rejected the rule in favor of what is designated as the modern rule.

New York in Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279, 95 A.L.R.2d 1 (1963), repudiated the lex loci rule long prevailing in that state in favor of the rule designated as the 'dominant contacts' rule.

Babcock involved New York residents, the plaintiff as a guest passenger in the defendant-host's automobile on a short trip from New York to Ontario and return. During the course of the trip, while in Ontario, defendant apparently lost control of the automobile striking a stone wall, resulting in injuries to plaintiff for which suit was brought in New York. Under the laws of New York such an action was maintainable, but in Ontario such an action was, in effect, prohibited. In holding the law of New York should apply the court did so upon the premise justice, fairness and the best practical results would be achieved in tort cases having multi-state contacts by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction, which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation.

The specific issue in Babcock resulting from the multi-state contacts was the application or non-application of Ontario's guest statute. In applying this rule of 'dominant contacts' resulting in the holding New York law would apply, the court did so on the grounds the parties were New York residents as a trip that began in New York and was to end in New York. The court noted the only contact Ontario had with the parties was the fact the accident occurred in Ontario itself, a fortuitous event.

A later New York case of Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463, 209 N.E.2d 792 (1965), involving the same issue as Babcock v. Jackson, Supra, the court applying the 'dominant contacts' rule held the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred would control.

The Dym case involved two New York domiciliaries attending summer school in Colorado. While in Colorado the guest plaintiff went on a short trip in the host-defendant's automobile, during which an accident occurred, resulting in plaintiff's injuries for which suit was brought in New York. The court finding Colorado law would apply said:

Of compelling importance in this case is the fact that here the parties had come to rest in the State of Colorado and had chosen to live their daily lives under the protective arm of Colorado law. Having accepted the benefits of that law for such a prolonged period, it is spurious to maintain that Colorado has no interest in the relationship which was formed there.

A year after Dym v. Gordon, Supra, the New York courts decided Kell v. Henderson, 26 A.D.2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966). In the Kell case all of the parties were residents of Ontario on an automobile trip from Ontario with the intention the trip end in Ontario. During the course of this trip an accident occurred in New York, resulting in injuries to the guest plaintiff for which suit was brought against the host-defendant in New York. On the issue of whether New York or Ontario law applied, it appears this is the exact factual situation in reverse as was in Babcock v. Jackson, Supra, and the law of Ontario would apply since the only contact New York had with the matter was that the unintentional tort, by happenstance, occurred in New York.

The court in Kell rejected the argument. The case was controlled by Babcock v. Jackson, Supra, and said:

Babcock was not intended to and did not change the established law of the State of New York that a guest has a cause of action for personal injuries against a host in an accident occurring in this State whether those involved are residents or domiciliaries of this State or not.

While the Kell case is not an opinion of the highest court in New York, it does cause us to wonder if the rule in Babcock v. Jackson, Supra, is to be applied both ways.

Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis.2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965), repudiated the lex loci rule in favor of the dominant contacts rule.

Wilcox involved a husband and wife, residents of Wisconsin, who were involved in an automobile accident resulting in injuries to the wife, which accident occurred in Nebraska when the parties were returning to Wisconsin from a vacation. The wife brought suit against the husband in Wisconsin. Nebraska had a host-guest statute requiring the proof of gross negligence for recovery, while Wisconsin allowed recovery on proof of ordinary negligence. This variance in the laws of these states made the conflicts question. The court held under these facts Wisconsin had the more 'dominant contacts' and the law of Wisconsin should apply.

In Wilcox the court in repudiating the lex loci rule was impressed by the fact the place of occurrence of an unintentional tort is fortuitous and it is by mere happenstance that the lex loci state is concerned at all.

The method of analysis of the 'dominant contacts' as applied by the Wisconsin court in Wilcox v. Wilcox, Supra, is different from the method adopted by New York in Babcock v. Jackson, Supra. In Babcock the court considered as the appropriate method that given in Restatement, Conflicts of Law § 379, which suggests a quantitative approach and lists important contacts, such as (1) place of injury, (2) place of conduct, (3) domicile, (4) nationality, (5) place of incorporation and place of business, and (6) the place the parties relationship is centered. New York examines these contacts in order of their importance on an equal plane between the state involved. The Wisconsin court begins with a rebuttable presumption in favor of the forum state and utilizes the contacts in order of their importance to remove the presumption.

The Wisconsin court in Conklin v. Horner, 38 Wis.2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968), was presented with a very similar factual situation as was presented in Wilcox v. Wilcox, Supra. In Conklin the parties involved were all residents of Illinois who began an automobile trip in Illinois with the intention the trip would end in Illinois. While traveling in Wisconsin an accident occurred, resulting in injuries to the plaintiff guest who brought suit in Wisconsin against the host-defendant. The conflicts question was whether to apply the Illinois law requiring proof of gross negligence or the Wisconsin law requiring proof of only ordinary negligence. The court, by majority opinion, held Wisconsin law would apply.

Under these facts it would appear, as the minority opinion points out, the Conklin case would be controlled by Wilcox v. Wilcox, Supra, and the law of Illinois applied. The parties in Conklin, as in Wilcox, were all residents of one state where the journey began and was to end, and by happenstance an accident occurred in another...

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