Woehlhoff v. State

Citation487 N.W.2d 16
Decision Date25 June 1992
Docket NumberCr. N
Parties. The STATE of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellee. o. 910385. Supreme Court of North Dakota
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court

Rolf P. Sletten, Bismarck, for petitioner and appellant.

Allen M. Koppy, State's Atty., Mandan, for respondent and appellee.

VANDE WALLE, Justice.

Courtney Woehlhoff appealed from a district court order denying his application for post-conviction relief. We affirm.

Woehlhoff was convicted of theft of property. In his appeal from that conviction, he raised several issues, including an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirmed the conviction without prejudice to Woehlhoff's right to raise the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel issue in post-conviction relief proceedings. State v. Woehlhoff, 473 N.W.2d 446 (N.D.1991). Woehlhoff applied for relief pursuant to section 29-32.1-01, NDCC, based on his trial lawyer's failure to bring a motion to suppress evidence. After a hearing, the district court denied Woehlhoff's petition and this appeal followed.

Our state and federal constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to reasonably effective assistance of counsel. N.D. Const., Art. I, Sec. 12; U.S. Const.Amends. 6, 14; Houle v. State, 482 N.W.2d 24 (N.D.1992). Consequently, ineffective assistance of counsel is one ground for relief from a criminal conviction under our post-conviction procedure act. NDCC Sec. 29-32.1-01(1)(a). The United States Supreme Court has stated a two-part test for allegedly ineffective assistance of counsel, and we use this test to assess claims based on the state constitution. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Houle, supra; State v. Patten, 353 N.W.2d 30 (N.D.1984). First, a defendant "must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Second, the defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. Thus, a defendant must demonstrate both deficient representation by counsel and prejudice caused by the deficient representation. Houle, supra.

Woehlhoff contends that our statements in State v. Woehlhoff, supra, indicate the only issue is whether or not trial counsel had some justifiable reason for not moving to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant, i.e., whether or not trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. In State v. Woehlhoff, we said that "without determining whether or not it should have been granted, it appears that a motion to suppress the evidence of the search warrant would have been appropriate. Nevertheless, we stop short of concluding that the failure to make that motion constituted ineffective assistance of counsel." 473 N.W.2d at 449. We then hypothesized two possible reasons why trial counsel may not have moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant. Our statements followed our discussion of our decision in State v. Ricehill, 415 N.W.2d 481 (N.D.1987), wherein we adopted a procedure that only when we are able to conclude from the record that defendant's trial counsel was ineffective will we reverse and remand for a new trial. Thus, in most instances, the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised before the trial court and a hearing held. We specifically noted that because it was not raised in the trial court, "Woehlhoff's contention that the search warrant was in violation of the requirement in our State and Federal Constitutions that no warrant should issue except upon probable cause cannot be considered or determined in the context of this appeal." 473 N.W.2d at 449.

Simply because an attack on the judgment of conviction premised on an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel implicates an alleged faulty search warrant, the validity of which is ordinarily reviewed as a matter of law, [see, e.g., State v. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d 830 (N.D.1989) ], does not obviate the need for a post-conviction procedure. Even matters of law are best resolved after a full development of the underlying facts. See, e.g., Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Overboe, 404 N.W.2d 445 (N.D.1987). Therefore, our statement in State v. Woehlhoff cannot be read to mean we have determined the warrant was invalid, particularly in view of our express refusal to consider the issue on that appeal.

The trial court's denial of Woehlhoff's application for relief was based solely on its finding that there was no prejudice, i.e., that the results would not have been different if trial counsel had moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant. Although Woehlhoff and the State presented evidence of defense counsel's reasons for not making a motion to suppress, the lower court did not make any findings respecting the standard of professional care required or whether defense counsel met that standard. Rather, the court concluded that the motion would not have been granted because there was probable cause to support the warrant. We, therefore, review only the issue of prejudice.

Whether probable cause exists is a question of law. State v. Birk, 484 N.W.2d 834 (N.D.1992). "[P]robable cause to search exists if it is established that certain identifiable objects are probably connected with criminal activity and are probably to be found at the present time at an identifiable place." State v. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d 207, 212 (N.D.1988).

The problem of assessing the validity of a warrant increases when the finding of probable cause is based on information supplied by an anonymous informant. In such a case, the informant must supply information from which one may conclude that the informant is honest and his information is reliable, or from which the informant's basis of knowledge can be assessed. State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363 (N.D.1985). If the informant does not supply the information necessary to evaluate the tip, the police must, through independent investigation, corroborate the tip or develop other sources of information leading to the conclusion that evidence of a crime will probably be found in a particular place. State v. Birk, supra.

Whether probable cause exists is judged by reviewing the "totality of the circumstances" presented to the magistrate, not by a piece-by-piece, hyper-technical review of the information offered in support of the warrant application. Ringquist, supra. In fact, the magistrate is expected to make a common sense determination of probable cause; on appeal, our only task is to judge whether substantial proof supports the probable cause determination. Birk, supra.

Applying these principals, Woehlhoff argues that we must conclude that the...

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  • Lindsey v. State
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • August 28, 2014
    ...must demonstrate both deficient representation by counsel and prejudice caused by the deficient representation.” Woehlhoff v. State, 487 N.W.2d 16, 17 (N.D.1992).... The first prong is measured using “prevailing professional norms,” Sambursky v. State, 2006 ND 223, ¶ 13, 723 N.W.2d 524, and......
  • Bahtiraj v. State
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • December 19, 2013
    ...must demonstrate both deficient representation by counsel and prejudice caused by the deficient representation.” Woehlhoff v. State, 487 N.W.2d 16, 17 (N.D.1992).A. First Prong [¶ 10] The first prong is measured using “prevailing professional norms,” Sambursky v. State, 2006 ND 223, ¶ 13, 7......
  • M.D.N., In Interest of
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • December 14, 1992
    ...to be so or there is a definite probability based on substantial evidence, the standard of probable cause has been met. Woehlhoff v. State, 487 N.W.2d 16 (N.D.1992); In Interest of R.R., 305 N.W.2d 38 (N.D.1981) citing State v. Persons, 201 N.W.2d 895 (N.D.1972). Therefore, a waiver-of-juri......
  • Dodge v. State
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • May 7, 2020
    ...must demonstrate both deficient representation by counsel and prejudice caused by the deficient representation." Woehlhoff v. State , 487 N.W.2d 16, 17 (N.D. 1992) .... The first prong is measured using "prevailing professional norms," Sambursky v. State , 2006 ND 223, ¶ 13, 723 N.W.2d 524,......
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