Wojtowicz v. Belden, 32909.

• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
• Writing for the Court: Stone
• Citation: 1 N.W.2d 409,211 Minn. 461
• Parties: WOJTOWICZ v. BELDEN.
• Docket Number: No. 32909.,32909.
• Decision Date: 02 January 1942

1 N.W.2d 409 211 Minn. 461 WOJTOWICZ
v.
BELDEN. No. 32909. Supreme Court of Minnesota. January 2, 1942.

Appeal from District Court, Ramsey County; James C. Michael, Judge.

Action by Karoline Wojtowicz, special administratrix of the estate of Nicholas Wojtowicz, deceased, against Lloyd I. Belden, to recover for death of plaintiff's deceased when struck by defendant's automobile. After a directed verdict for defendant, plaintiff appealed from an order denying her motion for a new trial.

Affirmed.

[211 Minn. 462]

A. B. Christofferson, of St. Paul, for appellant.

Freeman & King, of Minneapolis, for respondent.

STONE, Justice.

After verdict directed for defendant (because of decedent's contributory negligence), plaintiff appeals from the order denying her motion for new trial. After dark on the evening of December 28, 1939, the decedent, walking on the Point Douglas road near Battle Creek on the southerly outskirts of St. Paul, was struck fatally by defendant's automobile.

Point Douglas road leads southerly from St. Paul on the bench at the foot of the bluffs which there face westerly toward the Mississippi river. There are two roadways, one on the east for northbound, and the other on the west for southbound, traffic. They are divided by a wide, grassed parkway or mall. When struck by defendant's car, Mr. Wojtowicz was walking northerly at about the center line of the northbound roadway.

The holding of contributory negligence is based upon these statutes. L.1937, c. 464, § 57, Mason St.1940 Supp. § 2720-207. "Pedestrians when walking along a roadway shall walk near the left side of the roadway, giving way to oncoming traffic." Section 2720-151 (30) defines "roadway" as "that portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular traffic." Subdivision (31) of the same section defines "one-way roadway" as "a street or roadway designated and sign-posted for one-way traffic and on which all vehicles are required to move in one indicated direction." By L.1939, c. 430, § 30, Mason St.1940 Supp. § 2720-291, it is declared that "in all civil actions, a violation of any of the provisions of this act by either or any of the parties to such action or actions shall not be negligence per se but shall be prima facie evidence of negligence only."

1 N.W.2d 410

1. Inescapable is the conclusion that § 2720-207, requiring pedestrians to walk "near the left side of the roadway, giving way to oncoming traffic," applies to divided highways such as the Point Douglas road. That conclusion is compelled because of the

211 Minn. 463

contextual definitions of "roadway" and "one-way roadway." Each lane of a divided highway is a one-way roadway. Important is the requirement that the pedestrian shall not only walk near the left side but also give way to oncoming traffic. He must go against and not with the traffic.

The application of the statute to these two-way roadways is obvious. It was so assumed concerning statutes similar, but not identical, in Hutcheson v. Misenheimer, 169 Va. 511, 194 S.E. 665, and Tedla v. Ellman, 280 N.Y. 124, 19 N.E.2d 987. In the former a directed verdict for the defense was sustained. In the latter, because of distinguishing facts hereinafter considered, it was held that there was a fact question.

2. In this case it was correctly held below that there was no question of fact. Decedent's conduct, negligent or not, was plainly proximate and contributing cause of the accident. For him to be walking on the northbound highway near the center of it, with the traffic,...