Wodock v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 18 April 1892
• Parties: WODOCK v. ROBINSON.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

24 A. 73
148 Pa.St. 503

WODOCK
v.
ROBINSON.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

April 18, 1892.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Philadelphia county; Thayer, Judge.

Action by Mary Wodock against Sarah J. Robinson for personal injuries resulting from a defect in a house leased by plaintiff's husband from defendant. A demurrer was sustained to plaintiff's statement. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

The opinion of the trial court was as follows:

"The defendant, in accordance with the reformed principles of pleading introduced into this state by the procedure act of 1887, was sued in an action of trespass, in which the plaintiff seeks to recover consequential damages for a bodily injury resulting from the breach of an alleged contract. The plaintiff, Mary Wodock, is the wife of Charles Wodock, who, on the 16th of January, 1889. rented from the defendant, Sarah Robinson, a farm situate in Abington township, in Montgomery county. By the express terms of the lease, which is under seal, and which the plaintiff has properly made a part of her case by annexing the same to her statement filed, the lessee, the plaintiff's husband, expressly covenanted to keep the premises in good order and condition during the term, ordinary wear and tear and casualties by fire excepted, and to deliver up the premises in like good order and condition at" the expiration of the term. It was also stipulated that if the lessee should holdover

24 A. 74

it should he deemed a renewal of the lease and of all its covenants, terms, and conditions. This lease was formally sealed and witnessed. It so happened that on the 16th of June, 1890, the plaintiff, while engaged in her household duties in the kitchen of the farmhouse, was precipitated through the floor in consequence of the floor and joist giving way by reason of their rotten and decayed condition, by which she alleges she was hurt, and underwent much pain and suffering, for which she claims in this suit to recover five thousand dollars damages. By the terms of the demise it is plain enough that the defendant was under no obligation whatever to keep the premises in repair, but that, on the contrary, it was expressly covenanted by the lessee that he would keep the premises in repair himself. In the face, however, of this express agreement under the seals of the respective parties, it is averred by the plaintiff in her statement, that before, at the time, and after the execution of said lease, the said defendant, by her authorized agent, did...