Winters v. Warden

• Decision Date: 28 September 2021
• Docket Number: 3:21-CV-701-DRL-MGG
• Parties: EMMANUEL A. WINTERS, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

EMMANUEL A. WINTERS, Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN, Respondent.

No. 3:21-CV-701-DRL-MGG

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division

September 28, 2021

OPINION AND ORDER

DAMON R. LEICHTY, JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Emmanuel A. Winters, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his armed robbery conviction in Tippecanoe County under Cause No. 79D02-1303-FB-11. Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the court must review the petition and dismiss it “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief[.]”

Mr. Winters pleaded guilty to armed robbery and being a habitual offender; and, in October 2013, he was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 20 years. He appealed. On July 18, 2014, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed. Winters v. State, 16 N.E.3d 490 (Table), 2014 WL 3547049 (Ind.Ct.App. July 18, 2014). He did not seek review in the Indiana Supreme Court. On November 19, 2018, he sought post-conviction relief in state court. His petition was denied, and his appeal to the Indiana Court of Appeals was unsuccessful.^[1] He acknowledges that he did not seek review in the Indiana Supreme

1

Court. On September 17, 2021, he filed this federal petition, asserting claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in connection with his guilty plea, unconstitutionality of the habitual offender sentencing enhancement, and a speedy trial violation.

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) contains a strict statute of limitations, set forth as follows:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment

2

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Mr. Winters does not assert, nor does the court find any basis to conclude, that his claims are based on newly discovered facts or a new Supreme Court case. He asserts straightforward claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, unconstitutionality of his sentence, and a speedy trial violation. The factual basis for these claims would have been available to him at the time of his guilty plea and sentence in 2013. He also does not assert that a state-created impediment prevented him from filing his federal petition on time, nor can the court discern the existence of any such impediment from the present record.

Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) applies. Mr. Winters's conviction became final under that provision when the time for seeking review in the Indiana Supreme Court expired on direct appeal. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 150 (2012) (holding that for habeas petitioners who do not complete all levels of state review, the judgment becomes final when the time for filing...