Wise v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 02 June 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:03CV107-D-A.,3:03CV107-D-A. |
| Citation | 433 F.Supp.2d 743 |
| Parties | Jerry WISE; et al., Plaintiffs v. KANSAS CITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Michael D. Greer, Greer Pipkin Russell Dent & Leathers, William C. Spencer, L.F. Sams, Jr., Mitchell, McNutt & Sams, Tupelo, MS, for Plaintiffs.
Amanda McMillan Urbanek, Wilton V. Byars, III, Daniel, Coker, Horton & Bell, Oxford, MS, C. Michael Ellingburg, Daniel, Coker, Horton & Bell, Jackson, MS, for Defendant.
OPINION DENYING DEFENDANT'S POST-TRIAL MOTION AND DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' POST-TRIAL MOTIONS
Presently before the court is the Plaintiffs' motion for new trial, the Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and other expenses, the Defendant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, and the Plaintiffs' motion to strike. Upon due consideration, the court finds that the motions should be denied, with the exception of the Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and other expenses, which will be granted in part.
In 1997 and 1998, the Plaintiffs separately purchased various life insurance policies from the Defendant Kansas City Life Insurance Company (Kansas City Life). The Plaintiffs purchased the subject policies through a Kansas City Life sales agent named Larry Nowlin.
The Plaintiffs filed this action in the Circuit Court of Pontotoc County, Mississippi, on December 31, 2002, alleging that the Defendant's conduct in connection with the Plaintiffs' insurance policies renders the Defendant liable under various state law causes of action including fraudulent misrepresentation. The case was then removed to this court, with the court later denying the Plaintiffs' motion to remand the case to state court. The Plaintiffs' claims were tried to a jury beginning on December 5, 2005; after a ten day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs in varying amounts each, for a total award to the Plaintiffs of $333,792 in compensatory damages. Each of the Plaintiffs with the exception of Katherine Sparks Colbert received an award of compensatory damages, although the jury did find that the Defendant's conduct constituted fraud and gross negligence regarding all Plaintiffs, including Colbert. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Defendant Kansas City Life on each of the Plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages; no punitive damage award was assessed in favor of any Plaintiff.
In the present motions, the Plaintiffs argue that a new trial should be held on the issue of punitive damages alone and that the Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and other costs.1 The Defendant argues that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the Plaintiffs' claims.
Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the standard for granting judgment as a matter of law If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue ... In ruling on a renewed motion, the court may ... allow the judgment to stand, order a new trial, or direct entry of judgment as a matter of law.
In applying this standard, the court must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing all reasonable factual inferences in that party's favor, and leave credibility determinations and the weighing of evidence to the jury. McCrary v. El Paso Energy Holdings, Inc., 209 F.Supp.2d 649, 651 (N.D.Miss.2002) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149-50, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)). The court should grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law only when "the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of [the moving] party that the court believes that reasonable [jurors] could not arrive at a contrary verdict." Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969).
As for the Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a trial court to grant a new trial based on that court's appraisal of the fairness of the trial and the reliability of the jury's verdict. The rule does not specify what grounds are necessary to support such a decision, but states only that the action may be taken "for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States." Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a); Smith v. Transworld Drilling Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir.1985). A new trial may be granted, for example, if the district court finds that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the damages awarded are excessive, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was committed in the course of the trial. The judgment will stand when the evidence presented at trial could reasonably support the jury's verdict. See, e.g., Eyre v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 755 F.2d 416, 420-21 (5th Cir.1985); Westbrook v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 1233, 1241 (5th Cir.1985). A motion for a new trial based on evidentiary grounds should not be granted unless, at a minimum, the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence, not merely against the preponderance of the evidence. Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998).
As for the Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and other expenses, Mississippi (as well as the federal courts of the United States), except in very limited circumstances described infra, has adopted what has become known as the "American Rule" in the handling of attorney fee requests. Huggins v. Wright, 774 So.2d 408, 412 (Miss.2000); Wildmon v. Berwick Universal Pictures, 803 F.Supp. 1167, 1178 (N.D.Miss.1992). Unlike countries which follow the "English Rule," our courts do not routinely assess attorney fees against the losing party. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1616, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975) (). The American Rule was recognized by the Supreme Court as early as 1796. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306, 3 Dall. 306, 1 L.Ed. 613 (1796). The Rule proscribes the award of attorneys' fees absent statutory authorization or particularly compelling circumstances. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 688, 690 (Fed.Cir.1984). The policy behind the Rule is simple — to avoid penalizing a party "for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit." Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718, 87 S.Ct. 1404, 1407, 18 L.Ed.2d 475 (1967).
The Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to a new trial on the issue of punitive damages because, inter alia, one of the two punitive damage instructions the court gave the jury was improper. As the Fifth Circuit has noted, in determining whether a particular jury instruction was erroneous, the court considers the jury charge as a whole, and an inadequate instruction merits reversal only when "the charge as a whole leaves [the court] with the substantial and ineradicable doubt whether the jury has been properly guided in its deliberations." Septimus v. University of Houston, 399 F.3d 601, 607 (5th Cir.2005). For the following reasons, the court finds that the Plaintiffs' motion should be denied.
First, the Plaintiffs argue that Instruction D-66, which concerns punitive damages and was given to the jury in conjunction with Instruction P-41, was improper and prejudicially inflammatory. Specifically, the Plaintiffs argue that the statements "punitive damages are not favored in the law and are to be awarded with great caution and within limits" and the clear and convincing standard defined in D-66 are objectionable.
The court finds that the Plaintiffs' arguments are without merit because the language contained in D-66 is an accurate statement of Mississippi law regarding punitive damages. The statement that "punitive damages are not favored in the law and are to be awarded with great caution and within limits" is based on language contained in several Mississippi Supreme Court decisions in which the court discusses Mississippi's stance regarding the award of punitive damages in civil cases. See, e.g., Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So.2d 454, 460 (Miss. 1983). The Plaintiffs also argue that the clear and convincing standard articulated in D-66 is erroneous. The language to which the Plaintiffs object is "[t]he evidence presented must be so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable the fact finder to come to a clear conviction." While the Plaintiffs do not dispute that clear and convincing evidence is required before an award of punitive damages may be awarded, they do object to the word "conviction" appearing in the instruction, surmising that the word conjures up images of criminal activity. The Fifth Circuit's own pattern civil instruction regarding clear and convincing evidence, however, utilizes the word "conviction." See Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil § 2:14 (2005) (). Mississippi state courts have repeatedly utilized the word conviction in describing clear and convincing...
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