Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, WISLOCKI-GOI
| Decision Date | 21 October 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-2930,P,WISLOCKI-GOI,86-2930 |
| Citation | 831 F.2d 1374 |
| Parties | 45 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 216, 44 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,494, 42 Ed. Law Rep. 548 Marshalaintiff-Appellant, v. Darlene Wanda MEARS, and Lake County, Indiana, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Richard A. Miller, Gouveia & Miller, Merrillville, Ind., for plaintiff-appellant.
Robert S. Spear, Chief Counsel, Office of Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, Ind., for defendants-appellees.
Before RIPPLE and MANION, Circuit Judges, and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.
This appeal follows a one-day bench trial on Ms. Wislocki-Goin's Title VII claim of sex discrimination in employment. Ms. Goin had filed previously a charge of sex discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) following the termination of her employment with the Lake County Superior Court, Juvenile Division, and the denial to her of a job in the Lake County Jail. The EEOC issued Ms. Goin a Notice of Right to Sue and she filed an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division. Ms. Goin appeals the district court's entry of judgment in favor of the defendants. For the reasons set forth in the following opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
In June 1982, Ms. Goin applied for a teaching position with the Lake County government at the Juvenile Detention Center in Crown Point, Indiana. She testified that she thought she was applying for a position working with juveniles at the Lake County Jail. Tr. at 27, 31. Ms. Goin's qualifications for the job included a bachelor's degree in elementary education and child psychology from Purdue University and a master's degree in education with a certification in learning disabilities, also from Purdue. She also had significant employment experience. Ms. Goin interviewed with several people for the position including Judge Darlene Wanda Mears, the Superior Court Judge who oversees the Juvenile Detention Center. She was hired in August 1982, and was assigned duties, at least temporarily, in the Lake County Juvenile Detention Center. Ms. Goin believed that she would receive the position at the Lake County Jail when that job later became available. Tr. at 35.
The record reflects that Judge Mears strives to ensure that the Juvenile Center maintains a professional image. She considers it important that all employees dress conservatively. Although there is no written dress code, Judge Mears describes her dress standards as the "Brooks Brothers look." Tr. at 165. Employees who fail to conform with Judge Mears' appearance requirements are reprimanded. Ms. Goin failed to conform to Judge Mears' appearance requirements at work by wearing excessive makeup and by wearing her hair down. Ms. Goin was reprimanded orally. 1
Ms. Goin's dress and grooming habits were not the only conduct of which Judge Mears disapproved. At a deposition hearing of a disturbed juvenile, Ms. Goin wept openly in front of the child. The chief referee, believing that Ms. Goin's conduct was unprofessional and inappropriate, reported the incident directly to Judge Mears. In addition, Ms. Goin wrote a "Dear Santa" letter for a Christmas party which Judge Mears apparently considered offensive. Otherwise, Ms. Goin performed her teaching duties in a thoughtful, capable, and professional manner. Ms. Goin had not been informed that her work was in any way unsatisfactory.
In October of 1982, Ms. Goin learned that she would not be receiving the job at the Lake County Jail. Ms. Goin was told that Judge Mears had decided to hire Mr. Mark Helmerich for that position. Mr. Helmerich had not actively sought the position, and the district court concluded that he was not as qualified as Ms. Goin. Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, No. H 84-39, order at 17 (N.D.Ind. Oct. 20, 1986) [hereinafter Order]; R.42 at 17. Ms. Goin was advised by the superintendent of the Juvenile Center to "just let it go, these are the kinds of decisions that are made and it's all for the best, just let it go." Tr. at 40. During discovery in this action, in May of 1985, Ms. Goin learned that she did not get the job because the county sheriff-elect refused to hire women for positions at the jail. This information was disclosed by Judge Mears, who testified in her deposition that the sheriff told her that "there's no broad that's going to work in this facility." Tr. at 175. At trial, Judge Mears changed her testimony and said that she learned this information second-hand. Id. at 175-76.
By a letter dated January 3, 1983, Ms. Goin was discharged from her position as a teacher in the Lake County Juvenile Center. The termination was, however, rescinded after it was determined that Ms. Goin was entitled to a hearing pursuant to the Lake County Personnel Policies Manual. At the hearing, Wayne Wackowski, the education director of the Juvenile Detention Center, gave two reasons for disciplinary action against Ms. Goin: 1) two acts of insubordination; and 2) two incidents of failure to conduct herself in such a manner as to promote or support the purposes, goals, policies, position, and philosophy of the Juvenile Court. 2 The two incidents of insubordination occurred when Ms. Goin wore her hair down and wore excessive makeup. After the hearing, the panel recommended that Judge Mears not discharge Ms. Goin. However, Judge Mears disagreed and ordered the panel to terminate Ms. Goin. In late January 1983, Ms. Goin was notified that she was terminated for two acts of insubordination--wearing her hair down and wearing excessive makeup. Joint Ex. 10; Tr. at 120-21.
The evidence presented at trial showed that, in addition to Judge Mears, many women held important positions at the Juvenile Center. Ms. Goin was originally hired as a teacher at the Juvenile Center to replace another woman, Donna Echterling. A second teaching position was later filled by Patricia Haughton, a female. At the time of trial, two of the four hearing referees were female, as was the chief hearing referee. In addition, a female was the head of the Intake Department, and another female served as the Court Executive. Tr. at 196-97.
Ms. Goin filed a discrimination claim with the EEOC on May 18, 1983. In that claim, she alleged discrimination based on her discharge and on the failure to receive the job with the Lake County Jail. R.1 at Ex. "A". After Ms. Goin received her Right-to-Sue letter, she filed a complaint in the district court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division. In that complaint, she alleged that she had been subject to discrimination in her discharge, but no express mention was made of the jail job. However, her EEOC claim, which contained complaints with respect to both the jail job and her discharge, was appended to the complaint. Id. at 2.
Defendants' answers made no mention of the jail job, nor did they mention an affirmative defense that Ms. Goin failed to file the EEOC claim within 180 days after denial of the jail job. 3 R.12 and R.13. However, after discovery, in their trial brief, defendants argued that the claim of discrimination based on the jail job was not properly before the district court because Ms. Goin had not filed an EEOC claim within 180 days of being denied that job. R.31(a) at 2. They also claimed that they had not waived this defense because Ms. Goin's complaint did not raise a claim of discrimination based on the jail job, and it therefore did not come to their attention until discovery. Id. at 1. In her trial brief, Ms. Goin argued that her EEOC claim was timely because she had no reason to know that her nonselection was based on her gender at the time she was denied the job. R.33 at 2.
The district court concluded that the discharge of Ms. Goin did not constitute an unlawful employment practice within the meaning of Title VII. With respect to Ms Goin's disparate treatment theory, the district court held that she failed to establish a prima facie case because she did not prove that a similarly-situated male employee was given the benefit of more lenient treatment. The court also concluded that Ms. Goin had failed to rebut the defendants' legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for her discharge--violation of the dress and grooming code.
With respect to the plaintiff's disparate impact theory, the court held that the defendant had established a reasonable personnel policy with respect to grooming. Moreover, while the grooming standards were different for men and women, these were "only minor variations contained in an overall, even-handed grooming policy." Order at 15.
Before the EEOC, Ms. Goin alleged that she did not receive the teaching job at the Lake County Jail because of sex discrimination. She alleged that, although her qualifications were superior, Mark Helmerich was chosen to fill the jail job. Without specifically addressing the issue of whether this claim had been raised adequately by appending the EEOC claim to the complaint, the court concluded that Ms. Goin's claim with respect to the jail job was time-barred; she had not filed the EEOC charge within 180 days of the date that Mr. Helmerich received the job in October 1982. The district court explained that the 180-day period begins to run "when an employee either knows or should know that an unlawful employment practice has been committed." Order at 17 (quoting Ortiz v. Chicago Transit Auth., 639 F.Supp. 310, 312 (N.D.Ill.1986)). The jail job was filled by a male on October 9, 1982. In the district court's view, the 180-day period began to run on that date because Ms. Goin knew that the position was filled by a male on that date. The court further reasoned that equitable tolling did not apply because Ms. Goin did not allege that she ever inquired into the reasons why she did not receive the...
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