Witt v. Young

• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: JOHANSON
• Citation: Witt v. Young, 275 P.3d 1218 (Wash. App. 2012)
• Decision Date: 08 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. 41641–7–II.
• Parties: Julie WITT, Respondent, v. Ronald D. YOUNG, as the personal representative of the Estate of Danny Merle Young, deceased and the Estate of Danny Merle Young, deceased, Appellant.

275 P.3d 1218

Julie WITT, Respondent,

v.Ronald D. YOUNG, as the personal representative of the Estate of Danny Merle Young, deceased and the Estate of Danny Merle Young, deceased, Appellant.

No. 41641–7–II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

May 8, 2012.

William Hudson Dunn Jr., Attorney at Law, Vancouver, WA, for Appellant.

Brian a Walker, Brian Walker Law Firm, P.C., Vancouver, WA, for Respondent.

JOHANSON, J.

¶ 1 Ronald Young, the personal representative of Danny Merle Young's estate (the Estate), challenges the trial court's denial of the Estate's summary judgment motion seeking dismissal of Julie Witt's complaint against the Estate. Witt's complaint alleged that a portion of the Estate's property was her property based on a long-term, committed, intimate relationship.¹ The Estate argues that Witt's complaint was barred by the nonclaim statute, RCW 11.40.010, because Witt failed to comply with RCW 11.40.100(1) ² when she filed suit more than 30 days after the Estate rejected her creditor's claim. Because Witt's complaint did not involve a claim against the decedent, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2 In 1992, at a point when neither had any real property or significant personal property, Danny Merle Young and Julie Witt met, started a relationship, and began living together.³ Although they never married, Young and Witt held themselves out to the public as a married couple.

¶ 3 During the relationship, Young received disability income and Witt worked. Also during their relationship, they acquired and maintained a home on 15 acres,⁴ several vehicles, tools, and various household furnishings.

¶ 4 Young died intestate on September 26, 2009. Young's brother Ronald Young was appointed as the personal representative of Young's estate. According to the Estate, on March 16, 2010, Witt filed a “Creditor's Claim” in the estate proceedings, asserting that she had been in a committed, intimate relationship with Young and that she therefore had an equitable claim on all of Young's real and personal property.⁵ Clerk's Papers (CP) at 9. On March 29, the Estate rejected Witt's claim.⁶ The rejection notice stated, “that, unless suit was brought on the claim within thirty days of service of the Rejection, the Claim would be forever barred.” ⁷ CP at 9.

¶ 5 On June 16, more than 30 days after the Estate rejected Witt's claim, she filed a “Complaint for Partition of Real and Personal Property” against the Estate.⁸ CP at 3 (capitalization omitted). In her complaint, Witt argued that by virtue of her committed, intimate relationship with Young, she had an interest in all personal and real property acquired by either or both of them during their relationship, that they were “tenants in common in all personal and real property acquired by them both” during their relationship, and that she was “entitled to an equitable share of all personal and real property acquired by either or both of them” during their relationship. CP at 5.

¶ 6 The Estate filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss Witt's complaint. It argued that Witt's complaint was untimely under RCW 11.40.100(1) and, therefore, the nonclaim statute barred it. Witt responded that she had a “vested interest” in “one-half” of the property the Estate claimed based on her “marital-like relationship” with Young, which created a “quasi community property estate.” CP at 14–15. And she argued that the Estate could not claim property that belonged to her rather than to Young. The Estate replied that case law clearly established that the nonclaim statute applied to all claims against the Estate and asserted that Witt had not claimed an interest in any specific property. It also noted that other cases have considered similar claims “in the context of a duly filed creditor's claim.” CP at 16. The trial court orally denied the motion for summary judgment.

¶ 7 The Estate then moved for reconsideration based on additional facts that it alleged “prove[d] that [Witt] does not have any interest in any of the assets of the estate.” CP at 29. The Estate also directed the trial court to Davis v. Shepard, 135 Wash. 124, 237 P. 21 (1925), asserting that this case established that the nonclaim statute applied when the property at issue “ ‘is confused with’ ” a trustee's property to the extent that its identity is lost and the claimant effectively becomes the same as a general creditor, to whom the nonclaim statute applies. CP at 30 (quoting Davis, 135 Wash. at 128, 237 P. 21).

¶ 8 The trial court issued a written order denying both the summary judgment motion and the motion for reconsideration. The trial court then certified this case for discretionary review under RAP 2.3(b)(4), and the Estate moved for discretionary review. We granted discretionary review.

ANALYSIS

¶ 9 The Estate argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion for summary judgment because (1) an allegation of an interest in the Estate's property based on a committed, intimate relationship with the decedent is a “ ‘claim against decedent’ within the meaning of RCW 11.40.010”; and (2) Witt's claim was therefore untimely under the nonclaim statute. Br. of Appellant at 8. We disagree.

I. Standard of Review

¶ 10 We review a trial court's summary judgment order de novo to determine whether, taking all the facts and reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hertog v. City of Seattle, 138 Wash.2d 265, 275, 979 P.2d 400 (1999) (citing Taggart v. State, 118 Wash.2d 195, 199, 822 P.2d 243 (1992)).

II. Nonclaim Statute Does Not Apply

¶ 11 The Estate argues that Witt's claim based on her committed, intimate relationship with Young is the equivalent of a creditor's claim; the nonclaim statute, RCW 11.40.010 applies; and Witt's failure to comply with RCW 11.40.100(1) therefore precludes her claim. We disagree.

¶ 12 RCW 11.40.010 provides in part:

A person having a claim against the decedent may not maintain an action on the claim unless a personal representative has been appointed and the claimant has presented the claim as set forth in this chapter.

(Emphasis added). Thus, to establish that the nonclaim statute applies to Witt's claim, the Estate must show that the claim is a “claim against the decedent.” RCW 11.40.010. This it fails to do.

A. Property Rights Based on a Committed, Intimate Relationship

¶ 13 First, as a preliminary matter, Olver v. Fowler, 161 Wash.2d 655, 168 P.3d 348 (2007), establishes that Witt potentially has property rights in the property that she and Young acquired over the course of their relationship. In Olver, our Supreme Court held that community property law applied by analogy when evaluating the property rights of a deceased partner of a committed, intimate relationship. Olver, 161 Wash.2d at 670–71, 168 P.3d 348. It stated, “The death of one or both partners does not extinguish that right; [the deceased's] estate merely steps into [the deceased partner's] shoes.” Olver, 161 Wash.2d at 670–71, 168 P.3d 348. The Estate argues that Olver is not applicable because the claimant in that case brought the claim as a challenge to the inventory the estate filed and “[n]o violation of the nonclaim statute was alleged or invoked.” Reply at 8. But Witt's filing clearly identifies itself as a “Complaint for Partition of Real and Personal Property” against the Estate. CP at 3. And the Estate cites no authority establishing that Witt cannot bring a partition action solely because she originally filed a creditor's claim.

¶ 14 The Estate also argues that marriage and committed, intimate relationships are not treated the same under the law. The Estate cites Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash.2d 339, 348–49, 898 P.2d 831 (1995), for the premise that the laws related to distribution of marital property do not apply directly to the division of property when a committed, intimate relationship ends. The Estate is correct that the laws related to the distribution of marital property apply to committed, intimate relationships by analogy and that there may be subtle differences in their applications. But it is clear that these laws can and do offer “guidance.” Connell, 127 Wash.2d at 349, 898 P.2d 831. The Connell court limited the application of community property law to property the parties acquired during the relationship. But this has nothing to do with whether Witt's claim was a “claim against the decedent.” RCW 11.40.010. It is, instead, an issue of how to characterize the property that can be addressed if Witt is allowed to pursue her claim for partition.

B. Not a Claim Against the Decedent

¶ 15 Smith v. McLaren, 58 Wash.2d 907, 909, 365 P.2d 331 (1961), and Olsen v. Roberts, 42 Wash.2d 862, 865–66, 259 P.2d 418 (1953), establish that Witt's claim is not a “claim against the decedent” subject to the nonclaim statute based on Witt's alleged failure to comply with RCW 11.40.100(1). Smith and Olsen both hold that a claim for property as a tenant in common is not a creditor's claim and that a complaint claiming rights in the property as a tenant in common is not an action by a creditor of the estate. The court noted that these were not claims that the estate was indebted to the parties seeking relief and that the actions merely sought to establish the parties' interests in specific property and to exclude that interest from the estates' inventories. Smith, 58 Wash.2d at 909, 365 P.2d 331; Olsen, 42 Wash.2d at 865–66, 259 P.2d 418. The Olsen court specifically stated,

“To constitute a claim against the estate of a deceased person, an obligation must consist of a debt incurred by or for the decedent during his lifetime.

“Where, on the other hand, the recovery of specific property is sought on the ground that such property is impressed with a trust for the benefit of the person claiming it, and the particular property is properly identified or traced,...