Wivagg v. Duquesne Light Co.
Decision Date | 09 July 1975 |
Docket Number | 80 |
Parties | Wivagg v. Duquesne Light Company |
Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
October term, 1972.
Plaintiffs' motion for new trial; defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v.
Loyal H. Gregg and Jack Palkovitz, for plaintiffs.
James E. Coyne, for defendant.
This matter is before the court en banc on defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. and plaintiffs' motion for new trial.
Plaintiffs brought this action against the Duquesne Light Company to recover economic loss and property damage to their printing business and the building in which it was located. Plaintiffs claim that the fire which destroyed the building and its contents was proximately caused by (1) negligent installation and maintenance of electrical wires and equipment immediately outside and leading into the printing shop; and (2) breaches of defendant's implied warranties of merchantability and fitness to provide safe and hazard-free electrical service. The jury found no negligence, but returned a verdict for $ 50,000 for breach of the implied warranties. Defendant's contention throughout trial and in its motion for judgment n.o.v. raises the recently disputed issue of whether the courts will imply a warranty of fitness or merchantability in a sales-service hybrid transaction. More particularly, this court is confronted with the problem of determining whether an implied warranty of safe and hazard-free electrical service can arise from the supply of electricity by a public utility. Basically, defendant argues that the supply of electrical power is essentially a transaction for services, not a sale of goods within the scope of the Uniform Commercial Code of April 6, 1953, P.L. 3, as amended, 12A P. S. § § 2-104(1) (merchant), 2-105(1) (goods), 2-106(1) (contract for sale; sale), 2-314 (implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for ordinary purposes), and 2-315 (implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose). Defendant argues that the implied warranties attach to sales, and since this transaction was not a sale, there can be no warranties, exclusive of those expressed. Consequently, defendant suggests that the court should apply only the traditional standard of negligence to the power company's activities relating to its electrical service. See York Heating & Vent. Co. v. Flannery, 87 Pa.Super 19, 23-4 (1926).
To determine whether warranty or negligence law applied to a particular transaction, the Pennsylvania courts, as well as the majority of American jurisdictions, have distinguished between a sale and a service. The courts have made the distinction on the basis of whether the work or service is the essence of the transaction or whether it is merely incidental to the materials supplied. See Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 654, 663-64 (1957). However, to apply warranty concepts in those cases where the court can " find" a technical sale would seem to elevate from far beyond the true substance of a given transaction. Few sales of goods can be deemed pure sales. The manufacture, distribution and sale of a product involves the interplay of many individuals who provide various services to insure the ultimate sale to the consumer or user. See Nordstrom, Law of Sales, 47 (1970). The extremes of mere sale and the rendition of professional skill are separated by a continuum of sales-service hybrid transactions. Within this broad area falls the " service" of providing electricity. However, even if we refer to this product as a " service," it does not necessarily require this court to conclude that no warranties of safe and hazard-free electrical power can arise. The supply of electricity is intimately associated with the apparatus and equipment by which it is generated and conducted. It is doubtful that the sales-service dichotomy does any more than describe a result reached upon the analysis of a variety of factors: White and Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code 289 (1972). See Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir., 1964).
In Hoffman v. Misericordia Hospital, 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970), the Supreme Court resolved this issue of whether an implied warranty can attach to a sales-service hybrid transaction. In Misericordia, the court vacated the lower court's order sustaining the hospital's preliminary objections to the claim by plaintiff that his contraction of serum hepatitis from a blood transfusion was a breach of the hospital's implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for particular purpose. The court recognized that the adoption of the code did not impede the parallel development of warranties in non-sales situations, stating:
." Misericordia, supra at 507.
To arrive at this conclusion, the court relied upon Uniform Commercial Code, Comment 2 to § 2-313, 12A P.S. § 2-313, which provides:
One of the drafters of the code and a leading authority in the areas of commercial and contract law has written:
See also Nordstrom, supra, at 43, 239 (1970). And Justice Francis wrote in Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing Co., 45 N.J.Super. 434, 446 (1965):
See also Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 102 N.J.Super. 279 (1968).
In acknowledging that decisional warranties can be implied in nonsales transactions by analogy to the Uniform Commercial Code (see Farnsworth, supra, at 667-69), the Misericordia court sanctioned a case-by-case approach to the resolution of this issue. The trial court must determine " whether the policies for which warranties are implied in law would be furthered by their implication in this situation." Misericordia, supra, at 508. Subsequent to the decision in Misericordia, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted a statute which eliminated the cause of action for breach of implied warranty in cases involving blood transfusions medical transplants and the like: Act of...
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