Wisdom v. Armstrong, 3324.
| Citation | 196 A.2d 88 |
| Decision Date | 20 December 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 3324.,3324. |
| Parties | John B. WISDOM, Appellant, v. Virgie M. ARMSTRONG, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Columbia District |
Frank J. Martell, Washington, D. C., with whom Richard W. Galiher and William E Stewart, Jr., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before HOOD, Chief Judge, QUINN, Associate Judge, and CAYTON (Chief Judge, Retired).
In this automobile collision case defendant admitted liability and after a two-day trial on the question of damages a jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $1,000. Plaintiff moved for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was inadequate and also on other grounds. The motion was denied and plaintiff has brought the case here for review.
We first consider the contention that the verdict should be set aside as inadequate. Plaintiff claimed a small amount for property damage, which was not in dispute. He also claimed pain and suffering resulting from a whiplash injury, aggravation of an existing arthritic condition, medical expenses, and reduction in earning power. Although admitting liability, defendant challenged all these items as not being attributable to the collision, and the trial was on these disputed claims. Appellant (plaintiff below) urges here that his evidence as to special damages entitled him to a larger verdict. But the evidence was of such nature and purport that the jury was not required to accept plaintiff's version that all his injuries stemmed from the collision or that his claims were reasonable in amount. The defense presented no medical evidence to contradict the testimony of plaintiff's physician. But it is well established that expert testimony, though uncontradicted, is not conclusive as a matter of law and not binding on a jury. Randall v. United Securities Corporation, D.C.Mun.App., 176 A. 2d 788.
On the question of inadequacy of the verdict we must hold that it was a jury function to decide how much of plaintiff's injuries was shown to have resulted from the collision and how much his compensation should be. The trial judge was not in error in refusing a new trial. Gritz v. Hot Shoppes, D.C.Mun.App., 117 A.2d 126; Mc-Clain v. Collins, D.C.Mun.App., 117 A.2d 125.
Another assignment of error charges that defense counsel improperly argued to the jury to the effect that defendant would personally have to pay the amount of any verdict rendered, implying that defendant was uninsured when such was contrary to fact. We are asked to hold that these remarks were inflammatory and prejudicial. A great deal was said back and forth by counsel for the parties, and these remarks and arguments need not be repeated here. Studying them in full context we are satisfied that the statements of defense counsel were not prejudicial. And we think it clear that the trial judge did not err in refusing to permit plaintiff to show that someone other than def...
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Campbell–Crane & Assocs., Inc. v. Stamenkovic
...were attributable to the hostile work environment, or were sufficiently serious to warrant a significant award. See Wisdom v. Armstrong, 196 A.2d 88, 90 (D.C.1963) (affirming use of a jury instruction that “amounted to an instruction that the jury might award nominal damages if they found t......
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Mann v. Robert C. Marshall, Ltd.
...testimony of an expert is not necessarily conclusive and binding upon the trial judge as trier of the facts. Wisdom v. Armstrong, D.C.App., 196 A.2d 88 (1963); Randall v. United Securities Corp., D.C.Mun.App., 176 A.2d 788 (1961). Although an expert may give an opinion in his particular fie......
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Mantis v. Ashley, 12323.
...a record, the trial correctly declined to overturn the jury's verdict. See Cunningham v. Conner, supra, at 501; cf. Wisdom v. Armstrong, D.C.App., 196 A.2d 88, 89 (1963). Nor do we think that the jury's denial of an award for loss of consortium due to the wife's inability to perform domesti......