Witecki v. Saratoga Lakeside Acres Ass'n, Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 January 2022
• Docket Number: 532564
• Citation: Witecki v. Saratoga Lakeside Acres Ass'n, Inc., 201 A.D.3d 1175, 162 N.Y.S.3d 180 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022)
• Parties: Glenn J. WITECKI, Appellant, v. SARATOGA LAKESIDE ACRES ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent, et al., Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

201 A.D.3d 1175

162 N.Y.S.3d 180

Glenn J. WITECKI, Appellant,

v.SARATOGA LAKESIDE ACRES ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent, et al., Defendant.

532564

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: November 16, 2021

Decided and Entered: January 13, 2022

Glenn J. Witecki, Schenectady, appellant pro se.

Walsh & Walsh, LLP, Saratoga Springs (Jesse P. Schwartz of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Lynch, Pritzker and Colangelo, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Colangelo, J. Appeal from that part of an order of the Supreme Court (Buchanan, J.), entered May 1, 2020 in Saratoga County, which granted a motion by defendant Saratoga Lakeside Acres Association, Inc. to dismiss the amended complaint against it.

Defendant Saratoga Lakeside Acres Association, Inc. (hereinafter defendant) is a not-for-profit association that was formed in 1992 to protect, maintain and improve the roads and beachfront area on the western side of Saratoga Lake in an area known as Lakeside Acres in the Town of Malta, Saratoga County. To accomplish these goals, defendant acquired, among other things, a 1,600–foot parcel of lakefront property that had been subdivided in 1927 into multiple lots and then sold. The deed for this lakefront property granted rights to a "private beach reserved for use of all lot owners." Membership in defendant was voluntary, and only members were eligible to apply for dock space on defendant's lake front property.

By deed dated January 9, 2001, plaintiff and his son acquired lot 159 of the original subdivision from plaintiff's uncle, who had owned the lot since 1967. In 2016, plaintiff became the sole owner of the parcel. Plaintiff, who became a member of defendant in 2001, asked defendant, in accordance with a membership privilege, for permission to install a dock where his uncle had previously installed and maintained a dock. Defendant refused his request because all available space had already been assigned to other association members prior to plaintiff's acquisition of his lot, but defendant placed plaintiff on a waiting list for dock space. In 2000, prior to plaintiff's ownership, defendant's board had canvassed the lot owner members about their desire for a dock, and defendant granted dock privileges to all members who requested a dock at that time. Dock policies were drafted and adopted to ensure that the waterfront and docks could be utilized in a safe and orderly fashion. In 2000, defendant assigned the dock space immediately in front of plaintiff's lot to defendant Joseph Blaauboer, who installed and, at all times relevant to this appeal, maintained a dock at that location.

In September 2005, following an unsuccessful effort to create additional dock space, plaintiff presented a legal memorandum to defendant setting forth his legal and factual arguments in support of his claim that his deed granted to him an easement appurtenant entitling him to place a dock where his uncle's dock had previously been placed and that the presence of Blaauboer's dock violated his rights. Plaintiff took no other action to preserve these claims at that time. In June 2019, defendant filed a "Declaration of Covenants, Restrictions and Easements for Real Property" with the Saratoga County Clerk's office. As relevant here, this document specifically stated that "[d]ock license privileges[ ] are licenses, not easements or deed appurtenances, and as such may be modified, revoked or rescinded by [defendant] at any time."

In July 2019, plaintiff commenced this action seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief relating to his right to place a dock in the same location where his uncle's dock once stood pursuant to the alleged easement contained in his deed. Specifically, plaintiff's amended verified complaint sought (1) to cancel an instrument of record pursuant to Real Property Law § 329, (2) a declaratory judgment that the beach rights contained in his deed "are an easement and not a license," (3) to quiet title pursuant to RPAPL article 15, and (4) injunctive relief, compelling Blaauboer to remove his dock so that plaintiff could place his dock in the same location. The amended complaint also alleged a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action. Defendant moved pre-answer to dismiss the complaint against it – which motion was deemed to include the amended complaint upon its filing – based upon documentary evidence, failure to state a cause of action and because the claims were time-barred (see CPLR 3211[a][1], [5], [7] ). Defendant also sought an award of counsel fees pursuant to its bylaws. Supreme Court granted defendant's motion, finding all of plaintiff's claims to be time-barred, and awarded defendant counsel fees. Plaintiff appeals.¹

Plaintiff argues that Supreme Court erred in dismissing the amended complaint solely on statute of limitations grounds, as he holds an express "deeded appurtenant easement" that can only be extinguished by abandonment or adverse possession, neither of which occurred here. An easement appurtenant "is created through a written conveyance, subscribed by the grantors, that burdens the servient estate for the benefit of the dominant estate" ( Northwood Sch., Inc. v. Fletcher, 190 A.D.3d 1136, 1138, 140 N.Y.S.3d 297 [2021] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). "[I]t is well settled that, once created, an easement appurtenant runs with the land and passes to subsequent owners of the dominant estate through appurtenant clauses, even if not specifically mentioned in the deed" ( id. at 1139, 140 N.Y.S.3d 297 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Once such easement is created, it can only be extinguished by abandonment, conveyance, condemnation or adverse possession (see id. ). "The extent and nature of an easement must be determined by the language contained in the grant, aided where necessary by any circumstances tending to manifest the intent of the parties" ( Meadow at Clarke Hollow Bay, LLC v. White, 155 A.D.3d 1325, 1326, 65 N.Y.S.3d 326 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

As relevant here, plaintiff's deed provided that "[i]t is also intended to convey...