Wise v. Pacific States Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 September 1935
• Docket Number: No. 502-D.,502-D.
• Citation: 11 F. Supp. 895
• Parties: WISE v. PACIFIC STATES LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Illinois

11 F. Supp. 895

WISE v. PACIFIC STATES LIFE INS. CO.

No. 502-D.

District Court, E. D. Illinois.

September 13, 1935.

V. W. McIntire, of Danville, Ill., for plaintiff.

O. D. Mann, of Danville, Ill., for defendant.

LINDLEY, District Judge.

Plaintiff, as beneficiary, sues upon a life insurance policy, and defendant, through a duly appointed qualified receiver, moves to stay proceedings. This receiver was appointed by the director of insurance and qualified in the superior court of Cook county, outside of this District, subsequent to the institution of this suit, and that court, in approving the appointment, enjoined all creditors and parties in interest from interfering with the assets belonging to the defendant corporation. Plaintiff was not a party to the suit, and does not at the present time seek to reach assets in the possession of the receiver. She seeks rather to liquidate her claim upon the policy and to procure judgment thereon, and insists that neither the court having jurisdiction of the receiver nor this court has any right to deprive her of a hearing upon and adjudication of her cause of action.

The rule is quite general that where two actions between the same parties, concerning the same subject-matter, and to test the same rights, are brought in different courts having concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first acquires jurisdiction, its power being adequate to the administration of complete justice, retains its jurisdiction and may dispose of the controversy. No court of co-ordinate power is at liberty to interfere with such action. Williams v. Neely (C. C. A.) 134 F. 1, 69 L. R. A. 232; Phelps v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n (C. C. A.) 112 F. 453, 61 L. R. A. 717, affirmed 190 U. S. 147, 23 S. Ct. 707, 47 L. Ed. 987. Nor has any court the power to restrain a suit previously brought in another court which has complete jurisdiction thereof and is able to afford adequate relief. 15 C. J. 1141. Comity between federal and state courts is necessary to prevent unseemly conflicts of jurisdiction and to promote a decent and orderly administration of justice, but such comity may not preclude the determination of a cause by a court, which has previously acquired jurisdiction of a cause and can speedily hear the same and give the desired relief. 15 C. J. 1160. Consequently, where a state and a federal court have jurisdiction over the same parties or privies and the same subject-matter, the tribunal where jurisdiction first attaches retains it exclusively, and will be left to determine the controversy and to exhaust its jurisdiction and to decide every issue or question properly arising in the case. Rickey Land, etc., Co. v. Miller & Lux, 218 U. S. 258, 31 S. Ct. 11, 54 L. Ed. 1032; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 932, 14 Ann. Cas. 764; Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 537, 23 S. Ct. 398, 47 L. Ed. 584. The usual practice is for the court in which the second action is brought, not to dismiss its action, but to suspend proceedings therein in so far as it concerns the subject-matter involved in the first case until the same is decided. Huntington v. Laidley, 176 U. S. 668, 20 S. Ct. 526, 44 L. Ed. 630; In re Lasserot (C. C. A.) 240 F. 325.

Here we find that in the receivership suit the state court has taken into its custody all the corporate property within its jurisdiction and has drawn to itself jurisdiction of all suits regarding same, and while this is an entirely proper and commendable proceedings preventive of multiplications litigation and promotive of orderly administration, under the rule stated, such action does not justify this court in denying pla...