Winzer v. Kaufman Cnty.
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:15-CV-01284-N |
| Decision Date | 14 March 2023 |
| Parties | EUNICE J. WINZER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. KAUFMAN COUNTY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
This Order addresses Defendant Kaufman County's motion for summary judgment on all claims [128]. First, the Court denies the County's motion for protective order [131] as moot due to the close of discovery, and the Court denies Plaintiffs E. and S. Winzer's motion for leave to file a surreply [135].[1] Second, the Court concludes that no genuine dispute of material fact exists and that the County is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the Court grants the motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court also denies as moot the County's motion to dismiss Plaintiff H. Winzer's claims for failure to prosecute [151] and both parties' motions in limine [143] [145].
This case concerns a lethal law enforcement shooting in 2013. The circumstances giving rise to this litigation have been detailed in prior court orders, see Order Mots. Dismiss & Summ. J. [77]; Winzer v. Kaufman Cnty., 916 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2019), and are summarized here. Gabriel Winzer (the “Decedent”) was a 25-year-old black man with mental disabilities. On April 27 2013, five officers responded to reports of an armed and agitated man on a rural street near the Decedent's home. The suspect shot at the first two officers to arrive at the scene before disappearing. Some time later, the Decedent appeared on a bicycle and began approaching the officers from approximately 100 yards away. He matched the 911 dispatch description of the suspect's race, but not the suspect's clothing. It is contested whether the Decedent had anything visibly in his hand, but within seconds, the officers ordered him to “put that down,” and they fired at him within one second of their instructions. The officers located the Decedent several minutes later at his home with four gunshot wounds to his upper body. Once the officers permitted paramedics to enter the backyard, they pronounced the Decedent dead at the scene.
Plaintiffs initially brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Texas survival and wrongful death statute[2] against several individual and municipal defendants. But Plaintiffs omitted the Cities of Terrell and Kaufman from the Third Amended Complaint (“3AC”) [23], and the Court previously ruled in favor of the officers on the claims against them. Order Mots. Dismiss & Summ. J. 17. Plaintiffs appealed the Court's orders. The Fifth Circuit found a factual dispute as to whether Officer Matthew Hinds committed a constitutional violation, but ultimately affirmed the Court's rulings as to all officer-defendants. Winzer, 916 F.3d at 476. Only Plaintiffs' claims[3] against Kaufman County remain on remand. Id. at 477.
Courts “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). In making this determination, courts must view all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its belief that there is no genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
When a party bears the burden of proof on an issue, “he must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or defense to warrant judgment in his favor.” Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986). When the nonmovant bears the burden of proof, the movant may demonstrate entitlement to summary judgment by either (1) submitting evidence that negates the existence of an essential element of the nonmovant's claim or affirmative defense or (2) arguing that there is no evidence to support an essential element of the nonmovant's claim or affirmative defense. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-25.
Once the movant has made this showing, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact so that a reasonable jury might return a favorable verdict. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 58687 (1986). Moreover, “[c]onclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions” will not suffice to satisfy the nonmovant's burden. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Indeed, factual controversies are resolved in favor of the nonmoving party “only when an actual controversy exists, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting McCallum Highlands, Ltd. v. Washington Capital Dus, Inc., 66 F.3d 89, 92 (5th Cir. 1995)).
Plaintiffs may bring section 1983 claims against municipalities, but the statute does not permit vicarious liability. Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). First, as in all section 1983 cases, Plaintiffs must “(1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted). But under Monell, municipal liability also requires that an official policy or custom, promulgated by a final policymaker, be the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right. Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002); Advanced Tech. Bldg. Sols., LLC v. City of Jackson, 817 F.3d 163, 165-66 (5th Cir. 2016).
The possibility that a reasonable jury could find wrongdoing by the officers, see Winzer, 916 F.3d at 476, is just one component of Plaintiffs' failure-to-train claim. Because the County cannot be held vicariously liable in a section 1983 case, even assuming that a constitutional violation did occur, Plaintiffs must nevertheless show additional wrongdoing by the County to survive summary judgment. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not carried their burden to demonstrate that the County failed to instruct its officers adequately on proper use of force.
“A municipality's culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). In addition to proving a constitutional violation, Plaintiffs must also “prove that (1) the [County] failed to train or supervise the officers involved; (2) there is a causal connection between the alleged failure to supervise or train and the alleged violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights.” Hutcheson v. Dallas Cnty., 994 F.3d 477, 482 ().
The standard for municipal fault is stringent, and deliberate indifference ordinarily requires a “pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.” Pena, 879 F.3d at 623 (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 62). The Fifth Circuit “has been wary of” finding municipal liability for a failure to train claim based on single incidents. Pineda, 291 F.3d at 334-35. Single violations create liability in only the most egregious cases,[4] such as where the dangerous “proclivities” of an officer impute knowledge to the government that existing training is insufficient, Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 549 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Brown v. Bryan, 219 F.3d 450, 462 (5th Cir. 2000)), or where an “obvious need” for training exists, but the officer “was provided no training whatsoever.” Pena, 879 F.3d at 624 (citations omitted).
The single-incident exception also applies when the policy at issue is facially unconstitutional. See, e.g., Davis v. Montgomery Cnty., 2009 WL 1226904, at *7 (S.D. Tex. 2009). In such cases, plaintiffs need not prove deliberate indifference because “[w]here an official policy or practice is unconstitutional on its face, it necessarily follows that a policymaker was not only aware of the specific policy, but was also aware that a constitutional violation [would] most likely occur.” Covington v. City of Madisonville, 812 Fed.Appx. 219, 225 (5th Cir. 2020) (unpub.) (quoting Burge v. St. Tammany Par., 336 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2003)). Put differently, training on an unconstitutional policy is inherently inadequate. However, plaintiffs still “must cite evidence which could prove that the policy was the moving force behind the violation.” Davis, 2009 WL 1226904, at *8.
Plaintiffs contend that Kaufman County may be held liable on a single-incident theory because its official use-of-force policies are inconsistent with Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). In Graham, the Supreme Court held that whether a use of force is excessive turns on its “objective reasonableness” rather than the officer's subjective state of mind. Id. at 398-99. Kaufman County's Manual of Rules and Procedures states the following:
9-4. Use of Physical and Deadly Force. The use of deadly force will be used [sic] only to prevent imminent...
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