WM, In Interest of

• Decision Date: 01 August 1989
• Docket Number: No. C-88-13,C-88-13
• Citation: 778 P.2d 1106
• Parties: In the Interest of WM, a Minor Child. JW, Appellant (Respondent), v. STATE of Wyoming, ex rel. LARAMIE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL SERVICES, Appellee (Petitioner).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 1106

778 P.2d 1106

In the Interest of WM, a Minor Child.

JW, Appellant (Respondent), v. STATE of Wyoming, ex rel. LARAMIE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL SERVICES, Appellee (Petitioner).

No. C-88-13.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Aug. 1, 1989.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 25, 1989.

Douglas J. Mickey, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard E. Dixon, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Rodger McDaniel, McDaniel & Tiedeken, Cheyenne, guardian ad litem.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

The issue to be resolved in this case is whether a misinterpretation or misapplication of a statute relating to the entry of a decree of disposition placing a child in accordance with the statutes relating to juvenile courts deprived the court of jurisdiction and caused its decree to be void. The question is presented in the context of the claim of the appellant, the child's grandmother, that the district court sitting as the juvenile court erred in denying her motion to vacate the decree pursuant to Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P. ¹ After entering the decree, which placed the child with his great-aunt, the appellant's sister, in Arizona, the juvenile court judge denied the relief sought by appellant. No appeal was taken from the decree itself and, in accordance with the rule, it became final. The only question is raised by the denial of the motion for relief under Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P. We hold that the juvenile court was vested with jurisdiction in this case, and nothing occurred in the proceeding to deprive that court of jurisdiction. The ruling of the juvenile court in its Order Denying Motion to Vacate Orders is affirmed.

In her brief, the appellant states the issues to be:

"1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to vacate its Order for Custody entered July 24, 1987, on the ground that said Order is void as a result of the trial court's failure to adhere to the requirements of WYO.STAT.ANN. § 14-6-229(a), as amended.

"2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to vacate its Amended Order of Custody Order to Dismiss entered May 5, 1988, on the ground that said Order is void as a result of the trial court's failure to adhere to the requirements of WYO.STAT.ANN. § 14-6-229(a), as amended.

"3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to vacate its Order of October 23, 1986 and all subsequent orders of the trial court, on the ground that said orders are void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as required under WYO.STAT.ANN. § 14-6-203."

As appellee, the Laramie County Department of Public Assistance and Social Services (DPASS) responds by stating the following propositions:

"I. The juvenile court exercised its powers in compliance with statutory charter following an adjudication of neglect which appellant does not contest.

"II. The juvenile court has jurisdiction in all matters commenced therein concerning a minor alleged to be delinquent, which jurisdiction persists until dismissal or discharge.

"III. Appellant has benefited from all process due such a litigant; her appeal is occasioned not by a search for equity but by the desire for a different result."

The guardian ad litem appeared on behalf of the juvenile, WM, and, in a brief, posed these responses to the issues stated by the appellant:

"I. Is the order of the district court of October 23, 1986 subject to challenge under Rule 60(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure?

"II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to vacate its orders of October 23, 1986?

"III. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to vacate its orders of July 24, 1987 and May 5, 1988?"

The length of this proceeding in the juvenile court has resulted in the facts being both intricate and complex. On October 5, 1984, a petition was filed in the juvenile court by the district attorney's office alleging that WM was a neglected child as defined by § 14-6-201(a)(xvi)(B), W.S.1977 (1984 Cum.Supp.). ² The specific conduct alleged in the petition was that " * * * [O]n or about the 2nd day of September, 1984, [RC], the boyfriend of [JW, the child's mother], spanked said child with a hard object resulting in several serious bruises to the minor child's buttocks and [JW] knew of said abuse and failed to report the same or to take proper measures to protect her minor child."

The allegations of the petition were admitted, and the juvenile court ordered DPASS to prepare pre-disposition studies on both the mother and appellant, who is the mother's mother. After considering the studies, the juvenile court, on April 15, 1985, entered its order finding that WM was a neglected child and placing him in the custody of his mother, subject to the protective supervision of DPASS. This order was not challenged by appeal or otherwise, and that was the status quo until March 21, 1986. ³

On March 21, 1986, WM's mother was killed in a motorcycle/automobile accident. WM, together with two siblings, was taken in by the appellant, although she never became the formal custodian of the children by guardianship, adoption, or otherwise. Appellant had cared for her daughter's children previously, and she simply continued to do so after her daughter's death. Ultimately, other arrangements were made for the care of the two siblings, and only WM remained with appellant. DPASS continued its protective supervision under the April 15, 1985 order of the juvenile court, and it soon concluded that appellant was not able to furnish proper care for WM. On September 4, 1986, DPASS filed an Amended Petition in the same case file as the original neglect petition in which it alleged that WM was a neglected child as defined by § 14-6-201(a)(xvi)(A) (July 1986 Repl.). ⁴ Summarized briefly, the allegations of the Amended Petition were:

1. WM's mother was deceased, and her husband, the boyfriend who had abused WM, was in prison.

2. WM's putative natural father also was in prison.

3. WM had no natural guardian to provide care for him.

4. No person, institution, or agency having any responsibility for WM's welfare and also having legal custody pursuant to court order was available to provide for his care, custody, and control.

5. DPASS was required by the existing court order to supervise WM's care.

6. DPASS had concluded that appellant was unable to provide proper care for WM.

7. In the five months since the death of WM's mother, no provision had been made to more permanently place him with a legal custodian.

A copy of this Amended Petition was served upon the appellant, and she appeared to defend her interests. On October 23, 1986, the juvenile court entered an order in which it found that WM was a neglected child, and it placed him temporarily in the custody of appellant, pending completion of studies of several prospective homes. These studies, conducted by both DPASS and the guardian ad litem, supported a conclusion that it would not be in the best interests of WM to place him with appellant. A hearing was held and, on July 24, 1987, the juvenile court entered an order providing that WM should be placed with his great-aunt, the appellant's sister, still under the continued supervision of DPASS. The designated custodian lived in Arizona with her husband.

On March 28, 1988, the guardian ad litem filed a motion seeking final disposition of WM's case. The juvenile court, with all parties except the appellant in agreement, concluded that any additional legal proceeding such as the seeking of a guardianship or adoption would have to be pursued in Arizona and that the case, therefore, was ripe for final disposition by dismissal by the Wyoming court. The appellant filed a resistance to the guardian ad litem's motion in which she asserted that the juvenile court was without subject matter jurisdiction to enter the requested order. At a hearing conducted before the juvenile court on April 8, 1988, appellant argued at length her theories for the lack of jurisdiction in the district court. Through counsel, she contended that the court was without jurisdiction because there was no finding in the order entered on July 24, 1987 that WM was neglected. The second theory presented was that the juvenile court was without jurisdiction to place the child in the permanent custody of the great-aunt. Having considered these arguments, the juvenile court rejected them and, on April 21, 1988, entered an Order Continuing Custody Order to Dismiss, that was followed by an Amended Order of Custody Order to Dismiss, pursuant to which WM was placed in the physical and legal custody of the great-aunt and her husband, and the juvenile petition in the case was dismissed. No appeal was taken from either order.

On July 12, 1988, appellant filed a Motion to Vacate Orders accompanied by a Brief in Support of Motion to Vacate Orders in which the orders of the court entered on July 24, 1987 and May 5, 1988 were attacked relying upon Rule 60(b), clause (4), W.R.C.P. In its opinion letter, in which the history of the proceeding was reviewed, the juvenile court concluded it had jurisdiction to enter the challenged orders and, on October 14, 1988, it entered its order denying the relief requested by appellant. This appeal is taken from the latter order.

Appellant invokes the abuse of discretion standard for testing the order of the juvenile court from which the appeal was taken. That claim is bolstered by arguments addressed to the impropriety of the orders attacked by the motion for relief under Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P., urging an abuse of discretion with respect to those orders. The normal standard for testing orders denying relief under Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P., is abuse of discretion. R.L. Manning Company v. Millsap, 687 P.2d 252 (Wyo.1984); C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 2862 (1973). When the claim for relief is premised...