Wise v. Huntingdon Cnty. Hous. Dev. Corp.

• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: CHIEF JUSTICE BAER
• Citation: Wise v. Huntingdon Cnty. Hous. Dev. Corp., 249 A.3d 506 (Pa. 2021)
• Decision Date: 28 April 2021
• Docket Number: No. 97 MAP 2019,97 MAP 2019
• Parties: Sharon WISE, Appellant v. HUNTINGDON COUNTY HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Housing Authority of the County of Huntingdon, Chestnut Terrace Resident's Association and Weatherization Inc., a Non Profit Corporation d/b/a Huntingdon County Housing Services, Appellees

249 A.3d 506

Sharon WISE, Appellant

v.HUNTINGDON COUNTY HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Housing Authority of the County of Huntingdon, Chestnut Terrace Resident's Association and Weatherization Inc., a Non Profit Corporation d/b/a Huntingdon County Housing Services, Appellees

No. 97 MAP 2019

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: September 15, 2020

Decided: April 28, 2021

David C. Harrison, Esq., George Gerasimos Rassias, Esq., Schmidt, Kirifides & Rassias, PC, for Pennsylvania Association for Justice, 212 N. 3rd Street, #101, Amicus Curiae.

Joshua D. Shapiro, Esq., Claudia M. Tesoro, Esq., Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, Harrisburg, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Amicus Curiae.

Steven B. Barrett, Esq., Nathan M. Murawsky, Esq., Hamburg, Rubin, Mullin, Maxwell & Lupin, PC, Lansdale, for Appellant.

Anthony John Vigilante, Esq., City Solicitor's Office, New Kensington, for Appellee.

BAER, C.J., SAYLOR, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE BAER

We granted discretionary review of this matter to consider whether insufficient outdoor lighting of Commonwealth property, occurring because of the location on the property of a pole light and a tree blocking the light emitting from the pole light, constitutes a "dangerous condition of" the property for purposes of the real estate exception to sovereign immunity. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(4) (explaining that "sovereign immunity shall not be raised to claims for damages caused by ... [a] dangerous condition of Commonwealth agency real estate," sidewalks, and highways). For the reasons that follow, we answer this question in the affirmative. As the Commonwealth Court reached a contrary result, we reverse that court's order and remand this matter for further proceedings.

On March 9, 2015, Sharon Wise (Wise) filed a negligence action against the Housing Authority of the County of Huntingdon (HACH) alleging that, at approximately 12:10 a.m. on May 9, 2013, she tripped and fell while walking on a sidewalk in the Chestnut Terrace public housing complex in Mount Union, Pennsylvania.¹ While Wise originally claimed that "insufficient lighting and demar[c]ation of the ... sidewalk, and/or ... a defect within the sidewalk itself" caused her fall, Complaint, 3/9/2015, at ¶ 9, she has since limited the cause of her fall to the alleged insufficient outdoor lighting of the sidewalk area, purportedly due to the location of a pole light and a tree obstructing the light provided. See, e.g, Wise's Brief in Opposition to HACH's Motion for Summary Judgment, 11/14/2016, at unnumbered page 2. Wise further asserted that, at the time of the accident, HACH: (1) was responsible for the maintenance, control, and supervision of the dangerous condition of the sidewalk area; (2) knew or should have known of the dangerous condition of the sidewalk area and its insufficient illumination, and (3) failed to take corrective action. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11. Wise claimed that she suffered severe and permanent injuries and losses as a result of the accident. Id. ¶ 12.

During the course of the proceedings, HACH filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that, inter alia , sovereign immunity barred Wise's claim. On this point, HACH argued that the only exception to immunity that was potentially applicable to Wise's claim was the real estate exception set forth in Section 8522(b)(4) of the Sovereign Immunity Act (Act), supra at page 1, which requires that a dangerous condition "derive, originate from or have a[s] its source the Commonwealth realty." HACH's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 10/17/2016, at 8 (quoting Snyder v. Harmon , 522 Pa. 424, 562 A.2d 307, 311 (1989) ). HACH contended that there was no defect in the sidewalk, as Wise had acknowledged, and that "[a]llegedly insufficient lighting is not a condition or defect of the land itself." Id. Thus, according to HACH, Wise's claim could not serve as a basis to waive sovereign immunity.

Wise filed a brief in opposition to HACH's motion. Therein, Wise alleged that genuine issues of material fact existed in this case and challenged HACH's argument that sovereign immunity barred her claim of insufficient lighting because as a matter of law it did not constitute a condition or defect of the land itself under the real estate exception. In support of her position, Wise argued that the question of whether inadequate lighting constitutes a defect in the property is a question of fact for the jury, relying upon Peterson v. Philadelphia Housing Authority , 154 Pa.Cmwlth. 309, 623 A.2d 904, 906 (1993) (holding that whether the inadequate stairwell lighting system at issue constitutes a defect in the real property, by way of its status as a fixture, and thus a dangerous condition of the Philadelphia Housing Authority's (Authority) real estate, as contemplated by Section 8522(b)(4), was a question of fact for the jury), and Floyd by Floyd v. Philadelphia Housing Authority , 154 Pa.Cmwlth. 303, 623 A.2d 901, 903 (1993) (relying on Peterson to hold that the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the inadequate lighting system in a stairwell was not a defect in the Commonwealth realty).² Thus, Wise asserted that HACH was not entitled to the entry of summary judgment in its favor.

Thereafter, HACH filed a reply brief reiterating its position that Wise's claim was insufficient to waive sovereign immunity. HACH further argued that Peterson and Floyd were distinguishable because they held that it was for a jury to determine whether the inadequate stairwell lighting system at issue in each case constituted a fixture and, thus, could be deemed to be a defect of the land itself. HACH contended that, in contrast, Wise failed to demonstrate that the subject light pole was defective, regardless of whether it was a fixture.

On February 10, 2017, the trial court granted HACH's motion for summary judgment, dismissed Wise's case, and entered judgment in HACH's favor. Wise appealed the trial court's order.³ In its opinion issued pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court concluded that Wise's claim was barred by sovereign immunity. The trial court agreed with HACH that the only viable exception to the application of immunity in this case was the real estate exception and that, in order for that exception to apply, "the defect must derive, originate, or have its source as the Commonwealth realty itself." Trial Ct. Rule 1925(a) Op., 4/21/2017, at 2 (citing Jones v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. , 565 Pa. 211, 772 A.2d 435, 443 (2001) ). The trial court opined that there was no defect in the sidewalk itself, as was undisputed by the parties, and that the real estate exception was not so expansive to encompass Wise's claim of inadequate outdoor lighting.

In doing so, the trial court rejected Wise's reliance on Floyd and Peterson to support her argument that there was a material factual dispute regarding the adequacy of lighting rendering the award of summary judgment to HACH inappropriate. The trial court explained that Wise was improperly attempting to broaden the holdings of those cases, which concerned allegations of inadequate stairwell lighting in government-owned buildings, to "all types of lighting, even outside lighting." Trial Ct. Rule 1925(a) Op., 4/21/2017, at 2. Based on the foregoing, the trial court concluded that Wise's cause of action failed as a matter of law.

On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court's order in a unanimous, published opinion. Wise v. Huntingdon Cnty. Devel. Corp. , 212 A.3d 1156 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). Initially, the court highlighted that, even where the Commonwealth has breached a duty owed to those using its property, sovereign immunity will bar a claim against the Commonwealth so long as an exception to sovereign immunity does not apply. Id. at 1165. Thus, like the trial court, the Commonwealth Court focused its analysis on whether Wise had met the real estate exception under Subsection 8522(b)(4).

The Commonwealth Court noted that Wise characterized the alleged defect of the Commonwealth realty "as insufficient lighting due to a tree on the property obstructing the pole light's illumination."

Id. at 1165. The Commonwealth Court observed, however, that Wise's characterization "ignore[d] that, but for the natural nighttime darkness, there is no alleged defect." Id. In this regard, the Commonwealth Court highlighted that Wise did not allege that the pole light or tree themselves were defective, that the tree directly injured her, or that the Commonwealth realty was defective in any manner during daylight hours. Thus, the court concluded that Wise's complaint was, in actuality, that "the Commonwealth failed to alter the natural state of nighttime darkness," causing her fall. Id. at 1166.

Based upon its characterization of her claim, the Commonwealth Court held that the real estate exception did not apply. In doing so, the court distinguished this case from Peterson and Floyd . The court first noted that, unlike this case, Peterson and Floyd involved factual questions regarding whether the defective lights were fixtures and, if so, whether they constituted a dangerous condition of Commonwealth realty. The Commonwealth Court added that, in Peterson and Floyd , the enclosed building stairwells caused the "artificial condition of darkness" by blocking natural light, and the plaintiffs alleged that the Authority "failed to ensure that the lights which were installed to cure the artificially dark area were operative." Id.

The Commonwealth Court reasoned that, in contrast, the exterior nighttime darkness here was not an artificial condition caused by the Commonwealth realty, but rather occurred naturally. Id. at 1166-67 (explaining further that, "[g]iven the earth's natural rotation from light to darkness, the alleged dangerous condition – darkness – did not ‘derive, originate from or have as its source the Commonwealth realty’ " (quoting Synder , 562 A.2d at 311 )). The court...