Wlodarek v. Wlodarek

• Decision Date: 22 November 1934
• Docket Number: 26,27.
• Citation: 175 A. 455,167 Md. 556
• Parties: WLODAREK v. WLODAREK (TWO CASES).
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

175 A. 455

167 Md. 556

WLODAREK v. WLODAREK (TWO CASES).

Nos. 26, 27.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

November 22, 1934

Appeals from Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City; Eugene O'Dunne, Judge.

Suit by Eva Wlodarek, surviving widow of Stanislaus Wlodarek against Stanislawa Wlodarek, now known as Stanislawa Gilden, one of the executrices of the last will and testament of Stanislaus Wlodarek, deceased, and against Stanislawa Wlodarek, now known as Stanislawa Gilden, individually, and others in which the named defendant interposed demurrers in her representative and individual capacities. From a decree overruling the demurrers, the named defendant appeals in her representative and individual capacities.

Appeal dismissed as to first appeal, and decree affirmed as to second appeal.

Argued before BOND, C.J., and URNER, ADKINS, OFFUTT, PARKE, and SLOAN, JJ.

Joseph Loeffler, of Baltimore (Benjamin Unger and William J Stocksdale, both of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant in both cases.

Avrum K. Rifman, of Baltimore (Stuart M. Yeatman and Joseph Bernstein, both of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee in both cases.

PARKE Judge.

The two appeals on this record are from a decree overruling two demurrers to the amended bill of complaint of Eva Wlodarek widow of Stanislaus Wlodarek, deceased, against Stanislawa Wlodarek, Sofie Kwiatkevoski, Alexander J. Lane, executors of the will of Stanislaus Wlodarek, deceased, Thomas J. Grattan and Stanislawa Wlodarek, also known as Elizabeth Wlodarek, individually, defendants. The two demurrers were on identical grounds and were interposed by Stanislawa Wlodarek, but one was filed in her own behalf and the other in her representative capacity as one of the three executors of Stanislaus Wlodarek. An appeal was taken on each ruling. The plaintiff has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal in the representative capacity on the ground that one of the three coexecutors may not appeal. In the instant cause, the two other executors had answered the amended bill of complaint.

The amended bill of complaint is wordy and unnecessarily burdened with detail. An analysis of its substantial averments discloses that it charges a marriage of the plaintiff, a widow, with Stanislaus Wlodarek, a widower, on December 2, 1922, when the spouses were each near the age of sixty-eight years. Before their marriage, the plaintiff had lived with her widowed daughter, where she was courted by the widower for some six months, and they became engaged five or six weeks prior to their marriage. The plaintiff had worked for sixteen years in a menial position with a public service corporation, which, in four years more, would have retired her on a pension of $8 a week during the remainder of her life. Her future husband had her leave this service and sacrifice her prospective pension to become his wife. The day before the ceremony, the widower took his betrothed to his home at 419 South Durham street, Baltimore, and while there a man, who was unknown to the plaintiff, called and he and the prospective husband requested her to sign a paper. She inquired what they wanted from her, as she did not owe any one, and her future husband told her that she should sign her name and the property in which he resided, where they all were at the time, and in which the couple intended to live, would be her property when he died. In the belief that this representation was a fact, the plaintiff signed the paper at the foot of the page as directed, and without being informed or knowing its actual contents, but believing the instrument was as stated to her. After the plaintiff signed, she never saw the document again, nor had a copy.

The plaintiff was of German birth, and could neither read nor write English, and was only able to sign her name, as her education was one year in a German school. In addition, she was wholly unexperienced in all business transactions, while the prospective husband had been a builder and contractor for a great many years and was accustomed to the methods of business and the making of contracts. The third person present at the transaction was the representative of the husband, and there was no one there with whom the plaintiff could consult with reference to her execution of the proffered writing, nor was there any opportunity afforded for her to consult any member of her family or a legal adviser in regard to the effect of the paper which she was urged to execute, although her betrothed knew she was illiterate and inexperienced in business matters, and dependent upon him for advice and guidance.

The day after this document was executed, the wedding took place without any member of the wife's family being present. From the time of the marriage until the husband's death on July 26, 1933, the pair lived together in the husband's home, without the wife knowing or suspecting the real nature of the instrument which she had signed. On July 17, 1933, an operation for cancer was performed on the husband; and on the following July 26 the husband died, leaving a purporting will bearing date July 20, 1933, which was in the custody of Alexander J. Lane, an attorney at law and one of the executors, from its execution until it was probated on August 4, 1933. By this will, the surviving wife was bequeathed the sum of $200; three grandchildren $300; three of his children $100 each; and a fourth child and her husband $500 each; and all the residue of his estate was devised and bequeathed to his other daughter, Stanislawa Wlodarek. The residuary legatee, his daughter receiving a bequest of $500, and Alexander J. Lane were made the executors.

On October 5, 1933, the widow filed a caveat to the will on the grounds of fraud, undue influence, and mental incapacity, and the defendants answered in denial. Simultaneously with the filing of the caveat, the widow began proceedings in equity for an assignment of dower in certain fee-simple property of which she alleged her husband had died seized and possessed. On November 21, 1933, the defendant executors filed a supplemental answer to the petition and caveat setting up by way of further defense that by reason of an antenuptial contract between the plaintiff and her husband she had no right to object to the probate of the will of the husband. On the same ground that the wife had no interest in the real estate of the husband by reason of an antenuptial agreement, the defendants resisted her suit to have her dower assigned.

An investigation by her counsel resulted in the plaintiff learning that the paper writing, which she had signed on December 1, 1922, upon the representation that it would assure her the home of her husband, after his death, was, in form and effect, an antenuptial agreement that had been recorded among the land records of Baltimore City on March 5, 1927. At the time of the execution of this contract, the prospective wife had no real property of any kind, as the intended husband knew, and her personalty consisted of her accumulated savings of $3,000. The prospective husband owned a leasehold estate in a lot whereon the yearly ground rent issuing therefrom was $19, and three valuable fee-simple lots, two of which were improved by brick residences, and one of which was the home in which he had lived, and where he had taken his wife after marriage. In addition to this real and leasehold property, the future husband had savings accounts and bank deposits that made his net aggregate wealth approximately $20,000. The antenuptial contract was that the prospective husband and wife should, after the marriage, each continue to possess and enjoy all his or her existing and future real and personal property, with full power without the joinder of the other, to dispose of the same absolutely or conditionally by deed or will, notwithstanding coverture, as fully as though each had remained single; and that, upon the death of either, the survivor should have no estate, interest, nor part in the real or personal property of which the one dying was seized, possessed, or entitled; and that either prospective spouse would execute such instruments as might be required to enable the other to convey, assign, transfer, or otherwise deal with the separate property with the same effect in law as if done by a single person.

For the purpose of making a disposition of his real and leasehold property, in accordance with the right and power agreed in the antenuptial contract, the husband, on March 15, 1929 conveyed all his fee simple and leasehold property to a certain Thomas J. Grattan, without consideration and solely as a conduit of title. At the same time, Grattan reconveyed, without consideration, all these feesimple and leasehold lots unto the husband for the term of his natural life, with full power to convey, grant, assign, lease, mortgage, or dispose of by will any or all of said lots, including therein not only his own life estate but also the estates of the remaindermen, and, if not so disposed of, then, upon the death of the husband, unto his daughters, Stanislawa Wlodarek or Gilden, also known as Elizabeth Wlodarek, and Lilly Majchrzak (nee Wlodarek), their heirs, personal representatives, and assigns absolutely. After the description of the three freehold lots and the leasehold lot conveyed, there followed the declaration that the first and secondly described freehold lots, known as No. 416 South Wolfe street, and the fourthly described leasehold lot, known as No. 604 South Wolfe street, were granted in remainder to Stanislawa Wlodarek after the death of the father, unless disposed of by him in his lifetime; and that the thirdly described lot in fee simple, known as 419 South Durham street, were granted in remainder to Lilly Majchrzak (nee Wlodarek) after the death of her fathe...