Withrow v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 11 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:14-cv-3037-FVS,1:14-cv-3037-FVS |
| Parties | JESSICA WITHROW, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Washington |
BEFORE THE COURT are cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Ct. Rec. 15, 18.) Attorney D. James Tree represents plaintiff; Special Assistant United States Attorney Jeffrey E. Staples represents defendant. After reviewing the administrative record and briefs filed by the parties, the court GRANTS plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff Jessica Withrow (plaintiff) protectively filed for supplemental security income (SSI) on November 10, 2010. (Tr. 150, 160.) Plaintiff alleged an onset date of November 1, 2009. (Tr. 150.) Benefits were denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 98, 105.) Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), which was held before ALJ Wayne N. Araki on October 31, 2012. (Tr. 34-74.) Plaintiff was represented by counsel and testified at the hearing. (Tr. 35-64.) Vocational expert Leta Berkshire also testified. (Tr. 64-73.) The ALJ denied benefits (Tr. 18-28) and the Appeals Council denied review. (Tr. 1.) The matter is now before this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The facts of the case are set forth in the administrative hearing transcripts, the ALJ's decision, and the briefs of plaintiff and the Commissioner, and will therefore only be summarized here.
Plaintiff was 24 years old at the time of the hearing. (Tr. 53.) She testified she finished the ninth grade. (Tr. 36.) She did not start tenth grade. (Tr. 37.) She started living on her own at age 16. (Tr. 37.) She testified she doesn't really do anything during the day because she is depressed. (Tr. 41.) She sees a counselor once a month for her depression. (Tr. 41.) She has tried medication for depression, but it made her feel "like a zombie" and she would "freak out." (Tr. 43.) She sleeps a lot. (Tr. 60.) Some days she does not get out of bed. (Tr. 60.) She has anxiety. (Tr. 44.) Plaintiff was diagnosed with ADHD as a child. (Tr. 50.) She has work experience housekeeping and at a fast food restaurant. (Tr. 51.) She feels she cannot work a 40-hour workweek because of her depression, anxiety and mood swings. (Tr. 64.) She feels like she needs to be on medicine and she needs help with her problems. (Tr. 53.) She has no friends. (Tr. 54.) She had a previous boyfriend who was abusive. (Tr. 56.) She has nightmares and feels guilty, worthless, helpless and bad about herself. (Tr. 56-57.) She does not feel safe. (Tr. 57.) She snaps at people by raising her voice and swearing. (Tr. 58-59.) She loses track of what she is doing and starts something else. (Tr. 61.) She has a hard time keeping track of things like her keys and wallet. (Tr. 61.)
Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of a Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A Court must uphold the Commissioner's decision, made through an ALJ, when the determination is not based on legal error and is supported by substantial evidence. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F. 2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F. 3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). "The [Commissioner's] determination that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence." Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975), but less than a preponderance. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 601-602 (9th Cir. 1989); Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence "means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citations omitted). "[S]uch inferences and conclusions as the [Commissioner] may reasonably draw from the evidence" will also be upheld. Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). On review, the Court considers the record as a whole, not just the evidence supporting the decisionof the Commissioner. Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir. 1980)).
It is the role of the trier of fact, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in evidence. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. If evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will still be set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision. Brawner v. Sec'y of Health and Human Serv., 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, if there is substantial evidence to support the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence that will support a finding of either disability or nondisability, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987).
The Social Security Act (the "Act") defines "disability" as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423 (d)(1)(A), 1382c (a)(3)(A). The Act also provides that a plaintiff shall be determined to be under a disability only if his impairments are of such severity that plaintiff is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering plaintiff's age, education and work experiences, engage in any other substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). Thus, the definition of disability consists of both medical and vocational components. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001).
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Step one determines if he or she is engaged in substantial gainful activities. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activities, benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(I), 416.920(a)(4)(I).
If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activities, the decision maker proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment orcombination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the disability claim is denied.
If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step, which compares the claimant's impairment with a number of listed impairments acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii); 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P App. 1. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled.
If the impairment is not one conclusively presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, which determines whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing work he or she has performed in the past. If plaintiff is able to perform his or her previous work, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At this step, the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") assessment is considered.
If the claimant cannot perform this work, the fifth and final step in the process determines whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy in view of his or her residual functional capacity and age, education and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987).
The initial burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish a prima facie case of entitlement to disability benefits. Rhinehart v. Finch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th Cir. 1971); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999). The initial burden is met once the claimant establishes that a physical or mental impairment prevents him from engaging in his or her previous occupation. The burden then shifts, at step five, to the Commissioner to show that (1) the claimant can perform other substantial gainful activity and (2) a "significant number of jobs exist in the national economy" which the claimant can perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir. 1984). If the Commissioner does not meet that burden, the claimant is found to be disabled. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).
At step one of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity since November 10, 2010, the application date. (Tr. 20.) At step two, the ALJ found plaintiff had the following severe impairments: major depressive disorder; anxiety disorder/post-traumatic stress disorder; and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. (Tr. 20.) At step three, the ALJ found plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairmentsthat meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. (Tr. 21.) The ALJ then determined:
[C]laimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all physical exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: the claimant is able to remember, understand and carry out...
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