Wise v. Fiberglass Systems, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 April 1986
• Docket Number: No. 15618,15618
• Citation: 110 Idaho 740,718 P.2d 1178
• Parties: Steven O. WISE, Plaintiff-counterdefendant-appellant-cross respondent, v. FIBERGLASS SYSTEMS, INC., an Idaho corporation; Gary B. Multanen, an individual; and Christopher Walker, an individual, Defendants- counterclaimants-respondents-cross appellants.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 1178

718 P.2d 1178

110 Idaho 740

Steven O. WISE, Plaintiff-counterdefendant-appellant-cross respondent, v. FIBERGLASS SYSTEMS, INC., an Idaho corporation; Gary B. Multanen, an individual; and Christopher Walker, an individual, Defendants- counterclaimants-respondents-cross appellants.

No. 15618.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

April 10, 1986.

Robert M. Tyler, Jr., and Bobbi K. Dominick, of Elam, Burke & Boyd, Boise, for plaintiff-counterdefendant-appellant-cross respondent.

Rudolf D. Barchas, Boise, for defendants-counterclaimants-respondents-cross appellants.

BAKES, Justice.

Steven Wise, plaintiff appellant, appeals from the district court's denial of his motion for a new trial. Wise's motion for a new trial followed a jury verdict finding Wise 45% responsible for an automobile accident in which Wise sustained injuries. We affirm the district court's decision.

On December 15, 1981, at approximately 3:30 p.m., Steven Wise's 1977 Toyota Corolla station wagon collided with the right rear corner of a trailer being pulled by a truck owned by Fiberglass Systems, Inc., and driven by Christopher Walker. At the time of the collision, both vehicles were traveling eastbound on Interstate 84 near the Cloverdale Road overpass.

The truck/trailer driven by Walker was traveling slowly in the left lane of the interstate when Wise's vehicle struck the trailer from the rear. After the accident, Walker told the Idaho State Police that, while he was traveling in the opposite westbound direction, a tub and shower stall had fallen from the trailer, and that he had used a crossover to turn around to retrieve the tub and shower stall. At the time of the accident, Walker had located the missing tub and shower stall and was traveling slowly in the extreme left hand lane. He was about to use another crossover to turn around into the westbound lane and pick up the tub and shower stall. The crossover which Walker was preparing to use at the time of the accident was not a legal crossover.

Plaintiff Wise, on the other hand, acknowledged that he was traveling in excess of 55 m.p.h. and was probably traveling at 60 m.p.h. just prior to the accident. He based these speed estimates on his usual driving habits, since he remembered nothing about the accident itself. Other evidence admitted at trial indicated that Wise might have been traveling as fast as 70 m.p.h.

As a result of the collision, Wise was injured and his vehicle was damaged. Alana Wise, plaintiff's wife, who was traveling in the vehicle at the time of the collision and who was also injured, ultimately settled with the defendants in a separate action for approximately $167,000.

Wise subsequently filed this negligence suit, naming Walker and Fiberglass Systems, Inc., as defendants. Defendants answered and filed a counterclaim alleging negligence on the part of Wise and seeking contribution for amounts paid to Alana Wise.

Prior to trial, the defendants filed motions in limine seeking, inter alia, to prohibit mention at trial of the settlement reached with Alana Wise. The motion to prohibit mention of the settlement was granted. Plaintiffs also filed a motion in limine seeking to prevent mention of evidence as to Wise's failure to use a seat belt. This motion was also granted.

Trial began on February 6, 1984. At trial, Fiberglass Systems admitted full responsibility for any negligence attributable to Walker, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, and so stipulated. Throughout the trial, the plaintiffs attempted to put forth proof that Fiberglass Systems was independently responsible for the accident due to negligent hiring and training of Walker and negligent entrustment of the truck to Walker. After much consideration the district court refused plaintiffs' independent negligence claims against Fiberglass Systems, Inc., because of the admission by Fiberglass of responsibility for Walker's negligence.

The jury subsequently returned a verdict finding Walker 55% negligent and Wise 45% negligent. The total damages sustained by Wise were determined to be $43,750. Thus, Walker and Fiberglass Systems, Inc., were found jointly and severally liable to Wise for 55% of the damages, or $24,062.50, with the defendants collectively entitled to contribution on their counterclaim from Steven Wise for 45% of the $167,000 settlement which Alana Wise received. Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial and additur were denied, and this appeal followed.

In this appeal Wise argues that the district court erred in refusing to let him present evidence on his theories as to Fiberglass Systems' independent negligence. The question of the propriety of allowing a plaintiff to proceed against a vehicle owner under the independent negligence theories of negligent entrustment and negligent hiring and training, once the owner has admitted liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the employee's negligence, when no punitive damages are sought, is one of first impression in Idaho. This issue was extensively argued and briefed before the district court and has been extensively argued and briefed before this Court. Our review of the record and the authorities cited by both parties directs us to conclude, as it did the district court, that it was not error to refuse to allow Wise to pursue his independent negligence theory once Fiberglass Systems admitted liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Those jurisdictions which have considered this issue in factual circumstances similar to this case have almost without exception determined that if the owner has already admitted liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior, it is improper to also allow a plaintiff to proceed against the owner of a vehicle on the independent negligence theories of negligent entrustment and negligent hiring or training. See Elrod v. G & R Construction Co., 275 Ark. 151, 628 S.W.2d 17 (1982); Clooney v. Geeting, 352 So.2d 1216, 1220 (Fla.App.1977); Willis v. Hill, 116 Ga.App. 848, 159 S.E.2d 145 (1967) rev'd on other grounds 224 Ga. 263, 161 S.E.2d 281 (1968); Houlihan v. McCall, 78 A.2d 661, 665, 197 Md. 130 (1951). See also 30 A.L.R. 4th 838 (1984); 7A Am.Jur.2d Automobiles & Highway Traffic, § 693 (1980). ¹ The reason for the rule prohibiting the plaintiff from presenting proof on independent negligence issues under these factual circumstances was ably articulated by the Georgia Court of Appeals.

"It must be remembered that there is more than one way to impose liability upon A for B's conduct. Possibilities for doing so, recognized in varying degrees in various jurisdictions, are agency, negligent entrustment of a chattel to an incompetent, conspiracy, the family-purpose doctrine, joint enterprise, and ownership liability statutes. Assuming that all these theories for attaching liability to A for B's wrongdoing were recognized in this jurisdiction and that all six grounds were properly pleaded in one case for one injury, would the plaintiff be entitled as 'the master of his own lawsuit,' to introduce evidence to prove a liability link or 'breach of duty' under each and every ground, notwithstanding the fact that A does not contest his liability for B's conduct? Under a contrary holding, if A has breached six 'duties' to the plaintiff, the plaintiff may take all the trial time necessary, with corresponding space in the record, to prove liability under all six theories, regardless of the fact that A admits directly the ultimate thing sought so laboriously to be established in the first instance--that he is legally responsible in any event for B's conduct. The fallacy of the situation is not relieved by declaring that A, the employer-entrustor in this case, has breached two, or six, or a hundred 'duties' to the plaintiff. In cases where A is sought to be held for an injury caused by B, the employee-driver in this case, the 'breach of duty' by A is nothing more than a theory under which responsibility for B's conduct is tacked onto A. The result is the same whether A's 'duty' be called primary or vicarious. If, then, the only purpose and relevance of evidence showing the employee's incompetence and the employer's knowledge thereof is to show a liability link from the employee to the employer, and this link is admitted to exist, the evidence should be excluded under the general rule regarding undisputed matters, leaving as the only question the one contested issue--whether the employee's negligence caused the injury." Willis v. Hill, supra at 158 (footnote omitted).

We agree with the district court that the overwhelming weight of authority follows the reasoning expressed by the Georgia court, and that that reasoning is persuasive. Under the factual circumstances presented to us here, plaintiffs offered evidence which could only have served to establish that Fiberglass Systems was responsible for putting Walker behind the wheel of the truck/trailer with which Wise ultimately collided. Since, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, Fiberglass Systems admitted responsibility for putting Walker behind the wheel and for Walker's negligence, the offered evidence would only have served to deflect the jury's attention from the one contested issue--whether the collision was caused by Walker's negligence.

It should be emphasized that, after a full review of the record, we do not see this as a case where the independent acts of the employer might impose additional liability on the employer. As the Florida Court of Appeals stated in Clooney v. Geeting, 352 So.2d 1216 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977):

"We recognize that factual situations could arise where one of the [independent negligence] theories would impose additional liability. ... [An] example might be where an owner or authorized custodian of a motor vehicle who knows that the vehicle has defective brakes allows one who is not aware of this dangerous condition to use it, and because of the bad brakes an accident occurs. If the driver were found not to be...