Wolcott v. Superior Court Div. of the Trial Court of Mass., CIVIL ACTION NO. 14–30175–TSH

• Decision Date: 25 September 2015
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 14–30175–TSH
• Citation: 133 F.Supp.3d 309
• Parties: Donna M. Wolcott, Petitioner, v. Superior Court Division of The Trial Court of Massachusetts, Respondent
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

133 F.Supp.3d 309

Donna M. Wolcott, Petitioner,
v.
Superior Court Division of The Trial Court of Massachusetts, Respondent,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 14–30175–TSH

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Signed September 25, 2015

133 F.Supp.3d 310

Michael J. Hickson, Michael J. Hickson, Esq., Springfield, MA, for Petitioner.

Jennifer K. Zalnasky, Office of the Attorney General, Springfield, MA, for Respondent.

ORDER

TIMOTHY S. HILLMAN, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Background

Donna M. Wolcott ("Wolcott" or "Petitioner") filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Docket No. 1)("Petition") alleging as her sole ground for relief that the sentencing law applicable to her, Mass.Gen.L.ch. 279, § 5 is unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. On December 8, 2014, the Responded filed a motion to dismiss (Docket No. 7) on the grounds that because Petitioner had served her sentence prior to filing her Petition, her Petition must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based on mootness. On January 21, 2015, the Court allowed that motion as follows: "No opposition having been filed, the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is granted for the reasons state in Respondent's memorandum." See Docket Entry No. 14. This Order addresses Petitioner's Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment Pursuant To Fed. R. Civ. Pro. For 59(e) [sic.] (Docket No. 18), which was filed on February 13, 2015. For the reasons set forth below, that motion is denied .

Discussion

Wolcott asserts that the Court's determination that her Petition should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction "is a manifest error of law and fact." In support, Wolcott contends that the Court dismissed her claim for failure to file an opposition. This is a clear mischaracterization of the Court's order. While the Court noted that no opposition had been filed, the matter was dismissed "for the reasons state in Respondent's memorandum. " See Docket Entry No. 14. This Court is well aware that a court may not automatically treat Petitioner's failure to file an opposition to a motion to dismiss as a procedural default warranting dismissal irrespective of whether the Petition has merit, that is , the Court cannot simply allow the motion to dismiss as a sanction failure to oppose the motion. Cf.Pomerleau v. West Springfield Public Schools, 362 F.3d 143 (1st Cir.2004). At the same time,

Rule 59(e) ‘does not provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures' or to ‘advance arguments that could and should have been presented to the district court prior to judgment.’ That a district court may not, without notice, dismiss the plaintiff's complaint as a sanction for the failure to file an opposition does not mean that the non-responding plaintiff is relieved of his or her duty ‘to incorporate all relevant arguments in the papers that directly address a pending motion.’ Thus, a plaintiff who fails to raise any substantive legal arguments prior to the dismissal of his or her complaint is appropriately limited under Rule 59(e) to challenging the court's decision as a manifest error of law.

Id. , 362 F.3d at 147 n. 2 (internal citations and citations to quoted cases omitted)

133 F.Supp.3d 311...