Wirtz v. Quinn

Decision Date11 July 2011
Docket NumberNo. 111903.,111903.
Citation953 N.E.2d 899,2011 IL 111903,352 Ill.Dec. 218
PartiesW. Rockwell WIRTZ et al., Appellees,v.Patrick QUINN, Governor, et al., Appellants.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

2011 IL 111903
953 N.E.2d 899
352 Ill.Dec.
218

W. Rockwell WIRTZ et al., Appellees,
v.
Patrick QUINN, Governor, et al., Appellants.

No. 111903.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

July 11, 2011.


[953 N.E.2d 903]

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Richard S. Huszagh, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.Sam Vinson, Floyd D. Perkins, Claudette P. Miller, Seth A. Horvath and Patrick J. Hanlon, of Ungaretti & Harris LLP, of Chicago, for appellees.Marc R. Poulos, Kara M. Principe and Melissa L. Binetti, of Countryside, for amicus curiae Indiana, Illinois, Iowa Foundation for Fair Contracting.
[352 Ill.Dec. 222] OPINION
Justice BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In this appeal, plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of four public acts, Public Acts 96–34, 96–35, 96–37, and 96–38 (eff. July 13, 2009). The public acts at issue, comprising three substantive bills and one appropriation bill, were enacted as part of a “capital projects” plan and were signed into law by Governor Patrick Quinn on July 13, 2009.

¶ 2 The appellate court held that Public Act 96–34 violates the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const.1970, art. IV, § 8(d)), and that the three remaining public acts were invalid based on language making their enactment contingent on the enactment of Public Act 96–34. 407 Ill.App.3d 776, 347 Ill.Dec. 562, 942 N.E.2d 765.

¶ 3 For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court.

¶ 4 BACKGROUND

¶ 5 On August 25, 2009, plaintiffs, W. Rockwell Wirtz, on behalf of all taxpayers situated in the State of Illinois, and Wirtz Beverage Illinois, LLC, filed a petition pursuant to section 11–303 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/11–303 (West 2008)) in the circuit court of Cook County for leave to file their verified complaint seeking to restrain and enjoin the disbursement of public funds by the defendant public officials. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that Public Acts 96–34, 96–35, 96–37, and 96–38 violated various provisions of the Illinois Constitution, including the single subject clause (Ill. Const.1970, art. IV, § 8(d)); the presentment clause (Ill. Const.1970, art. IV, § 9(a)); the effective-date-of-laws clause (Ill. Const.1970, art. IV, § 10); veto procedures (Ill. Const.1970, art. IV, § 9(b), (d), (e)); the separation of powers doctrine (Ill. Const.1970, art. II, § 1); the public-funds-for-public-purposes clause (Ill. Const.1970, art. VIII, § 1(a)); the uniformity clause (Ill. Const.1970, art. IX, § 2); and the [352 Ill.Dec. 223]

[953 N.E.2d 904]

limitation on the subject of appropriation bills (Ill. Const.1970, art. IV, § 8(d)).

¶ 6 On October 20, 2009, the circuit court denied plaintiffs' petition. The court held that all of plaintiffs' claims failed as a matter of law and, therefore, there was no “reasonable ground,” under section 11–303 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for allowing plaintiffs' complaint to go forward.1 The circuit court denied plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.

¶ 7 The appellate court reversed. 407 Ill.App.3d 776, 347 Ill.Dec. 562, 942 N.E.2d 765. The court held that Public Act 96–34 violates the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. IV, § 8(d)), because the provisions in the Act do not have a natural and logical connection to the single subject of revenue. Accordingly, the court concluded that Public Act 96–34 was void in its entirety. The court also held that Public Acts 96–35, 96–37, and 96–38 could not stand because they were expressly contingent on the enactment of Public Act 96–34. The court did not address the remaining constitutional issues raised by plaintiffs.

¶ 8 Defendants petitioned this court for leave to appeal as of right under Supreme Court Rule 317 (Ill. S.Ct. R. 317 (eff. July 1, 2006)) or, alternatively, as a matter of discretion under Rule 315 (Ill.S.Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010)). This court granted defendants' petition for leave to appeal. We also granted leave to the Indiana, Illinois, Iowa Foundation for Fair Contracting to submit an amicus curiae brief in support of defendants.

¶ 9 For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court. In the interest of judicial economy, rather than remand the cause to the appellate court, we also address and reject the remaining claims raised in plaintiffs' complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 10 ANALYSIS
¶ 11 I. Single Subject Clause

¶ 12 The single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution provides, in relevant part: “Bills, except bills for appropriations and for the codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject.” Ill. Const.1970, art. IV, § 8(d).

¶ 13 The single subject rule regulates the process by which legislation is enacted, by prohibiting a legislative enactment from “clearly embracing more than one subject on its face.” Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill.2d 341, 351, 240 Ill.Dec. 710, 718 N.E.2d 191 (1999); People v. Olender, 222 Ill.2d 123, 131, 305 Ill.Dec. 1, 854 N.E.2d 593 (2005). One purpose of the single subject requirement is to preclude the passage of legislation which, standing alone, would not receive the necessary votes for enactment. Olender, 222 Ill.2d at 132, 305 Ill.Dec. 1, 854 N.E.2d 593; People v. Cervantes, 189 Ill.2d 80, 83, 243 Ill.Dec. 233, 723 N.E.2d 265 (1999). This disfavored practice is known as “logrolling,” or “bundling unpopular legislation with more palatable bills, so that the well-received bills would carry the unpopular ones to passage.” People v. Wooters, 188 Ill.2d 500, 518, 243 Ill.Dec. 33, 722 N.E.2d 1102 (1999). Thus, the single subject rule “ensures that the legislature addresses the [352 Ill.Dec. 224]

[953 N.E.2d 905]

difficult decisions it faces directly and subject to public scrutiny, rather than passing unpopular measures on the backs of popular ones.” Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill.2d 499, 515, 224 Ill.Dec. 1, 680 N.E.2d 1372 (1997). Another reason for the single subject rule is to promote an orderly legislative process. Wooters, 188 Ill.2d at 518, 243 Ill.Dec. 33, 722 N.E.2d 1102. “ ‘By limiting each bill to a single subject, the issues presented by each bill can be better grasped and more intelligently discussed.’ ” Johnson, 176 Ill.2d at 514–15, 224 Ill.Dec. 1, 680 N.E.2d 1372 (quoting Millard H. Ruud, No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject, 42 Minn. L.Rev. 389, 391 (1958)).

¶ 14 In determining whether a particular enactment violates the single subject rule, we construe the word “subject” liberally in favor of upholding the legislation. Olender, 222 Ill.2d at 132, 305 Ill.Dec. 1, 854 N.E.2d 593; Arangold, 187 Ill.2d at 352, 240 Ill.Dec. 710, 718 N.E.2d 191. The subject may be as broad as the legislature chooses. People v. Boclair, 202 Ill.2d 89, 109, 273 Ill.Dec. 560, 789 N.E.2d 734 (2002); Johnson, 176 Ill.2d at 515, 224 Ill.Dec. 1, 680 N.E.2d 1372. However, “while the legislature is free to choose subjects comprehensive in scope, the single subject requirement may not be circumvented by selecting a topic so broad that the rule is evaded as ‘a meaningful constitutional check on the legislature's actions.’ ” Boclair, 202 Ill.2d at 109, 273 Ill.Dec. 560, 789 N.E.2d 734 (quoting Johnson, 176 Ill.2d at 515–18, 224 Ill.Dec. 1, 680 N.E.2d 1372).

¶ 15 Neither the length of an act nor the number of provisions in an act is determinative of its compliance with the single subject rule. Arangold, 187 Ill.2d at 352, 240 Ill.Dec. 710, 718 N.E.2d 191; Cutinello v. Whitley, 161 Ill.2d 409, 423, 204 Ill.Dec. 136, 641 N.E.2d 360 (1994). What is dispositive is whether the provisions in the act have a “natural and logical connection” to the single subject. Boclair, 202 Ill.2d at 109, 273 Ill.Dec. 560, 789 N.E.2d 734; Arangold, 187 Ill.2d at 352, 240 Ill.Dec. 710, 718 N.E.2d 191. Thus, a piece of legislation violates the single subject rule when it contains unrelated provisions that by no fair interpretation have any legitimate relation to the single subject. Arangold, 187 Ill.2d at 352, 240 Ill.Dec. 710, 718 N.E.2d 191.

¶ 16 A. Public Act 96–34

¶ 17 In count I of their complaint, plaintiffs allege that Public Act 96–34 violates the single subject clause. Legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional ( Wooters, 188 Ill.2d at 505, 243 Ill.Dec. 33, 722 N.E.2d 1102; People v. Reedy, 186 Ill.2d 1, 9, 237 Ill.Dec. 74, 708 N.E.2d 1114 (1999)), and a party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of clearly establishing a constitutional violation ( People v. Dabbs, 239 Ill.2d 277, 291, 346 Ill.Dec. 484, 940 N.E.2d 1088 (2010)). The appellate court's finding that a statute is unconstitutional is reviewed de novo. People v. Burdunice, 211 Ill.2d 264, 267, 285 Ill.Dec. 191, 811 N.E.2d 678 (2004); People v. Sypien, 198 Ill.2d 334, 338, 261 Ill.Dec. 294, 763 N.E.2d 264 (2001).

¶ 18 Public Act 96–34, entitled, “An Act concerning revenue,” contains the following provisions.

¶ 19 Article 5 creates the Video Gaming Act. This legislation allows certain licensed establishments, including establishments where alcoholic liquor is served for consumption, fraternal establishments, veterans establishments, and truck stops, to conduct video gaming. Article 5 sets forth rules for obtaining licenses and requirements for video game terminals. It provides that the Illinois Gaming Board is [352 Ill.Dec. 225]

[953 N.E.2d 906]

responsible for testing and approving every licensed video game terminal. The article imposes a tax of 30% on all net income from video gaming terminals. Of the taxes collected, five-sixths shall be deposited into the Capital Projects Fund and one-sixth shall be deposited into the Local Governmental Video Gaming Distributive Fund.

¶ 20 Article 800 creates the Capital Spending Accountability Law. This law requires the Governor's Office of Management and...

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