Winward v. State

• Decision Date: 07 December 2012
• Docket Number: No. 20101005.,20101005.
• Citation: 293 P.3d 259,723 Utah Adv. Rep. 98
• Parties: Shannon Glenn WINWARD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE of Utah, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

293 P.3d 259

723 Utah Adv. Rep. 98

Shannon Glenn WINWARD, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.STATE of Utah, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 20101005.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Dec. 7, 2012.

Grant W.P. Morrison, Matthew G. Morrison, Salt Lake City, for appellant.

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Christopher D. Ballard, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellee.

Justice PARRISH, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 Petitioner Shannon Glenn Winward appeals the dismissal of his first petition for post-conviction relief. The district court dismissed Mr. Winward's petition as procedurally barred under the Post–Conviction Remedies Act's (PCRA's) one-year statute of limitations because he filed his petition more than ten years after the required date. Mr. Winward argues that applying the one-year statute of limitations to his petition violates the Utah Constitution under the “egregious injustice” exception that this court announced in Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, 234 P.3d 1115. We disagree and affirm the district court's dismissal of all but one of the claims alleged in Mr. Winward's petition. Mr. Winward may have a newly-recognized claim for ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining process under the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Lafler v. Cooper, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012), which may extend the statute of limitations on his claim under section 78B–9–107(2) of the Utah Code. We therefore vacate the district court's dismissal of Mr. Winward's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining process and affirm the dismissal of the remainder of Mr. Winward's claims.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Mr. Winward appeals the dismissal of his petition for relief under the PCRA. In 1993, the State charged Mr. Winward with four counts of sodomy on a child, a first-degree felony, and one count of sexual abuse of a child, a second-degree felony. These charges arose out of allegations that Mr. Winward had repeatedly molested his girlfriend's eight- and ten-year-old sons, R.W. and T.W., over a four-year period, as well as a neighbor's six-year-old son, A.F., on one occasion.

¶ 3 Mr. Winward was tried twice. The first trial resulted in a hung jury. The State retried him, and his second jury trial resulted in a conviction on all charges. Mr. Winwardappealed his conviction to the Utah Court of Appeals, which affirmed his conviction in June 1997. See State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627 (Utah Ct.App.1997). We denied certiorari in October 1997. The same counsel represented Mr. Winward in the first and second trials and in his direct appeal.

¶ 4 In April 2009, Mr. Winward, represented by new counsel, filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The district court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely under the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations without accepting any briefing from the parties. Mr. Winward appealed the dismissal and the Utah Court of Appeals reversed. Winward v. State, 2009 UT App 245U, 2009 WL 2837135 (per curiam). The court of appeals held that under section 78B–9–106(2) of the Utah Code, the district court judge must “give[ ] the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard” before summarily dismissing a petition sua sponte based on the time bar. Id. para. 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 5 On remand, the State filed a motion for summary judgment based on the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations. Mr. Winward opposed the motion, alleging that the “egregious injustice” language in Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, ¶¶ 93–97, 234 P.3d 1115, created an exception to the PCRA's procedural bars and that this exception excused his untimely filing. The district court disagreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the State. The district court reasoned that even if this court had recognized an “egregious injustice” exception to the PCRA, Mr. Winward had failed to prove that it should apply in his case. Mr. Winward now appeals the district court's dismissal of his petition under the PCRA's one-year time bar. We have jurisdiction under section 78A–3–102(3)(j) of the Utah Code.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6 “We review an appeal from an order dismissing or denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to the lower court's conclusions of law.” Taylor v. State, 2012 UT 5, ¶ 8, 270 P.3d 471 (internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

¶ 7 The district court dismissed Mr. Winward's petition as untimely under the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations. Mr. Winward admits that his petition was untimely, but he argues that the time bar should not apply to his petition for three reasons. First, Mr. Winward argues the PCRA's statute of limitations unconstitutionally strips this court of its habeas corpus authority. Second, he argues the previously recognized common law “good cause” and “interest of justice” exceptions apply to the PCRA's time bar. And third, Mr. Winward asks this court to apply an “egregious injustice” exception to the time bar based on our language in Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, 234 P.3d 1115. The State responds that Mr. Winward failed to raise the first two arguments in the district court and that those arguments are therefore unpreserved. The State also argues that the “egregious injustice” exception to the PCRA's statute of limitations is not applicable in this case. We agree with the State.

I. MR. WINWARD FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS HABEAS CORPUS AND COMMON LAW EXCEPTION ARGUMENTS

¶ 8 Mr. Winward argues that the PCRA's time bar unconstitutionally strips this court of its habeas corpus authority. He also argues that we should apply our previously recognized common law exceptions to his untimely PCRA petition. Specifically, he argues that the “interest of justice” and “good cause” exceptions apply and that the PCRA's time bar is therefore inapplicable in this case. We need not address these arguments because they were not properly preserved below.

¶ 9 “As a general rule, claims not raised before the [district] court may not be raised on appeal.” State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11, 10 P.3d 346. This preservation rule serves two policy aims: fairness and judicial economy. Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 15, 266 P.3d 828. “An issue is preserved for appeal when it has been presented to the district court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on [it].” Id. ¶ 12 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether the district court had an opportunity to rule on an issue, a court considers three factors: “(1) whether the issue was raised in a timely fashion, (2) whether the issue was specifically raised, and (3) whether supporting evidence or relevant authority was introduced.” Warne v. Warne, 2012 UT 13, ¶ 16, 275 P.3d 238 (internal quotation marks omitted). If an argument is unpreserved, we will not address it for the first time on appeal unless the party can prove either plain error or exceptional circumstances. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11, 10 P.3d 346.

¶ 10 Mr. Winward failed to present to the district court his arguments regarding the writ of habeas corpus and the common law exceptions to the PCRA's procedural bars. In fact, in his brief to the district court opposing the State's motion for summary judgment and at the motion hearing, Mr. Winward never mentioned the court's habeas corpus authority. And Mr. Winward similarly failed to argue that any of the previously recognized common law exceptions to the PCRA's procedural bars applied to his case. Instead, Mr. Winward's arguments before the district court focused solely on the “egregious injustice” language in Gardner.

¶ 11 Mr. Winward does not argue the applicability of either of the exceptions to our preservation rule. Instead, he contends that the “egregious injustice” exception, which he did raise in the district court, is broad enough to encompass his habeas corpus and common law exceptions claims. We disagree. In order to preserve a claim, a party must specifically raise the issue and introduce “supporting evidence or relevant authority.” Warne, 2012 UT 13, ¶ 16, 275 P.3d 238 (internal quotation marks omitted). In his appellate brief to this court, Mr. Winward clearly articulates supporting authority for his unpreserved arguments, citing to our constitutional habeas corpus provision, as well as several cases articulating the common law exceptions that he seeks to apply for the first time on appeal. Yet he failed to specifically raise these issues and provide any supporting authority in the district court. Because Mr. Winward failed to preserve these arguments, we will not address them for the first time on appeal.

II. WE AFFIRM THE DISMISSAL OF MR. WINWARD'S SIX CLAIMS FOR POST–CONVICTION RELIEF BECAUSE HE HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT HE WOULD QUALIFY FOR AN EXCEPTION TO THE PCRA'S TIME BAR

¶ 12 The PCRA “establishes the sole remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal.” Utah Code § 78B–9–102(1).¹ Under the PCRA, “[a] petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued.” Id.§ 78B–9–107(1).² In this case, Mr. Winward's cause of action accrued on the date of “the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari.” ³Id.§ 78B–9–107(2)(d). We denied Mr. Winward's petition for certiorari on October 21, 1997. Thus, the statute of limitations on Mr. Winward's post-conviction claims expired in October 1998. But Mr. Winward did not file his petition for post-conviction relief until April 2009, more than ten years after the limitations period had expired.

¶ 13 Mr. Winward acknowledges that his petition is procedurally barred by the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations, but he argues that our opinion Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, 234 P.3d 1115, recognized an “egregious injustice” exception to the PCRA's procedural bars and that this...