Witt v. St. Paul & N. P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 10 January 1888
• Citation: Witt v. St. Paul & N. P. Ry. Co., 38 Minn. 122, 35 N. W. 862 (Minn. 1888)
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: WITT v ST. PAUL & N. P. RY. CO.

38 Minn. 122

35 N.W. 862

WITTvST. PAUL & N. P. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

January 10, 1888.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Where, in condemnation proceedings by a railway company, a village lot is appropriated under the description thereof as designated by a survey and plat of the same, the company takes presumptively to the center of the street. And, subject to the public easement and the control of the proper public authorities, the company acquires the same interest in that portion of the lot so taken lying in the street as to the remainder thereof, and may apply it to the same uses.

Actual possession is sufficient evidence of title to enable the party in possession of land to maintain trespass against a stranger.

It is a cardinal rule of construction, to ascertain and give effect, if practicable, to the intention of the parties as gathered from the language of a deed, the situation of the parties, and the subject-matter. All parts of the instrument are to be considered together, and the construction is to be upon the whole, if the different parts can stand together. The words of a deed are to be taken as the grantor's, and any ambiguity or uncertainty is to be resolved in favor of the grantee; but technical rules of construction are not to be so applied as to defeat the manifest intention of the parties.

Where the grant is in general terms, a particular exception is good; and so also a general description of land conveyed by deed may be limited and restrained by a particular description.

Where a grantor and his wife, who had been in possession without color of title of certain village lots, (in connection with others in the same block held under a tax title which appeared of record,) under circumstances tending to show adverse possession thereof, the lots being situated in, and a part of, block 10, (according to the plat of a certain addition,) executed a deed to a purchaser containing the following description, viz.: “All of blocks 10 and 11,” (in the same addition,) “intending to convey only those lots in said blocks 10 and 11 which have been quitclaimed to the parties of the first part, or either of them, by conveyance of tax titles,” held, that there passed by the deed only such lots as were acquired under the conveyance of tax titles.

To make a case of adverse possession which will be recognized as equivalent to title, it must have been continued for the statutory time under the original hostile entry; and each succeeding occupant must show title under his predecessor, and his possession be referable to such entry.¹

Appeal from district court, Hennepin county; REA, Judge.

D. A. Secombe, for St. Paul & N. P. Ry. Co., appellant.

A. B. Jackson, for Charles Witt, respondent.

VANDERBURGH, J.

The plaintiff seeks to recover damages against the defendant, for certain acts of trespass to several village lots alleged to belong to him, and specifically described as lots 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14, in block 10, in Demmon's addition to North Minneapolis, according to the recorded plat of the same. The pleadings, however, admit that the defendant has duly taken and appropriated for its railroad, by virtue of condemnation proceedings, under Gen. St. 1878, tit. 1, c. 34, lot 13, the front 55 feet of lots 8 and 9, and also that part of the street lying in front of and adjoining lot 14, above described, and that it has built its railroad upon the front 55 feet of lots 8 and 9 over and upon the front portions of lots 10 and 11, and in the street in front of lots 12 and 13, and in the street over the strip condemned in front of lot 14.

1. As respects lots 8, 9, and 13, the trespasses complained of consisted in excavations or embankments caused to be made by the company in that half of the street in front of and next adjoining the lots. By the descriptions under which the lots were condemned and appropriated, the company took presumptively to the center of the street; and, subject to the rights of the public, the defendant may enter upon and may use that portion of the street so acquired for its improvements, just as it may use and occupy any other portions of the lots in question. Under a description of village lots eo nomine, as platted, the land in the street passes as parcel of the lots, and not as appurtenant. In re Robbins, 34 Minn. 99, 24 N. W. Rep. 356. And under that description, the title, right, or interest acquired, whatever it be, in the street is presumed to be included in the estimation of the value or damages in the condemnation proceedings, and such estimation is usually deemed to be the value of the lot as described, whether in such proceedings under railway charters, the company requires the fee or the land for its corporate purposes only. Robbins v. Railroad, 22 Minn. 287. No damages were recoverable by plaintiff for the alleged trespasses to these lots.

2. The defendant has acquired no part of lot 14, save that portion which lies in the street, and plaintiff alleges ownership and possession of the balance of the lot. The evidence tends to show that he was, at the time of the alleged trespass, in the possession thereof, and justifies an allowance of damages in his favor. It is not material to inquire whether he produced any other evidence of title in himself, since possession was prima facie sufficient against a mere trespasser. Sherin v. Brackett, 30 N. W. Rep. 551, 552.

3. As to the lots 10, 11, and 12, the defendant established on the trial, by indisputable evidence, its ownership of the paper title regularly derived from the patentee of the United States, and is the actual owner thereof in fee, and entitled to the possession of the same, unless its grantors were disseized and barred by an actual adverse possession, which has inured to the benefit of plaintiff, and ripened into a right of possession equivalent to title.

The plaintiff, to support his title, offered evidence tending to show that one Peter Poncin, who had no color of title to these lots on or before the year 1864, entered and occupied block 10, in which they are included in connection with the adjoining blocks 9 and 11, which were all inclosed together, including the streets. The evidence also tended to prove that Poncin had and claimed title to block 9, except one lot, and upon this block he resided and erected substantial improvements; and blocks 10 and 11, which were inclosed in part by line fences of the neighbors, connected by a fence built and maintained by him, together with the intervening streets, were used by him, in connection with block 9, chiefly for pasturage and tillage. His occupancy continued down to the year 1871, when he made a sale and conveyance to one Fluhrer, who immediately entered into possession, lived upon block 9, and used and occupied the other blocks as Poncin had done. After several years, Fluhrer died; but his widow continued in possession until she sold to the grantor of plaintiff in the year 1879, who immediately succeeded to her possession, and has since retained the same. No deeds or record evidence of these sales and transfers were introduced by plaintiff, though admitted to be in writing; but the plaintiff claims that it sufficiently appears from the evidencein his behalf that the entry of Poncin was hostile, and the possession adverse, to the present time, and that the possession of the several successive occupants was connected and continuous.

Whether, upon a careful examination and analysis the plaintiff's evidence would be found to sustain this contention, we deem it unnecessary to decide, for the reason that we are of the opinion that the record evidence of the transfers referred to introduced by the defendant, make it manifest that, as respects the three lots in question, there was no privity between the several successive occupants, and that the plaintiff has not yet acquired title thereto by adverse possession.

It appears that in 1863 a tax deed of the seven lots described in the complaint, and certain lots in block 11, was issued by the auditor of the county to a tax purchaser. In 1874 the owner of the title to lots 10, 11, and 12 in controversy bought in and acquired the interest of such tax purchaser, and in 1867 the owner of the tax title conveyed his interest in block 10, except the three lots last above mentioned, to Catherine Poncin, wife of Peter Poncin, and thereafter, in October of the same year, a lease was executed and placed on record by Catherine Poncin and husband to one Keegalsperger, of all the lots in block 9, except lot 7, and in...