Wojt v. Chimacum School Dist. No. 49

• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: PEARSON
• Citation: Wojt v. Chimacum School Dist. No. 49, 516 P.2d 1099, 9 Wn.App. 857 (Wash. App. 1973)
• Decision Date: 05 November 1973
• Docket Number: No. 845--II
• Parties: Richard WOJT, Appellant, v. CHIMACUM SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 49, Respondent.

Page 857

9 Wn.App. 857

516 P.2d 1099

Richard WOJT, Appellant, v. CHIMACUM SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 49, Respondent.

No. 845--II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

Nov. 5, 1973.

Morgan Collins, Port Angeles, for appellant.

William J. Daly, Jr., Port Townsend, for respondent.

PEARSON, Chief Judge.

Mr. Wojt was discharged from his employment as a school teacher in December of 1971. This appeal is taken from the judgment of the superior court upholding the action of the school board.

The primary issue on this appeal is whether the causes specified by the school board, as established at trial, constitute 'sufficient cause' for discharge within the contemplation of RCW 28A.58.100(1) ¹ and allied statutes. Accordingly, we deem it necessary to set out at length those causes and the pertinent findings of the trial court with respect to them.

On December 14, 1971, the board of directors of the Chimacum School District passed a resolution discharging Mr. Wojt. As required by RCW 28A.58.450, the resolution specified the causes for discharge. These were in substance as follows:

1. that Mr. Wojt made no effort to maintain an effective educational classroom atmosphere, but on the contrary permitted a complete breakdown of discipline;

2. that he permitted students to deface classroom property, and negligently permitted damage to a student's property;

3. that he was guilty of 'unprofessional and unmanly' conduct in giving notice to his students of parental complaints directed against him, with the intent to humiliate the student daughter of the complainant, and that he released the complaints of a fellow teacher;

4. that he permitted students to fix their own grades, in defiance of school policy;

5. that he exposed his students to materials wholly irrelevant to the purposes of his courses, in particular that he played in class a phonograph record wholly irrelevant to the subject matter of his course 6. that he played the record without clearance by the instructional materials committee of the school;

7. that he removed the record from the safekeeping of the librarian with a showing of contumaciousness and insubordination; and

8. that he has evinced an attitude of egocentrism, and refusal to conform to school policies toward the school board, administrators, and parents.

Mr. Wojt elected to pursue his remedy directly to superior court, pursuant to RCW 28A.58.515, in lieu of an intermediate hearing before the school board. A trial de novo was had in that court, as required by RCW 28A.58.480. See Hattrick v. North Kitsap School Dist. 400, 81 Wash.2d 668, 504 P.2d 302 (1972). Upon live testimony and other evidence, the trial court found that 6 of the causes specified by the board had been established. Essentially, the findings relate

1. that Mr. Wojt offered lip service to classroom discipline, failing to respond in good faith to administration directives;

2. that he gave public notice to his students of complaints respecting his teaching methods;

3. that he failed to follow administrative policy in fixing grades;

4. that he played a record irrelevant to the subject matter of his course in class, without clearance by the instructional materials committee;

5. that he wrongfully thereafter obtained the record from the custody of the librarian; and

6. that his attitude toward the administration and its policies was one of egocentricity, stubbornness, and insubordination, lacking in a spirit of good faith and cooperation.

Mr. Wojt initially contends that the findings of the trial court cannot sustain his discharge, aside from the question of whether they demonstrate 'sufficient cause,' because they are not based 'upon the cause or causes stated in the notice . . .' as required by RCW 28A.58.515. This argument is without merit. While the causes specified by the school board were in some instances stated in more conclusionary terms than the trial court's determinations, it is apparent that the findings were 'based upon' them. Moreover, in this case the board's specifications were expanded and elucidated by a bill of particulars produced after the pretrial conference. The trial court pursued its inquiry within the parameters established by the stated causes and the bill of particulars, and shaped its findings accordingly. This satisfied the statutory mandate that the trial be confined to the issues framed by the school board.

Furthermore, it is clear from the record that the trial court's determination was made 'independent of any conclusion of the school board, and . . . based solely upon the evidence and testimony . . .' which it received. Hattrick v. North Kitsap School District 400, supra, at page 670, 504 P.2d at page 303. Thus, while the scope of the inquiry in superior court is defined by the causes specified by the school board, the trial judge is unhampered by the board's conclusions. In effect, the superior court is substituted for the school board and redecides the case. Reagan v. Board of Directors, 4 Wash.App. 279, 480 P.2d 807 (1971). The trial court in this case recognized this requirement, and its findings were supported by substantial evidence adduced in court.

The legal sufficiency of these findings as cause for discharge is the crucial issue. RCW 28A.58.100(1) differs from many such statutes in other jurisdictions in its failure to set forth with particularity specific types of conduct which constitute grounds for the discharge of a teacher during his contract term, or to set any reasonably ascertainable standard against which a teacher's conduct may be measured. ² This complicates the task of determining 'sufficiency.'

It is clear under Washington law that the discharge of a teacher affects a legal right, which cannot be canceled or impaired at the will or discretion of the board of directors. Seattle High School Chapter 200 v. Sharples, 159 Wash. 424, 293 P. 994 (1930). Notwithstanding this proposition, the case law does little to elucidate what constitutes sufficient cause for discharge. Teacher failure in the areas of classroom organization, control, and discipline has been held to create sufficient cause for Nonrenewal of a teaching contract. Robel v. Highline Public Schools, Dist. 401, 65 Wash.2d 477, 398 P.2d 1 (1965). Disciplinary shortcomings, in conjunction with lack of success in teaching certain subjects, were held sufficient for discharge in State ex rel. Board of Directors, Dist. 306 v. Preston, 120 Wash. 569, 208 P. 47 (1922). Such cases are arguably applicable to the instant facts.

However, while the language of RCW 28A.58.100(1) has remained unchanged, the general statutes pertaining to the scope of teachers' contractual rights have undergone significant modification since the above cases were decided. A determination of the meaning of 'sufficient cause' can only be made in light of the legislative purpose embodied in the statutes pertaining to teachers taken as a whole. Insofar as such enactments can be construed to modify the term 'sufficient cause,' they are relevant to the inquiry here.

This factor assumes importance to the facts of this case in light of RCW 28A.67.065, enacted by Laws of 1969, 1st Ex.Sess. This statute, previously unconstrued, provides:

Every board of directors, in accordance with procedure provided in RCW 28A.72.030, shall establish an (sic) evaluative criteria and procedures for all certificated employees. Such procedure shall require not less than annual evaluation of all employees. New employees shall be evaluated within the first ninety calendar days of their employment. Every employee whose work is judged unsatisfactory shall be notified in writing of stated areas of deficiencies along with recommendations for improvement by February 1st of each year. A probationary period shall be established from February 1st to April 15th for the employee to demonstrate improvement.

RCW 28A.72.030 in turn contemplates the participation of duly designated employee organizations in the formulation of the evaluative criteria and procedures.

We are of the opinion that this statute, which contemplates...