Wirtz v. Hartley's, Inc.
Citation | 245 F. Supp. 101 |
Decision Date | 03 September 1965 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 64-426. |
Parties | W. Willard WIRTZ, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff, v. HARTLEY'S, INC., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
James H. Woodson, Atty., Department of Labor, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff.
Alan A. Bruckner, Miami, Fla., for defendant.
In this action the Secretary of Labor seeks an injunction against the defendant to preclude further violations of the minimum wage, overtime and record keeping provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (29 U.S. C.A. § 201 et seq.) and an order restraining the withholding of minimum wage and overtime compensation due certain of defendant's employees.
Defendant, Hartley's, Inc., operates four specialty stores at which are sold wearing apparel. In 1951 the defendant had one store on Flagler Street in Miami, Florida. An additional outlet was purchased in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, in 1957; a third outlet was purchased in 1960 located in the Northside Shopping Center in Miami; and a fourth outlet was purchased at the Dadeland Shopping Center in 1962. Defendant employs at all its locations a total of from 200 to 250 employees with employment peaks around Christmas and Easter.
The Flagler outlet contains approximately 40,000 square feet of floor space. The shipping and receiving room is on the third floor and occupies about 5,000 square feet. Incoming goods are deposited on the first floor at a freight entrance and are taken to the third floor by an elevator. They are unpacked, checked, marked, and counted and the count is recorded upon a receiving apron. From orders which the receiving manager has in his files, cost and retail prices are put on each item. The receiving apron then goes to the accounting office to be computed at cost and retail prices, and the cost is compared against the invoice price per payment. Also located on the third floor is an executive office and a general office. The shipping and receiving facility and the general office employees are the ones with whom this case is concerned.
The crew working in the shipping and receiving area consisted of one receiving manager, one employee handling shipping, and from two to three markers. These employees regularly shipped and received goods in substantial quantities between Miami, Florida, and points outside the State of Florida.
The office employees regularly performed billing, purchasing, inventory control, collections, bookkeeping, accounting, advertising, preparation of payrolls, and otherwise performed duties directly involved in interstate transactions.
After a shipping and receiving area was opened at Northside Shopping Center in June, 1963, about one-half of the goods for the Fort Lauderdale and Northside outlets came to the Flagler outlet and the remainder came to the Northside facility.
Although there are wholesalers in the Miami area dealing in wearing apparel, defendant does not make use of their services. When the defendant's buyers make purchases from the manufacturers, the buyers earmark and break down orders placed for each individual outlet and the manufacturer packs the orders in separate boxes and earmarks the orders for each individual outlet, but they are received and processed as above described.
If certain merchandise does not sell or is slow in one outlet, it is transferred to another with a notation on a "transfer slip" which is used to keep the inventory records in order. Thus, the transfer slip is a bookkeeping entry to change the merchandise from one department or one outlet to another.
The defendant's contentions can be summarized as follows: (1) it was exempted with respect to the employees in question by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 13(a) (2) of the Act; (2) defendant complied, at least from June 29, 1962, through October, 1962, because of the enforcement policy of the plaintiff published as Interpretative Bulletin, Title 29, Part 779 CFR, Appendix; (3) there was insufficient evidence upon which to base a finding concerning employees Dobson, Langen, Mazarredo, and Sudhoff (the claims relating to Belanger, Crain and Greenberg having been dismissed at the close of the plaintiff's case); and (4) plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief because of defendant's past history in the light of its good faith attempt to comply and in complying with the provisions of the Act.
Claimed Exemption under Section 13(a) (2)
The plaintiff, relying on the landmark decision of Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 80 S.Ct. 453, 4 L.Ed.2d 393, rehearing denied, 362 U.S. 945, 80 S.Ct. 803, 4 L.Ed.2d 772 (1960), takes the position that, although it was stipulated at the trial that over 90 per cent of defendant's transactions were made within the state, the defendant offered no evidence with respect to "recognition" of any of its transactions in any industry. Plaintiff further contends that defendant's figures are unintelligible, and in any event fail to show that the inter-store transfer of goods was "not for resale", and therefore does not bring defendant's operations "plainly and unmistakably" within the exemption.
These contentions are passed over because dispositive of this case is the fact that the employees in question performed their interstate duties apart from any retail function. The central office and receiving room were physically separate from the other of defendant's operations. These facilities served all four of defendant's stores, and it was in and through these central facilities that the interstate transactions occurred.
The law was settled with A. H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 65 S.Ct. 807, 89 L.Ed. 1095 (1945), and has been followed consistently.
Id. at 497-498, 65 S.Ct. at 810.
The shipping and receiving functions are the determining criteria in this case. It is of no moment that the defendant has no "warehouse" as such. While the defendant argues that an application of the proper rationale of Phillips would raise a Section 13(a) (2) exemption in this case, it is interesting to note the lack of reference, in its brief or argument, to Mitchell v. Sunshine Department Stores, Inc. et al., C.A.5, 1961, 292 F.2d 645, in which Chief Judge Tuttle, considering a factual situation almost akin to this,1 pointed up with emphasis "the essential key to the problem" decided in Phillips:
"" Id. at 647.
There was no evidence that any of the office or receiving people performed any retail functions. Bearing in mind that the exemption is to be narrowly construed against the employer seeking to assert it, Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., supra, defendant was not entitled to assert an exemption under Section 13(a) (2) of the Act.
Defendant claims compliance in part because of Interpretative Bulletin, Title 29, Part 779, Appendix, published by the plaintiff. By virtue of the Portal-to-Portal Act2 which provides in pertinent part:
"* * * no employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment for or on account of the failure of the employer to pay minimum wages or overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended * * * or the Bacon-Davis Act, if he pleads and proves that the act or omission complained of was in good faith in conformity with and in reliance on any written administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation * * *."
the Appendix to the Bulletin is such a written interpretation as may be relied upon.
It is unnecessary to consider whether defendant was "in conformity" with the Appendix because there was no showing at all when, if ever, defendant had or saw the bulletin or its appendix or that the defendant in any way at any time relied upon any part of it. These are essential operative facts which must be proved to establish the defense. As was said in Selby et al. v. J. A. Jones Const. Co., C.A.6, 1949, 175 F.2d 143:
See also Spring v. Washington Glass Co., W.D.Pa.1957, ...
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