Wishart v. United States
Decision Date | 20 October 1928 |
Docket Number | No. 8048.,8048. |
Parties | WISHART v. UNITED STATES. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
George A. Bangs, of Grand Forks, N. D., for plaintiff in error.
Seth W. Richardson, U. S. Atty., of Fargo, N. D.
Before LEWIS and VAN VALKENBURGH, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, District Judge.
Plaintiff in error, together with one Carl Anderson, one Francis McKee, and one Walter Wishart, a nephew of plaintiff in error, were indicted for conspiracy to violate the provisions of section 593(b) of the Tariff Act of 1922 (19 USCA § 497), by importing and bringing into the United States certain intoxicating liquor, to wit, whisky and wine, contrary to law in the following respects, without reporting the same to an officer of the United States customs at the border, without securing a permit to bring the same into the United States, without unlading the same in the presence of a customs officer, and without securing a permit to bring the same into the United States from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Thereafter, as the overt act, it is stated that said liquor was brought into the United States by vehicle fraudulently and knowingly, and without such required acts on the part of the defendants. William Wishart was tried alone. It was stated at argument that Walter Wishart was not arrested. Anderson and McKee testified for the government. The trial resulted in a verdict of guilty, and judgment accordingly.
The points urged by counsel for plaintiff in error may be reduced to three: (1) That the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict; (2) errors of commission and omission in the charge of the court; (3) that the indictment does not state a public offense, and does not directly allege the acts constituting the offense charged as the subject of the controversy, and therefore that the demurrer interposed thereto should have been sustained.
1. At the close of the entire case the claimed insufficiency of the evidence was not called to the attention of the court by demurrer or motion of any kind. In such case, the question is not here for review, provided there is in the record any substantial evidence to sustain the verdict. Rossi v. United States (C. C. A. 8) 9 F.(2d) 362-365; Havener v. United States (C. C. A. 8) 15 F.(2d) 503; Simpson v. United States (C. C. A. 8) 184 F. 817; Rimmerman et al. v. United States (C. C. A. 8) 186 F. 307. An examination of the record discloses that substantial evidence to support the verdict was present. This assignment may therefore be dismissed without further consideration.
2. The objections to the charge of the court are three in number: (a) The following with respect to the testimony of the government witnesses Anderson and McKee:
It is claimed that a verdict of conviction was thereby made dependent, not upon the jurors' belief beyond a reasonable doubt in the guilt of the defendant, but upon whether or not the testimony of certain witnesses was believed; also, that the language quoted is argumentative in selecting out and calling to the attention of the jury certain testimony, and making the verdict depend thereon. The jurors, however, were told that they were the sole and exclusive judges of the facts in the case, and that if, after a full and fair consideration of all the evidence, there was in their minds a thorough conviction of the guilt of the defendant, they should have no hesitation in finding him guilty; if, on the other hand, they had in their minds, after such a consideration, no thorough conviction of his guilt, they should have no hesitation in finding him not guilty. The language complained of amounted to no more than advising the jury of what, under the evidence presented, would be sufficient to justify a verdict. The court did not imply that the jury would be required to find the defendant guilty or not guilty accordingly as it might or might not believe certain of the testimony. The entire scope of the conspiracy, and of the overt act committed thereunder, appeared in the testimony of Anderson and McKee. The court had already recited, with sufficient fullness, the crucial facts establishing the charge and the defense. We do not perceive that the charge was argumentative, nor that it ignored vital and important facts on behalf of the defendant. The point is ruled against plaintiff in error.
(b) It is next urged that the court erred in neglecting to instruct and caution the jury against giving too much reliance to the testimony of accomplices and to require corroborating testimony before giving credence to them. No instruction to this effect was asked on behalf of the defendant, nor was any exception preserved to the failure of the court to charge upon this point. However, in federal jurisdictions conviction may be had upon the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices.
"While it is the better practice in criminal cases for courts to caution juries against too much reliance on the testimony of accomplices and against believing such testimony without corroboration, mere failure to give such an instruction is not reversible error." Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 37 S. Ct. 192, 61 L. Ed. 442, L. R. A. 1917F, 502, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1168; Holmgren v. United States, 217 U. S. 509, 30 S. Ct. 588, 54 L. Ed. 861, 19 Ann. Cas. 778. This court has many times so decided. Lett v. United States, 15 F.(2d) 686; Graham v. United States, 15 F.(2d) 740; Rossi v. United States, 9 F.(2d) 362.
(c) Error is assigned to the charge of the court respecting the character testimony introduced on behalf of the defendant. Here, again, no instruction upon this phase of the testimony was requested nor was any exception taken to the charge given by the court. The portion of the charge involved is as follows:
While this instruction does not follow the precise formula frequently approved by the Supreme Court and federal courts generally, nevertheless the substance is preserved. In the absence of prejudice amounting to a failure of justice, we do not feel called upon to apply the rule invoked in the absence of exception to the charge.
At the hearing before us some point was made upon the use in the charge of the word "smuggling" as not being properly defined. "The word `smuggling' had a well-understood import at common law; and, in the absence of a particularized definition of its significance in the statute creating it, resort may be had to the common law for the purpose of arriving at its meaning." Keck v. United States, 172 U. S. 434, 435, 19 S. Ct. 254, 258 (43 L. Ed. 505). The court, after reciting the requirements of law with respect to the importation of intoxicating liquor into the United States, used the word "smuggle" for the purpose, as was said, of putting the matter in more simple language. There can be no doubt that the jury understood what was meant by the term as used, and that that term was therefore sufficiently defined.
3. We come finally to the contention that the indictment does not state a public offense. It is in the following language:
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