Wisnasky-Bettorf v. Pierce
| Decision Date | 22 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 111253 |
| Citation | 2012 IL 111253 |
| Parties | WHITNEY WISNASKY-BETTORF, Appellant, v. PEGGY PIERCE et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
¶ 1 Petitioner, Whitney Wisnasky-Bettorf, appeals from the circuit court's order sustaining petitioner's removal from the ballot for the general election held on November 2, 2010. A divided panel of the appellate court affirmed (403 Ill. App. 3d 1080), and we granted leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010)). We now reverse the judgments of the circuit and appellate courts.
¶ 3 At the Republican Party's general primary election held on February 2, 2010, no candidate's name for the office of board of review for St. Clair County, Illinois, was printed on the ballot, and no candidate was nominated as a write-in for that office. Accordingly, on March 25, 2010, the St. Clair County central committee of the Republican Party (the committee) held a meeting at which it passeda motion designating petitioner as the appointee for candidacy for the office of board of review member.
¶ 4 On April 1, 2010, the committee filed a "resolution/certificate of appointment" with the county clerk of St. Clair County, indicating that the executive committee of the Republican Party in St. Clair County had voted to nominate petitioner for the office of board of review member as required pursuant to section 7-61 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7-61 et seq. (West 2010)). On April 16, 2010, petitioner filed her nominating petitions with the clerk together with the notice of appointment, her statement of candidacy and her receipt for filing a statement of economic interests.
¶ 5 On April 26, 2010, the objector, Peggy Pierce, filed a verified objector's petition requesting that petitioner's name not appear on the ballot for election to the office of board of review member because the resolution was not filed within three days as required by section 7-61. On April 30, 2010, the St. Clair County electoral board held a hearing on the objection. At the conclusion of the hearing, the St. Clair County electoral board sustained the objection and removed petitioner's name from the ballot for the general election to be held on November 2, 2010. In doing so, the St. Clair County electoral board stated the committee was required to file a resolution under section 7-61 in order to fill the vacancy in nomination and that this resolution was to be filed within three days after the committee's meeting on March 25, 2010.
¶ 6 On May 3, 2010, the St. Clair County electoral board entered a written decision, ordering that petitioner's name was to be removed from the ballot for the November 2, 2010, general election. On May 10, 2010, petitioner sought judicial review in the circuit court of St. Clair County, arguing that: (1) the committee was not required to file a resolution under section 7-61 in order for petitioner to fill the general primary vacancy, and (2) even if the committee were required to file a resolution, the objections in this case were untimely.
¶ 7 On June 2, 2010, the circuit court held a hearing on the petition. Petitioner asked the court for relief, specifically to have her name placed back on the ballot for that election. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court confirmed the decision of the St. Clair County electoral board.
¶ 8 A divided panel of our appellate court affirmed, holding section 7-61 required the filing of a resolution under the circumstances. 403 Ill. App. 3d 1080. The dissenting justice concluded that the amendedportion of section 7-61 sets forth a distinct procedure for situations such as the case at hand and specifically substitutes a "notice of appointment" for the filing of a resolution. 403 Ill. App. 3d at 1091 (Spomer, J., dissenting). Petitioner seeks reversal of the judgment of the appellate court.
¶ 11 We must initially address the contention that this matter is moot given that the November 2010 election has already occurred and the petitioner does not request a new election if she were to prevail in this appeal.
¶ 12 One exception to the mootness doctrine allows a court to resolve an otherwise moot issue if the issue involves a substantial public interest. Petitioner invokes this exception specifically requesting that this court clarify this area of the law for future elections. The criteria for application of the public interest exception are: (1) the public nature of the question, (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination for the purpose of guiding public officers, and (3) the likelihood that the question will recur. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 257 (1989); People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 622 (1952). A clear showing of each criterion is required to bring a case within the public interest exception. See Kohan v. Rimland School for Autistic Children, 102 Ill. App. 3d 524, 527 (1981).
¶ 13 The present case meets this test. Issues regarding the filling of vacancies in nomination of a public office are of substantial public interest. The appellate court correctly observed that issues regarding this subject are long-standing and have not been addressed by courts or the legislature (Phelan v. County Officers Electoral Board, 240 Ill. App. 3d 368, 371, 381 (1992)). See Thurston v. State Board of Elections, 76 Ill. 2d 385, 387-88 (1979); Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts, 1981 Annual Report to the Supreme Court of Illinois 22. An authoritative guide for future controversies is needed; the issue will likely recur. We therefore will address the merits of this cause.
¶ 15 The question before us is whether an established political party must file a resolution pursuant to section 7-61 of the Election Code(10 ILCS 5/7-61 (West 2010)) in order to fill a vacancy in nomination when no candidate appeared on the primary ballot and no write-in candidate was nominated. Regarding our standard of review, factual findings made by an electoral board will not be disturbed unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Girot v. Keith, 212 Ill. 2d 372, 378-79 (2004). We are not bound, however, by the board's interpretation of a statute. King v. Justice Party, 284 Ill. App. 3d 886, 888 (1996). The construction of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. Sylvester v. Industrial Comm'n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (2001).
¶ 16 The primary rule of statutory interpretation and construction, to which all other canons and rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and effectuate the true intent and meaning of the legislature. People ex rel. Hanrahan v. White, 52 Ill. 2d 70, 73 (1972). In interpreting a statute, a court must give the legislative language its plain and ordinary meaning. Illinois Power Co. v. Mahin, 72 Ill. 2d 189 (1978). If the language of the statute is plain, clear, and unambiguous, and if the legislative intent can be ascertained therefrom, it must prevail and will be given effect by the courts without resorting to other aids for construction. In re Marriage of Logston, 103 Ill. 2d 266 (1984). Also, the statute should be evaluated as a whole; each provision should be construed in connection with every other section. Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 397 (1994). Statutes should be construed, if possible, so that no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless. Bonaguro, 158 Ill. 2d at 397.
¶ 17 The objection in this case was based on section 7-61 of the Election Code. We note that section 7-61 consists of multiple paragraphs which address different circumstances in which vacancies in nomination occur. According to the objection, section 7-61 requires the filing of resolution in this case. In so arguing, the objector relied upon paragraph 3, which states:
10 ILCS 5/7-61 (West 2010).
In response, petitioner maintains that paragraph 3 does not apply to the situation present in this case—where no name had appeared on the primary ballot—and that paragraph 9 controls in such situations. We agree.
¶ 18 The plain language of section 7-61, when read in its entirety, reveals that paragraph 3, quoted above, does...
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