WJ Dillner Transfer Company v. United States

• Decision Date: 08 February 1963
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 62-516.
• Citation: 214 F. Supp. 941
• Parties: W. J. DILLNER TRANSFER COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America and Interstate Commerce Commission, Defendants, Middle Atlantic Conference, Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and Central States Motor Freight Bureau, Inc., Intervenors.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

214 F. Supp. 941

W. J. DILLNER TRANSFER COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America and Interstate Commerce Commission, Defendants Middle Atlantic Conference, Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and Central States Motor Freight Bureau, Inc., Intervenors.

Civ. A. No. 62-516.

United States District Court W. D. Pennsylvania.

February 8, 1963.

Ernie Adamson, Pittsburgh, Pa., for plaintiff.

Lee Leovinger, John H. D. Wigger, U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for United States.

Robert W. Ginnane, Fritz R. Kahn, I. C. C., Washington, D. C., for I. C. C.

Bryce Rea, Jr., Watkins & Rea, Washington, D. C., John A. Vuono, Delisi & Wick, Pittsburgh, Pa., for Middle Atlantic Conference, intervenor.

Donald A. Brinkworth, Pittsburgh, Pa., for Pennsylvania Railroad, intervenor.

Earl E. Meisenbach, Chicago, Ill., John A. Vuono, Delisi & Wick, Pittsburgh, Pa., for Central States Motor Freight Bureau, intervenor.

Before STALEY, Circuit Judge, GOURLEY, Chief District Judge, and WILLSON, District Judge.

WILLSON, District Judge.

This is an action to annul, vacate and set aside an Order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. A Three Judge Court was empaneled to hear and determine this matter pursuant to the provisions of Section 2284 of Title 28 United State Code by Order of Chief Judge John Biggs, Jr., Third Judicial Circuit entered September 13, 1962. Thereafter, Middle Atlantic Conference, Pennsylvania Railroad Company and Central States Motor Freight Bureau, Inc., were permitted to intervene.

Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendants in their answer sought dismissal of the complaint only. At the hearing all parties agreed that there was no dispute as to any issues of fact. In order, however, that the record be clear, defendant was permitted to and has filed a formal written motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. At the hearing there were no matters outside the pleadings presented to the court which in any wise affect the decision except the tariff which is referred to in the complaint and answer and submitted to the court by plaintiff. The discussion and conclusion which follows is based solely on the pleadings, affidavits^* and appendix attached to plaintiff's motion, the tariff submitted, Interstate Commerce Commission and court decisions relating to the particular matter now before the court.

On May 29, 1962 plaintiff filed with the Commission its tariff MF-I.C.C. No. 16 in proper form and manner. The tariff as filed was to become effective June 30, 1962. It was thus filed 32 days prior to its effective date. Protests to the tariff were filed on June 18, 1962 and June 19, 1962. On June 28, 1962, Division 2 of the Commission rejected the tariff and directed that it be returned to the plaintiff. The reason given by the Commission in its Order rejecting the tariff was the following:

"It further appearing, that W. J. Dillner Transfer Company has filed with this Commission its tariff MF-I.C.C. No. 16, which states certain rates, charges, and provisions for transportation services in interstate and foreign commerce for which the said carrier holds no operating authority as required by Section 206 of the Interstate Commerce Act, and that said tariff publication is therefore unlawful and may not be retained in the Commission's files:"

Plaintiff contends that the action of the Commission in rejecting the tariff in the manner in which it did, was arbitrary and capricious and without authority in law. It is contended by plaintiff that the written protests by the intervening defendants were filed with the Suspension Board of the Commission but that the Suspension Board took no action in suspending the tariff. Therefore, says plaintiff, the tariff being in proper form and manner should have been permitted to become effective on June 30, 1962. Further, says plaintiff, it was summarily and arbitrarily treated in the manner in which its application for a hearing was rejected. In support of this charge plaintiff reviews the record which shows that notice of rejection was served on plaintiff June 29th. The next day, June 30th, plaintiff filed a petition for reconsideration and vacation of the Order rejecting the tariff. This application was denied by an Order of the Commission entered July 3, 1962. Plaintiff contends that it was entitled to a hearing on its application for reconsideration of the rejection order. Plaintiff's prayer for relief is that the rejection order of the Commission be vacated and set aside and that the tariff be reinstated, and in the alternative that a hearing be directed.

The foregoing is a brief summary of the record made before the Commission and from it the issue seems to be clear. The defendants' contention before this court is that even though the tariff, on the basis of its outward appearance, may have been received for filing, such filing is no bar to its subsequent rejection prior to its effective date, where following the filing of protests by other carriers and answers thereto by plaintiff, the Commission determines that the tariff has no proper place in its files. The reason, say the defendants, is that time and time again the Commission had determined that Dillner had no authority to transport firebrick and ferro alloys. The Commission contends that it has the power to reject a tariff without a hearing which names rates for the interstate transportation of commodities for which the carrier holds no operating authority. The tariff as filed has been exhibited to the court. A decision of this court, W. J. Dillner Transfer Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 193 F.Supp. 823, W.D.Pa.1961, held that Dillner had no authority under its certificate to transport firebrick. In its brief the defendant refers to prior Orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission which show that plaintiff is without authority to transport firebrick or ferro alloys. The several Orders on this subject by the Commission were:

In Docket No. MC-C-1766, W. J. Dillner Transfer Co. Investigation of Operations, by report and order entered April 10, 1959, and reported at 79 M.C.C. 335, 357, the entire Commission found that "the transportation by Dillner of * * * firebrick, is not authorized by its certificate and is unlawful." Its determination was affirmed by the entire Commission by Orders entered September 23, 1959, January 13, 1960, and August 1, 1960. The Commission's actions in that proceeding were sustained by this Court in the case previously cited, W. J. Dillner Transfer Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 193 F.Supp. 823, 826 (W.D.Pa. 1961), aff'd mem. 368 U.S. 6 82 S. Ct. 16, 7 L.Ed.2d 16 (1961).

In Docket No. MC-21623 (Sub-No. 80), W. J. Dillner Transfer Co., Extension — Ferro Alloys, the Commission, Division 1, in its report and order entered December 22, 1960, found with respect to ferro alloys that "the transportation of these products * * * on pallets by applicant * * * is unlawful." This determination was affirmed by the entire Commission by orders entered May 9, 1961 and September 8, 1961.

In Docket No. MC-C-3447, W. J. Dillner Transfer Co. — Petition for Declaratory Order, the Commission, Division 1, by order entered November 8, 1961, dismissed the plaintiff's petition for declaratory order seeking the interpretation of its certificate to include the right to transport articles that are bundled or packaged for shipment and ferro alloys, among other commodities. The order stated that "most of the issues presented thereby have been fully litigated in Docket No. MC-C-1766 and no further interpretation of the petitioner's certificate of public convenience and necessity appears at this time to be warranted". Dismissal of plaintiff's petition was affirmed by the entire Commission by order entered April 17, 1962.

In Docket No. MC-21623 (Sub-No. 81), W. J. Dillner Transfer Co. Extension — Firebrick on Pallets, the plaintiff filed an application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing it to transport firebrick on pallets and ferro alloys, among other commodities, accompanied by its motion to dismiss on the ground that it already held the requisite operating authority. By order entered November 8, 1961, the Commission, Division 1, denied the motion to dismiss as to firebrick, and by Order entered December 4, 1961, it denied the motion as to ferro alloys. Denial of the plaintiff's motion was affirmed by the entire Commission by order entered April 17, 1962.

The plaintiff's application in that proceeding remains pending before the Commission.

It is noticed in regard to the foregoing action of the Commission that in its brief Dillner contends that Tariff MF 16 does not contain the words "firebrick or ferro alloys" except those requiring special equipment to load, unload or transport. However, on examination of the tariff exhibited to the court, pp. 259 thru 273 show "Refractory Products, High Temperature, on pallets," under which is listed "brick, shapes; ore, chrome; Pressed Brick;". Ferro Alloys is likewise listed in Section 6 pp. 49 through 55. At the argument counsel for plaintiff mentioned the rather voluminous document comprising the tariff as filed consisting of 285 pages and that the two commodities mentioned in any event covered but a small portion of the commodity rates filed and therefore the commission was arbitrary in rejecting the whole tariff. Counsel for the Commission, however, in reply stated that Dillner's tariff could be refiled and no doubt would be accepted on deletion of the matters covering commodities for which it had no authority. Plaintiff's burden in this case and other cases of this kind is heavy. It must show that the Commission Orders were invalid as unjust and unreasonable. The prior case decided that point, W. J. Dillner v. Interstate Commerce Commission, supra. This court concludes that the language in the new tariff seeks to establish rates on commodities, i. e. firebrick...