Wohlwend v. Edwards
Decision Date | 02 October 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 54A01-0211-CV-460.,54A01-0211-CV-460. |
Citation | 796 N.E.2d 781 |
Parties | Bryon R. WOHLWEND, Appellant-Defendant, v. Donna J. EDWARDS and Michael Edwards, Appellees-Plaintiffs. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Matthew C. Robinson, Seth M. Lahn, Yarling & Robinson Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Paul S. Kruse, Parr Richey, Obremskey & Morton Lebanon, IN, Attorney for Appellees.
Appellant-Defendant, Bryon R. Wohlwend, appeals from the trial court's judgment in favor of Appellee-Plaintiffs, Donna J. Edwards and Michael Edwards, in their negligence claim against Wohlwend. Upon appeal, Wohlwend's two presented issues concern only the matter of punitive damages: (1) whether the trial court improperly admitted evidence of Wohlwend's behavior subsequent to the incident giving rise to the Edwardses' claim, and (2) whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury that driving while intoxicated is per se willful and wanton misconduct.
With regard to punitive damages, we reverse and remand.
The record reveals that in the early morning hours of March 11, 2000, the vehicle which Wohlwend was driving crossed the center line of the road and collided head-on with a vehicle driven by Mrs. Edwards. Wohlwend had been drinking and was intoxicated. An open bottle of wine cooler was found in his vehicle. He had also gotten very little sleep in the few days prior to the accident. Mrs. Edwards was injured in the collision. Her arm was injured as a result of bracing herself for the impact. She suffered from pain and discomfort, concentrated in her left arm, head, and chest. She had severe headaches for a week following the accident, and her chest was bruised for four months. Mrs. Edwards's medical expenses totaled $11,760. As a result of this accident, Wohlwend was arrested and convicted for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.
On May 1, 2000, the Edwardses filed suit against Wohlwend. On March 8, 2002, Wohlwend filed a motion in limine seeking to prohibit the Edwardses from presenting certain evidence, including Wohlwend's driving record. The trial court granted the motion. On October 15 and 16, 2002, a jury trial was held. Evidence was admitted at trial which indicated that, prior to the accident involving Mrs. Edwards, Wohlwend had been arrested for possession of marijuana and illegal consumption or possession of alcohol by a minor. The Edwardses also introduced evidence that, subsequent to the Edwards accident, Wohlwend had twice been arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Specifically, Wohlwend was arrested for operating while intoxicated on June 1, 20001 and again on January 12, 2002.
The trial court granted the Edwardses' motion for a directed verdict on the issue of liability. The jury then resolved the issue of compensatory and punitive damages, awarding Mrs. Edwards $50,000 in compensatory damages, awarding Mr. Edwards $500 in compensatory damages, and assessing punitive damages against Wohlwend in the amount of $100,000. On October 16, 2002, the trial court entered judgment on the verdict and costs for the action.
Wohlwend claims that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his behavior which occurred after the incident involving Mrs. Edwards. Wohlwend argues that such evidence was irrelevant to the issue of punitive damages and unfairly prejudicial.
The Edwardses claim that Wohlwend has forfeited any claim of error with regard to the introduction of this evidence by failing to make a timely objection. It is true that a party may not rely upon a pre-trial ruling on the admissibility of evidence to preserve error upon appeal. See Lenoir v. State, 515 N.E.2d 529 (Ind.1987). Wohlwend, however, does not rely upon the trial court's grant of his motion in limine to preserve his error. Instead, Wohlwend objected at trial immediately prior to the admission of the evidence in question, which was adduced during the direct examination of Wohlwend by counsel for the plaintiffs.
Wohlwend first objected when plaintiffs' counsel asked if he had a "chemical dependency problem." Transcript at 237. Wohlwend argued that the plaintiffs were attempting to introduce improper character evidence. This objection was overruled. Wohlwend again objected when plaintiffs' counsel attempted to adduce testimony revealing that Wohlwend had a prior arrest for underage drinking, which the trial court also overruled. After this, Wohlwend testified that, prior to the accident with Mrs. Edwards, he had been arrested for possession of marijuana and underage possession and consumption of alcohol. Although Wohlwend does not challenge the admission of this evidence upon appeal, this line of questioning led to the admission of the evidence at issue. Wohlwend was then asked, "Did your arrest in this matter for the charge of Driving While Intoxicated, when you were in the collision with Mrs. Edwards, serve as a lesson to you, or deter you from doing this again?" Id. at 242-43. Wohlwend's counsel immediately objected and was granted a request that the jury be removed from the courtroom. Wohlwend's counsel then stated that the court should not allow any evidence of Wohlwend's subsequent convictions for drunken driving, citing Evidence Rule 404 and claiming that such would be "extremely prejudicial" and irrelevant. Transcript at 243-44. The Edwardses' counsel countered that, although Wohlwend's subsequent conduct was irrelevant to the issue of compensatory damages, it was relevant to the issue of punitive damages. After further discussion, the trial court stated, Id. at 247. Wohlwend's counsel then moved for a mistrial upon grounds that the evidence was irrelevant, violated Evidence Rule 404(a), and its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. This motion was denied, and the jury was brought back into the courtroom and instructed to only consider the acts subsequent to the accident involving Mrs. Edwards "for the limited purpose of whether to award punitive damages in this case." Id. at 248.
After this extensive objection and discussion, we cannot fault Wohlwend's counsel for not repeating his already-stated and overruled objection when the testimony concerning the subsequent acts came into evidence immediately thereafter. The purpose of requiring a trial objection is so that any error might be corrected by the trial court at that time. Lenoir, 515 N.E.2d at 529. Here, that purpose was fulfilled by Wohlwend's timely objection and motion for mistrial.
As stated, the essence of the issue before us is whether the trial court should have admitted evidence of Wohlwend's behavior after the event giving rise to the Edwardses' claim even if limited to the matter of punitive damages. This appears to be an issue of first impression in Indiana.
Punitive damages in civil cases are governed by Indiana Code 34-51-3. See Ind.Code § 34-51-3-1 (Burns Code Ed. Repl.1998). The standard used to determine whether punitive damages are properly awarded is whether, considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment, a reasonable trier of fact could find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with malice, fraud, gross negligence,2 or oppressiveness which was not the result of a mistake of fact or law, mere negligence, or other human failing. INS Investigations Bureau, Inc. v. Lee, 784 N.E.2d 566, 582 (Ind.Ct.App.2003),trans. denied. See also Ind.Code § 34-51-3-2 (Burns Code Ed. Repl.1998). The purpose of punitive damages is not to make the plaintiff whole or to attempt to value the plaintiff's injuries; instead, the purpose is to deter and punish wrongful activity. Cheatham v. Pohle, 789 N.E.2d 467, 471 (Ind.2003). See also Lee, 784 N.E.2d at 582 ( ). Moreover, civil plaintiffs have no right to receive punitive damages. Cheatham, 789 N.E.2d at 471.
Our General Assembly has limited the amount that may be recovered as punitive damages to no more than the greater of three times the amount of compensatory damages or fifty thousand dollars. Ind. Code §§ 34-51-3-4, 34-51-3-5 (Burns Code Ed. Repl.1998). Pursuant to Indiana Code § 34-51-3-6 (Burns Code Ed. Repl. 1998), when punitive damages are awarded in civil actions, the party against whom the judgment was entered shall pay the punitive damage award to the clerk of the court where the action is pending. Upon receiving the payment, the clerk must then pay the plaintiff twenty-five percent of the award and pay the remaining seventy-five percent to the Treasurer of State who is to deposit the funds into the violent crimes compensation fund. Id.
Here, Wohlwend claims that evidence of his acts subsequent to the accident involving Mrs. Edwards was irrelevant to the issue of punitive damages in connection with that accident. The Edwardses claim that this evidence is relevant to the purpose of punitive damages—to deter similar conduct. We are unwilling to say that, in a case involving punitive damages, post-incident acts could never be relevant to the issue of punitive damages in conjunction with the incident giving rise to the plaintiff's claim. We can envision a rare situation in which the acts of the defendant subsequent to the incident at issue might bear some relevance to the culpability of the defendant and the related question of whether or not to impose punitive damages or in what amount they should be imposed.3 Be that as it may, this does not mean that such evidence, even if relevant, is necessarily admissible. Although...
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