WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Gasconade County, Mo., 96-1179
| Citation | 105 F.3d 1195 |
| Decision Date | 27 January 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-1179,96-1179 |
| Parties | , 27 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,683 WMX TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; Waste Management of Missouri, Inc.; Kahle Landfill, Inc., Plaintiffs--Appellants, v. GASCONADE COUNTY, MISSOURI; Wilford Kallmeyer; Michael Meyer; Raymond Ochsner, in their capacities as Commissioners of the Gasconade County Commission; John B. Berkemeyer, in his capacity as prosecuting attorney of Gasconade County; Charles Schlottach, Defendants--Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
Thomas C. Walsh, argued, St. Louis, MO (Elizabeth C. Carver and Steven J. Poplawski, on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
P. Dennis Barks, argued, Hermann, MO (Walter D. McQuie, Jr. and John B. Berkemeyer, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.
Before McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and BOGUE, * Senior District Judge.
Appellants WMX Technologies, Inc. ("WMX"), Waste Management of Missouri, Inc. ("WMM"), and Kahle Landfill, Inc. ("Kahle") (collectively "Waste Management") challenged the appellees Gasconade County Commissioners' ("County" or "Commissioners") enactment of a Solid Waste Management Ordinance claiming that such was a violation of Waste Management's substantive due process rights, constituted an illegal bill of attainder, and violated Missouri state law. The district court ** dismissed Waste Management's substantive due process and bill of attainder claims for failure to state a claim and refused to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Alternatively, the district court indicated it would grant summary judgment on both the substantive due process and bill of attainder claims. We affirm.
The facts, as alleged by appellants, are as follows: In 1990, Kahle obtained a permit from the Missouri Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") to operate a sanitary landfill on a ten acre parcel in Gasconade County, Missouri. In 1992, WMX acquired a 160 acre parcel within which the 10 acre landfill is located. Title to the property was transferred to WMM in March 1994. Waste Management is currently the only solid waste collector licensed by the DNR to operate a solid waste landfill in Gasconade County. The existing ten acre Kahle landfill is now filled to its permitted capacity. In June 1993 Waste Management applied to the DNR for an operating permit to expand the existing landfill to include an additional 51 acres within the 160 acre parcel. They expended in excess of $3 million in planning, developing, and seeking a DNR permit for the proposed expanded landfill in anticipation of obtaining a permit to operate the site as a sanitary landfill for the deposit of solid waste, construction and demolition waste, and special waste collected from the counties, cites, and towns encompassing an eight county area in Missouri--including Gasconade County. In August 1993 and October 1993, the DNR held public hearings on Waste Management's application for expansion of the existing landfill. Despite Waste Management's offer of evidence showing the proposed expansion site is well-suited for use as a sanitary landfill, members of "Missourians for the Preservation of Water and the Environment" ("MPWE"), a group formed to oppose the proposed expansion, as well as other Gasconade County citizens attended the October hearing and voiced strenuous opposition to the proposed expansion.
The record shows that in late 1993 or early 1994, the commissioners began investigating the possibility of enacting an ordinance regulating landfills. Defendant Berkemeyer, the prosecuting attorney of Gasconade County, was instructed to investigate what types of ordinances were available. Based upon their Pursuant to Missouri Senate Bill 60, section 1, before the DNR may approve a permit application, verification is required from local governments that the entity and activity that are the subject of the application are in compliance with all applicable "local zoning, building, and health codes, ordinances, and orders." On December 7, 1995, the DNR denied Waste Management's application for a permit to operate the expanded landfill citing Waste Management's failure to comply with the local Gasconade County ordinance's permit requirements.
consultations with civil engineer Ray Frankenberg and attorney Berkemeyer, and upon sample ordinances, rules, and regulations compiled by Berkemeyer from other Missouri Counties, the Commissioners enacted the Gasconade County Solid Waste Management Ordinance on December 12, 1994. Three days later, Waste Management filed the complaint in this action, asserting that the ordinance was unconstitutional and illegal in several respects under Missouri law. Waste Management has never applied for, nor have they ever been denied a permit from the County. The ordinance was amended on July 26, 1995 and in its final form, purports to regulate and restrict the storing, collecting, transporting, processing, and disposing of solid, liquid, hazardous, and special waste within Gasconade County by requiring application to the Commissioners for a permit to operate a solid waste disposal, processing storage site.
After directing the parties to file cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss Waste Management's substantive due process and bill of attainder claims. The Court held in the alternative that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on both counts. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Waste Management's state law claims. In dismissing Waste Management's substantive due process claim, the court held that "plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to suggest that the commissioners' passage of the Amended Ordinance was 'truly irrational.' " Similarly, with respect to Waste Management's bill of attainder claim the court held that the ordinance does not constitute an illegal bill of attainder because it does not "single out" Waste Management, and the ordinance is not punitive.
On appeal, Waste Management argues that the district court improperly applied the heightened "truly irrational" standard to Waste Management's complaint and should have found that the Commissioners' enactment of the ordinance without authority to do so was arbitrary and capricious. Alternatively, appellants argue the substantive Due Process Clause was violated when the Commissioners allegedly ceded their legislative responsibilities to others and enacted an ordinance solely to pacify the vocal opposition to the expansion plan. Appellants also maintain the district court erred in dismissing their bill of attainder claim as all required components of a bill of attainder claim were properly pled.
We review the district court's dismissal de novo. Goss v. City of Little Rock, 90 F.3d 306, 308 (8th Cir.1996). In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must construe the complaint liberally and assume all factual allegations to be true. Id. Dismissal should not be granted unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
Initially we note that Waste Management has brought a facial substantive due process claim and that they therefore have the burden of showing that "any application of [the ordinance] is unconstitutional." Christopher Lake Development Co. v. St. Louis County, 35 F.3d 1269, 1275 (8th Cir.1994). In this context, the ordinance is unconstitutional if it is arbitrary, capricious and not rationally related to a legitimate public purpose. 1 See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 11, 108 S.Ct. 849, 857, 99 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988)(a land use ordinance is unconstitutional under Due Process Clause only if "arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt").
Waste Management does not argue that the County has no legitimate interest in regulating landfills for the safety, health, and welfare of its citizens. 2 Rather, they argue that the means 3 by which the County seeks to further that interest are arbitrary, capricious, irrational, and wholly unrelated to its legitimate interest. Waste Management maintains the ordinance violates the substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for either of two reasons: First, they claim the ordinance is unconstitutional because the Commissioners' act of allegedly passing the ordinance without authority (that is, the ordinance lacked basis in state law) was "truly irrational." 4 Alternatively, assuming the commissioners had authority to enact the ordinance, Waste Management claims the ordinance is arbitrary, capricious, and irrational because: (1) by relying on the expert advice of an attorney and an engineer, the Commissioners allegedly abdicated their legislative responsibilities; and (2) the commissioners passed the ordinance solely to assuage the unreasoned fears of the electorate without due regard to the state waste disposal laws.
Initially, Waste Management argues the ordinance is unconstitutional because the Commissioners' enactment of the ordinance was "truly irrational" where they allegedly lacked the authority to enact the ordinance. Yet, it is clear the Commissioners have statutory authority to adopt ordinances regulating land use with respect to solid waste disposal that are "equal to or more stringent than" the state solid waste disposal laws--provided they are not "substantially inconsistent" with the state solid waste disposal laws. 5 Appellants argue, however the ordinance is so "substantially inconsistent" with the state solid waste laws, that § 260.215.5 preempted the ordinance and it was therefore passed in violation of state law. Thus, they claim, the Commissioners' passage of the ordinance contrary to...
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