Wm. Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh

Decision Date03 October 1975
Citation346 A.2d 269,464 Pa. 168
PartiesWM. PENN PARKING GARAGE, INC., et al. v. CITY OF PITTSBURGH, Appellant.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

[464 Pa. 180] Grace S. Harris, Mead Mulvihill, Jr., Dept. of Law, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Leonard Boreman, Richard H. Martin, Baskin, Boreman, Wilner, Sachs, Gondelman & Craig, Pittsburgh, for appellees.

Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

Page 275

[464 Pa. 181] OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERTS, Justice.

On January 26, 1973, the City of Pittsburgh adopted an ordinance imposing a tax on all patrons of 'non-residential parking places' in the amount of 20% Of the consideration paid for storage of any vehicle in such a parking place. On February 14, 1973, this appeal from adoption of the ordinance, pursuant to section 6 of the Local Tax Enabling Act, 1 Act of December 31, 1965, P.L. 1257, as amended, 53 P.S. § 6906 (1972) (the Act), 2 was brought by nine operators of commercial parking facilities and fifty-five other persons. 3

[464 Pa. 182] The City filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer contending that (1) none of the plaintiffs were 'taxpayers . . . aggrieved by the ordinance' authorized by section 6 to appeal from its adoption, (2) section 6 is an unconstitutional delegation of taxing power to the judiciary 'insofar as it permits a court to determine the reasonableness of a tax rate and to reduce any rate it finds unreasonable without providing standards to guide the court's determination,' and (3) the petition failed to state a cause of action. The court of common pleas sustained the objections on both of the first two grounds asserted by the City. It therefore dismissed the petition without leave to amend.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Commonwealth Court. They admitted certain formal defects in their petition, but contended that they should have been permitted to correct these by amendment. 4 On this basis, they argued that the trial court had erred as to both substantive grounds on which it based the dismissal of the petition. The Commonwealth Court agreed with them and reversed. William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 11 Pa.Cmwlth. 507, 314 A.2d 322 (1974). Because of the importance of the issues involved to the administration of the Act, we

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allowed this appeal. 5 We affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court

Part I of this opinion will consider the contentions of the City relating to the trial court's refusal to allow [464 Pa. 183] amendment, a question which assumes peculiar importance in the procedural setting of this litigation. Part II will resolve the dispute over standing of the plaintiffs to maintain this statutory appeal. Part III will deal with the claim that the Act has unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the judiciary.

I

It is now agreed that the petition is formally defective because it fails to allege any manner in which the individual plaintiffs are 'aggrieved by the ordinance,' 6 though it has been assumed at all stages of the proceedings that they are individuals who are liable for the tax imposed by the ordinance. 7 The City maintains that this formal defect is fatal to the petition because the trial court properly refused to allow amendment.

If the trial court were correct in refusing to allow the amendment, the City's position would be well taken because the Act requires 'taxpayers representing twenty-five percent or more of the total valuation of real estate in the political subdivision . . . or taxpayers of the political subdivision not less than twenty-five in number aggrieved by the ordinance' to bring an appeal under section 6. 8 If the individual appellants are not permitted to allege the basis on which they are 'aggrieved by the ordinance,' only the parking operators would remain and they are fewer than 25 in number. Because there is no claim that the plaintiffs own 'twenty-five percent or more of the total valuation of real estate' in the City, the petition would then fail to comply with the threshold requirements of section 6. However, we conclude that the trial court was not correct in refusing to allow amendment.

[464 Pa. 184] The City's argument on this point is twofold. It argues, first, that no amendment to a petition under section 6 is permitted after the thirty-day period allowed for filing such petitions. Second, even if the statute permits a petition to be amended after expiration of the thirty-day period, the City argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow amendment. We find no merit in either contention.

The City argues that the brief period allowed for the taking of appeals under section 6 is intended to promote early determination of the validity of taxing ordinances in order to minimize the uncertainty which would otherwise affect budgetary planning. See Alco Parking Corp. v. City of Pittsburgh, 6 Pa.Cmwlth. 433, 446, 291 A.2d 556, 563, 295 A.2d 349 (1972) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds, 453 Pa. 245, 307 A.2d 851 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 417 U.S. 369, 94 S.Ct. 2291, 41 L.Ed.2d 132 (1974); Jones v. Oxford School District, 3 Pa.Cmwlth. 102, 108, 281 A.2d 188, 191 (1971) (laches will bar equitable action to enjoin collection of a tax). From this proposition the City argues that taxpayers proceeding under section 6 should not be permitted to amend their petitions after expiration of the thirty days allowed for commencement of an appeal. However, the only direct support offered for this position is Archbold v. Codorus Township School District, 33 Pa.D. & C.2d 311, 315--16 (Q S.York 1963) (dictum).

Apparently recognizing the weakness of its position, the City seeks to bolster its argument by reliance on two cases involving

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elections. Pietrowski Nominating Petition, 24 Pa.D. & C.2d 239 (C.P. Philadelphia 1961); Williams v. Todman, 367 F.2d 1009 (3d Cir. 1966). 9 Pietrowski[464 Pa. 185] refused to allow amendment of a motion to strike a nominating petition to cure a failure to specify the signatures attacked after expiration of the time allowed for filing objections to such petitions. In Williams, a petition to set aside a nominating petition was filed on September 12, the last day on which such petitions were permitted. However, it was not presented to any judge for action, as required by statute, until September 24, immediately after an amended petition was filed. Because the statute required that hearings on such petitions be conducted not later than September 16 and final determinations be made not later than September 21, the court of appeals held that the district court was powerless to act when the petition was presented to the court on September 24. It also held that the petition was barred by failure of the plaintiff to prosecute it with due diligence. Finally, the court noted that the petition, as originally filed, was defective because it failed to set forth specifically the plaintiff's objections. It then held, relying on Pietrowski, that the amendment of the petition could not cure the defect because the amendment was filed too late

Assuming that these cases correctly hold that defects in a challenge to a nominating petition may not be cured by amendment after expiration of the time allowed for filing of such challenges, 10 we conclude that they are distinguishable. The peculiar reasons for requiring rigid adherence to statutory time limits are well stated by the opinion in Williams:

'(T)he time limits fixed by section 412 are mandatory and not merely directory, since that section is intended[464 Pa. 186] to provide the efficient procedure for the speedy determination of controversies regarding nomination petitions which is absolutely essential if political campaigns are to proceed in order and primary and general elections are to be held without confusion, or even at all.

'That this must necessarily be the construction to be placed upon the Virgin Islands statute is highlighted by the situation in which we find ourselves today. For although we heard argument in this appeal only 10 days after it was docketed and only 16 days after the order appealed from was entered, our decision, rendered with the greatest dispatch, comes down only 13 days before the day of the general election in the Virgin Islands. And it must be remembered that this proceeding is an attack upon nomination petitions filed in behalf of candidates who might have had to run in a primary election on October 4th, the very day on which the district court heard and decided the matter, if such a primary election had been required. It hardly needs to be added that if the court had set aside the petition the Republican primary election, which in that event would have been required by 18 V.I.C. § 359 to be held on October 4th, could not actually have been held. Indeed it would have been difficult enough to prepare for and hold such a primary election on October 4th even if the district court had set aside

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the petition on September 21st, the last day for such action fixed by section 412.'

367 F.2d at 1012--13.

However great the need for prompt determination of the validity of a tax, it cannot be compared with the exigencies resulting from the need to conduct an election on a specific date, fixed in advance. Consequently, we conclude that Pietrowski and Williams have no application in this case.

[464 Pa. 187] We hold that section 6 does not preclude amendment of a petition after expiration of the period allowed for commencing an appeal. We base this conclusion on two factors. First, the rule argued for by the City encourages hyper-technicality and formalism in pleading, contrary to the modern practice of allowing free amendment in order to promote resolution of cases in their merits. See, e.g., Schaffer v. Larzelere, 410 Pa. 402, 406--07, 189 A.2d 267, 270 (1963); Pa.R.Civ.P. 126, 1033; Fed.R.Civ.P. 1, 15(a) & (b). Second, the proposed restriction of amendm...

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