Woehl v. Hy-Vee, Inc.

Decision Date10 July 2009
Docket NumberNo. 4:08-cv-00019-JAJ.,4:08-cv-00019-JAJ.
Citation637 F.Supp.2d 645
PartiesDona G. WOEHL, Plaintiff, v. HY-VEE, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

Michael J. Carroll, Kodi A. Petersen, Babich Goldman Cashatt & Renzo PC, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.

Kermit B. Anderson, Finley Alt Smith Scharnberg Craig Hilmes & Gaffney PC, Des Moines, IA, for Defendant.

ORDER

JOHN A. JARVEY, District Judge.

This matter comes before the court pursuant to the Defendant Hy-Vee, Inc.'s, ("Hy-Vee") motion for summary judgment. [Dkt. 15]. Plaintiff Dona G. Woehl ("Woehl") filed a response in opposition to summary judgment on May 29, 2009. [Dkt. 18]. On June 12, 2009, Hy-Vee filed a reply to Woehl's response in opposition to summary judgment. [Dkt. 23]. For the reasons set out below, Hy-Vee's motion is granted.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 10, 2008, Woehl brought this action against Hy-Vee, alleging that Hy-Vee discriminated against her on the basis of her age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623, et seq., and the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code Chapter 216. [Dkt. 1]. Woehl worked at the Ankeny Hy-Vee as a floral manager or equivalent position from March 1979 to October 12, 2006. She alleges that Hy-Vee terminated her employment on October 12, 2006, due to her age. Woehl was 52 years old on the date she was removed from her position. Woehl alleges that she received no warnings or reprimands prior to her termination, and Hy-Vee failed to provide her with a reason for her termination. Hy-Vee filed an answer on January 24, 2008. [Dkt. 3].

On May 1, 2009, Hy-Vee filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 56. [Dkt. 15]. Hy-Vee urges this court to grant summary judgment on two grounds. First, Hy-Vee argues that Woehl failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. Next, Hy-Vee argues that even if Woehl established a prima facie case, no evidence exists to demonstrate that Hy-Vee's proffered reason for the termination was pretextual and that age discrimination was the true reason for the termination. On May 29, 2009, Woehl filed a response to Hy-Vee's motion for summary judgment. [Dkt. 18]. Woehl contends that she established a prima facie case for age discrimination. Furthermore, she argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Hy-Vee's proffered reason for terminating Woehl and that a reasonable jury could infer that Hy-Vee's proffered reason was pretextual. On June 12, 2009, Hy-Vee filed a reply. [Dkt. 23].

II. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

Woehl was born on June 25, 1954. In June of 1980, Woehl commenced employment at the Hy-Vee store in Ankeny as the manager of the floral department. On October 12, 2006, Ankeny store director Ken Butcher met with Woehl. Scott Gaskill, manager of store operations and Woehl's direct supervisor, was also present at the meeting. Prior to the meeting, Butcher told Gaskill that he was unhappy with floral department's recent quarterly inventory, and that it was time to make a change. In the meeting, Butcher told Woehl she was being relieved of her position as floral manager. Hy-Vee alleges that Butcher did not terminate Woehl's employment with Hy-Vee on October 12, 2006. Hy-Vee alleges that Butcher directed Woehl to look into other job opportunities within the company. Woehl alleges that she asked Butcher if she was being terminated, and he told her, "Whatever it takes." Woehl alleges that Butcher told her she would never work another day in the Ankeny store. Woehl was instructed not to return to work at the floral department that day, and she was escorted off the premises. Woehl was 52 years old when her employment as floral manager ended.

Hy-Vee alleges that for a nine-month period prior to Woehl's removal, Butcher was unhappy with Woehl's job performance. During several quarterly inventories, Butcher discussed with Woehl her lack of gross profit, high labor costs, sales, and personnel. Butcher stated that he did not, at any point, tell Woehl that her job was in jeopardy. According to Butcher, the company-wide goal for floral departments was 55% gross profit. He asked Woehl to achieve 50% as a starting point. In the sixteen quarters prior to the end of her employment as floral manager, Woehl attained this goal twice, in the quarters ending in June 2004 and June 2005. Other than the quarters ending in June 2004 and June 2005, Woehl attained a gross profit percentage above 45% in five quarters. In the remaining nine quarters, her gross profit percentage was below 45%. In the quarter ending September 2006, the last quarter before Woehl's employment ended, Woehl's gross profit percentage was 37.1%. Butcher was also dissatisfied with the high inventory in the floral department and lack of training for floral department employees. Woehl was instructed to maintain no more than $20,000 of inventory. In the quarter ending September 2006, the last inventory period before Woehl's employment ended, she reported an ending inventory of $32,657.

Woehl alleges that Butcher occasionally discussed gross profit percentage with her, but seemed more concerned with her sales. The Ankeny Hy-Vee store underwent an extensive remodel during the last two years Woehl was floral manager. Woehl's sales were generally acceptable during the remodel, despite the disruption caused by the construction. In the quarter ending in June 2006, Woehl's sales at the Ankeny store increased by 38.6%, ranking first in the 39-store comparison group, and in the quarter ending in September 2006 by 18.11%, ranking third. Woehl alleges that the inventory in the floral department was high because Butcher directed her to order a large amount of fresh cut flowers from Flower Distributors of Iowa ("FDI"), a Hy-Vee subsidiary. By the quarter ending in June 2006, however, the Ankeny store ranked thirty-third in size of average inventory, and in the quarter ending in September 2006, the store ranked thirty-fourth. Woehl contends that she only failed to train one part-time employee, Ashley Stephenson. Woehl claims that Stephenson was difficult to work with, and that she had spoken with Mike Blunk, the human resources manager, about transferring Stephenson to another department. Woehl says that she was never informed that her job was in jeopardy due to the gross profit percentages, high inventory, and employee training issues.

After the October 12, 2006, meeting with Butcher, Woehl called Rita Peters, vice president of floral operations at Hy-Vee. Woehl informed Peters she was no longer floral manager at the Ankeny store. Peters offered to help Woehl find employment as a designer in another store. On November 10, 2006, Woehl was offered a full-time position as a pharmacy technician at the Ankeny store. Woehl declined the offer, and alleges that it was not a bona fide offer because she was not qualified for the position and Butcher told her she would never work another day in the Ankeny store on October 12, 2006.

At the time Woehl's employment as floral manager ended, Butcher did not have a particular person in mind to fill the position. Through the corporate office, a bulletin was put out to the entire company requesting applications. Jodi Evans, born October 3, 1971, submitted an application for the position on October 17, 2006. At the time, Evans was an associate with Florist Distributing, Inc. She had worked as a display coordinator and assistant floral manager from 1992 to 1997 and as a floral manager in two different Hy-Vee stores from 1997 to 2006. On November 13, 2006, Butcher hired Evans to be the floral manager for the Ankeny store. Evans was 35 years old when she was hired to be the floral manager.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment may be granted only if, after examining all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. HDC Medical, Inc. v. Minntech Corp., 474 F.3d 543, 546 (8th Cir.2007) (citation omitted); see also Kountze ex rel. Hitchcock Found. v. Gaines, 536 F.3d 813, 817 (8th Cir.2008) ("[S]ummary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, discovery materials, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.").

Once the movant has properly supported its motion, the nonmovant "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). "The nonmoving party must make a satisfactory showing on every element of its case for which it has the burden of proof at trial." Housley v. Orteck Intern., Inc., 488 F.Supp.2d 819, 827 (S.D.Iowa 2007) (citing Wilson v. SW. Bell Tel. Co., 55 F.3d 399, 405 (8th Cir.1995); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). "[A]n issue of material fact is genuine if the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury verdict for the nonmoving party." Great Plains Real Estate Devel., L.L.C. v. Union Central Life Ins., et al., 536 F.3d 939, 944 (8th Cir.2008) (citation omitted). "A genuine issue of fact is material if it `might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'" Saffels v. Rice, 40 F.3d 1546, 1550 (8th Cir.1994) (citation omitted). The nonmoving party is entitled to all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence without resort to speculation. Sprenger v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 253 F.3d 1106, 1110 (8th Cir.2001).

"[A]lthough [the non-moving party] does not have to provide direct proof that genuine issues of fact exist for trial, the facts and circumstances that she [or he] relies `upon must attain the dignity of substantial evidence and not be such as merely to create...

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