Wise v. Scutt, Civil No. 2:11-CV-14294
| Decision Date | 26 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 2:11-CV-14294 |
| Parties | MARTE'NEZ DOREZ WISE, Petitioner, v. DEBRA SCUTT, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
HONORABLE VICTORIA A. ROBERTS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CORPUS, DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY,
Marte'nez Dorez Wise, ("Petitioner"), confined at the Cotton Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his pro se habeas petition, Petitioner challenges his conviction and sentence for one count each of assault with intent to commit murder, M.C.L.A. 750.83, armed robbery, M.C.L.A. 750.529, and being a fourth felony habitual offender, M.C.L.A. 769.12.
For the reasons that follow, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
A jury convicted Petitioner of the above offenses in Oakland County Circuit Court. This Court recites verbatim the relevant facts relied upon by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F. 3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009):
This case arises out of a violent incident involving defendant and Mark Mishler that took place in a hotel room. Mishler testified that defendant physically assaulted him, demanded his wallet, and stabbed him repeatedly in the face and neck with a woodworking instrument before fleeing Mishler's hotel room. Defendant maintained that Mishler made sexual advances toward him and then physically attacked him, effectively arguing that he retaliated against Mishler in self-defense.
People v. Wise, No. 267897, Slip. Op. at * 1 (Mich.Ct.App. October 25, 2007).
Petitioner's conviction was affirmed on appeal. Id., lv. den. 480 Mich. 1136, 746 N.W.2d 86 (2008).
Petitioner then filed a post-conviction motion for relief from judgment pursuant to M.C.R. 6.500, et. Seq., which was denied. People v. Wise, No. 2005-203178 (Oakland County Cir. Ct. December 8, 2009). Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration as well as a motion to supplement his motion, which was also denied. People v. Wise, No. 2005-203178-FC . The Michigan appellate courts denied Petitioner's post-conviction appeal. People v. Wise, No. 299088 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2010); lv. den. 490 Mich. 858, 802 N.W.2d 343 (2011).
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the following grounds: (1) The complaint and warrant were defective, (2) Trial counsel was ineffective for: (a) failing to object to testimonial hearsay when the victim, not his doctors, testified about his injuries; and (b) waiving a treating doctor's presence, (3) The prosecutor committed misconduct, (4) Petitioner's convictions for armed robbery and assault with the intent to commit murder constituted double jeopardy, (5) Trial counsel was ineffective for: (a) failing to object to photographs of Mr. Mishler's injuries, (b) failing to use the preliminaryexamination transcript to impeach Mr. Mishler's credibility, (c) failing to call witnesses, and (d) failing to impeach Mr. Mishler with a prior conviction, (6) Appellate counsel was ineffective, (7) The state court denied Petitioner his right to appeal when it failed to appoint a third appellate attorney, and (8) Cumulative error deprived Petitioner of a fair trial.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:
A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state court decision unreasonablyapplies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 410-11.
The Supreme Court explained that "[A] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,'and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010)(quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). "[A] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011)(citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). Furthermore, pursuant to § 2254(d), "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or...could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision" of the Supreme Court. Id.
"[I]f this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be." Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786. Although 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the AEDPA, does not completely bar federal courts from relitigating claims previously rejected in state courts, it preserves the authority for a federal court to grant habeas relief only "in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with" the Supreme Court's precedents. Id. Indeed, "Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a 'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332, n. 5 (1979)(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). Thus, a "readiness to attribute error [to a state court] is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law." Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24. Therefore, in order to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a state prisoner is required to show that the state court's rejection of his claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87. Finally, in reviewing Petitioner's claims, this Court must remember that under the federal constitution, Petitioner was "entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one." Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953).
A. Claim # 1. The arrest warrant and criminal complaint.
In his first claim, Petitioner contends that there was no proper arrest warrant orcriminal complaint filed in his criminal case; he says this deprived the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The determination of whether a state court is vested with jurisdiction under state law over a criminal case is a function of state courts, not federal courts. Wills v. Egeler, 532 F. 2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1976). This claim raises an issue of state law; it questions the interpretation of Michigan law. See United States ex. rel. Holliday v. Sheriff of Du Page County, Ill., 152 F. Supp. 1004, 1013 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Cf. Toler v. McGinnis, 23 Fed. Appx. 259, 266 (6th Cir. 2001)(district court lacked authority on habeas review to review petitioner's claim that the state court erred in refusing to instruct jury on the requirements for extraterritorial jurisdiction, because the claim was contingent upon an interpretation of an alleged violation of state law). This claim, therefore, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus review. See Hogan v. Ward, 998 F. Supp. 290, 295 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
Moreover, any possible problems with the arrest warrant would not have deprived the state court of the ability to try Petitioner. "An illegal arrest, without more, has never been viewed as a bar to subsequent prosecution, nor as a defense to a valid conviction." United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980)(citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975)); See also Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). The Supreme Court has held that "[T]he 'body' or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogationoccurred." INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984). Although the exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction at trial of evidence that was seized in violation of the constitution, a...
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