Wojdacz v. Blackburn
| Decision Date | 05 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 13-cv-01738-MSK-MJW |
| Parties | ELIZABETH WOJDACZ, Plaintiff(s), v. ROBERT E. BLACKBURN, MICHAEL E. HEGARTY, ERIC LAMPHERE, KIM DELINE, MICHAEL WATTS, RUTHERFORD, MULLEN & MOORE, LINDSEY TOPPER, COLORADO SPRINGS CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, SGT. JOEL KERN, W. LAMBERT, LT. SCOTT WHITTINGTON, MEDINA GENERAL HOSPITAL, AKRON CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER OF AKRON, ASHLAND COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, and CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO, Defendant(s). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
This case is before this court pursuant to an Order Referring Case issued by Chief Judge Marcia S. Krieger on September 4, 2013 (Docket No. 27).
The pro se plaintiff, Elizabeth Wojdacz, asserts the following in her Amended Complaint (Docket No. 22). Over nineteen years ago, on May 29, 1995, plaintiff and her minor son, Christopher, were detained at defendant Medina General Hospital ("Medina General") by hospital workers who refused to give them directions to defendant Akron Children's Hospital. While at Medina General, plaintiff was made to sign the following documents for Akron Children's Hospital without first being there: (1) an Agreements and Informen [sic] Consent, (2) an Authorization to Pay Third-Party Benefits Major Medical Assignment, Authorization to Contact Third-Party Payors and Utilization Management Entities, Agreement to Pay and Cooperate; and (3) an Application for Voluntary Admission for Akron Children's Medical Center. After plaintiff signed these three forms for Akron Children's Hospital, she was allowed to leave, and Medina General workers gave her directions to Akron Children's Hospital. Medina General refused to allow plaintiff to leave with Christopher, telling her that he had been admitted to Akron Children's Hospital and must now be transported there by ambulance.Christopher thus went by ambulance, and plaintiff drove there. When plaintiff arrived, she was placed on a locked ward and told to sit in a small room where a hospital worker gave her blank family session forms to sign. Plaintiff refused to sign them because they indicated that there had already been family sessions with the doctors named thereon. Plaintiff was told the information would be added after she signed them, but plaintiff refused, and the forms were taken from her by that hospital worker. Plaintiff left Akron Children's Hospital, and she was not permitted to take Christopher.
When plaintiff arrived home, and for several days thereafter, she was contacted by Akron Children's Hospital workers. At one point a hospital doctor told her that if she did not come into the hospital, they would file a report with Children's Services. Plaintiff never returned to Akron Children's Hospital.
In a phone conversation, Christopher told plaintiff to contact Paul Lumadue at Children's Services, which she did. Plaintiff told Lumadue that the papers for Christopher's admission to Akron Children's Hospital were signed under false circumstances and were not lawful. Lumadue filed a complaint for custody without notifying plaintiff of a hearing where she then lost custody. A doctor from Akron Children's Hospital had made the initial complaint to Paul Lumadue. Plaintiff was never permitted visitation but secretly met with Christopher while he was in state custody. Christopher told plaintiff that he cooperated with doctors and state officials in exchange to go to college. Plaintiff and Christopher wrote down these facts and filed them with the court on June 12, 1996, in an effort to be given custody, but the court ignored them. On January 3, 1997, plaintiff filed a complaint in the same court, claiming that Christopher was an endangered, delinquent, and neglected child and demandedcustody be returned to her. It was never adjudicated.
On January 20, 1997, plaintiff was arrested by Ashland City Police for being mentally ill; they beat and injured her. The plan to commit her involuntarily to a mental hospital failed, and she was falsely charged with crimes.
On or about December 9 to 14, 1997, Christopher was murdered in his dorm room. The exact date of his death was never determined. All persons involved in his death investigation covered up the murder and made a claim of suicide, which is included in his death certificate. Plaintiff has maintained all murder evidence, which includes the clothes (with blood evidence) he was wearing when he was killed, photos taken by plaintiff of Christopher's body, and photos given to her by police that they had taken in his room when his body was discovered. Plaintiff also has documentary evidence.
Plaintiff filed a wrongful death action in Wood County, Ohio.
In July 2000 plaintiff moved to Colorado Springs with her youngest son Sean. Shortly after this move, Sean cooperated with officers of defendant Colorado Springs Police Department ("CSPD") to enable them to remove him from plaintiff's custody, as his brother had done. Department of Human Services and court involvement prevented plaintiff from seeing Sean since that time, and their relationship has never been the same.
In both custody cases, plaintiff was not permitted to have representation by counsel and/or counsel failed to represent her adequately.
Plaintiff dropped the wrongful death suit when Sean was taken for fear of his life. On March 31, 2002, plaintiff gave Sgt. Clayton of the CSPD a file containingRICO violations, including information and evidence of her son's murder. Clayton has since claimed he does not know what happened to that file.
Plaintiff contacted the CSPD trying to report multiple criminal acts by her common law husband, Gary Norman, but police covered up his criminal acts each time.
In June 2012 plaintiff filed a RICO and civil rights action in this court, Civil Action No. 12-cv-01483-REB-MEH.1 At no time was this case ever set for pretrial conference or trial, contrary to the court rules. The Clerk mailed to plaintiff at the wrong address the order from the court to prepare the scheduling order and setting a scheduling conference on August 22, 2012. Plaintiff never received it, could not participate in the formulation of the scheduling order, and was unable to attend the scheduling conference. At no time did defendant attorneys Lamphere, DeLine, or Watts contact plaintiff to permit her to participate in the formulation of that scheduling order until after it was submitted to the court. On August 15, 2012, Watts mailed plaintiff a draft scheduling order, and plaintiff was not permitted to participate in that order. On October 24, 2012, DeLine filed a 19-page motion to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings. On November 27, 2012, Watts filed a 19-page motion to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings. The court sua sponte struck both motions for failure to comply with defendant Judge Blackburn's practice standards. Watts failed to serve plaintiff with ananswer to the amended complaint within the time prescribed and thereafter at some point after December 14, 2012, gave plaintiff a copy when she was in the office. On the 47th page of that document, plaintiff's address was incorrect. The court dismissed Watt's client after being advised by plaintiff of the default. On March 11, 2012, plaintiff noticed depositions for Gary Norman, Cliff Hudson, and Patrick Miller. In a Minute Order by defendant Judge Hegarty, all three depositions were stopped. When the depositions were finally permitted, Judge Hegarty coached Norman in his answers, forbid certain questions of Hudson, and refused to allow the deposition of Miller.
On April 22, 2013, defendant attorney Topper filed a verified response to a motion plaintiff never filed, knowing that his client was in default and the response had no standing. As a result, Judge Hegarty sua sponte struck the response, ruling that Topper could refile when plaintiff filed for the default, which plaintiff has not yet filed. Judge Hegarty also issued several orders due to scheduling and rescheduling requests from Lamphere, Watts, and DeLine which resulted in the discovery deadline expiring. At one point Judge Hegarty ordered the depositions to be scheduled, and in that document stated for the record that these depositions would conclude discovery. At another point Judge Hegarty ordered Watts, DeLine, and plaintiff to set weekly meetings to discuss the case and file weekly status reports with the court concerning those meetings. Plaintiff endured needless expense, her claims being thrown out, and parties being dismissed where motions misconstruing her claims and her rights to due process were ignored by Judge Hegarty, Lamphere, Watts, and DeLine and permitted by Judge Blackburn.
Where Watts, DeLine, and Lamphere could have filed appropriate motions andreceived dismissals (or not) they instead engaged in multiple filings, rescheduled matters several times, and in cooperation with Judge Hegarty, delayed and prevented discovery in this case. Judge Blackburn would have been...
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