Wolf Creek Collieries v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 21 April 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-3438,88-3438
• Citation: 872 F.2d 1264
• Parties: WOLF CREEK COLLIERIES, Petitioner, v. Olga ROBINSON; and Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 1264

872 F.2d 1264

WOLF CREEK COLLIERIES, Petitioner, v. Olga ROBINSON; and Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, Respondents.

No. 88-3438.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Feb. 16, 1989.

Decided April 21, 1989.

Ronald E. Gilbertson (argued), Kilcullen, Wilson & Kilcullen, Washington, D.C. for petitioner.

Leonard Stayton (argued), Inez, Ky., Paula Lincoln, Richard A. Seid (argued) U.S. Dept. of Labor, Office of the Sol., Washington, D.C. for respondents.

Before KENNEDY and JONES, Circuit Judges; and SILER, Chief District Judge. ^*

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge.

Wolf Creek Collieries (Wolf Creek or Petitioner) seeks review of the Benefits Review Board's (Board's) order affirming an administrative law judge's (ALJ's) award of survivor benefits to Olga Robinson under Part C of the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. Sec. 901 et seq. Wolf Creek contends that the Board erred in failing to hold that the remarriage of Robinson's widow permanently terminated her eligibility for black lung benefits under 30 U.S.C. Sec. 902(e) and the implementing regulations. Alternatively, Petitioner argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's invocation of the irrebuttable presumption of total disability pursuant to 30 U.S.C. Sec. 921(c)(3) and 20 C.F.R. Sec. 410.418. We find no merit to these arguments, and, accordingly, affirm the Board's order.

I. Background

At the time of his death in March 1975, Hayes Robinson had worked for 17 years as a miner until he suffered a series of heart attacks over a two-month period; the fourth attack was fatal. His widow, respondent Olga Robinson, filed a claim for surviving spouse benefits in April 1975. The ALJ initially considered her claim under the provisions of 20 C.F.R. Sec. 727.203. He found that although she was entitled to invoke the interim presumption of total disability under 20 C.F.R. Sec. 727.203(a)(1) (over 10 years in coal mine employment and X-ray establishes pneumoconiosis), this presumption was rebutted under section 727.203(b)(3) (total disability or death of miner did not arise out of coal mine employment). The ALJ therefore denied benefits. Based on Board precedent, he summarily rejected Wolf Creek's alternative claim that Olga Robinson's remarriage following the death of Hayes Robinson permanently terminated her eligibility for survivor's benefits.

On the Director's motion for reconsideration, the ALJ granted benefits. He accepted the Director's argument that his initial decision failed to consider evidence in the record that Dr. Cole, a certified B reader, ¹ had indicated on the Department of Labor's X-ray interpretation form that Robinson not only had small opacities (simple pneumoconiosis), the focus of the hearing, but also Category A large opacities (complicated pneumoconiosis). The ALJ found that the other evidence, while silent on complicated pneumoconiosis, indicated either simple pneumoconiosis, or posited tuberculosis without rejecting complicated pneumoconiosis as a possibility. The only other B reader was unable to evaluate the X-rays because his copy of the films was reduced and of poor quality, although he nevertheless indicated probable pneumoconiosis (simple). The ALJ concluded that the evidence was not contradictory, and in fact supported Dr. Cole's conclusion. He thus invoked the irrebuttable presumption of total disability under 30 U.S.C. Sec. 921(c)(3) and 20 C.F.R. Sec. 410.418.

The Board affirmed the ALJ's reconsidered decision as supported by substantial evidence, rational, and in accordance with law. The Board noted that the finding of complicated pneumoconiosis is a finding of fact, and that the ALJ "properly assigned more weight to the reading of Dr. Cole, a B-reader who reread the three 1975 x-rays as showing small irregular opacities, category 2/3t and large opacities, Category A." The Board further ruled that Olga Robinson's remarriage did not permanently bar her from entitlement to benefits. Under current Board case law, a claimant is entitled to benefits if the intervening marriage has terminated. See Luchino v. Director, OWCP, 8 B.L.R. 1-453 (1986). The remarriage issue is one of first impression before this Court.

Wolf Creek appeals the Board's decision, contending that the remarriage of a miner's surviving spouse permanently terminates that spouse's entitlement to the miner's black lung benefits, and that the irrebuttable presumption of 20 C.F.R. Sec. 410.418 was improperly invoked. We find that the plain language and legislative history of 30 U.S.C. Sec. 902(e), which defines a "widow" as an individual who "is not married," rather than who "has not remarried," allows for resumption of eligibility for survivor's benefits when an intervening marriage is terminated. Although the implementing regulations are somewhat ambiguous, they are not inconsistent with the statutory language, and the Director's interpretation is consistent with the statute. The agency's interpretation is thus entitled to deference. We also reject Wolf Creek's contention that Dr. Cole's additional notation of tuberculosis on the X-ray form creates sufficient ambiguity as to the cause of the large opacities and that the finding of complicated pneumoconiosis is unfounded. Although the form is not a model of clarity, substantial evidence requires only that a reasonable mind could accept the conclusion that the notation indicates complicated pneumoconiosis.

II. The Effect of Intervening Marriage on Eligibility

Wolf Creek argues that the remarriage of a miner's surviving spouse permanently terminates the widow's entitlement to black lung benefits. In this case, Olga Robinson was married to Hayes Robinson from January 1951 until his death in March 1975. She subsequently married Gay Pauley in November 1975, but divorced him in March 1979, and has not remarried since the divorce. Wolf Creek asserts that under the statute and regulations, Robinson's widow is only eligible for benefits for the months between March and November 1975.

A. Statutory Language

" '[T]he starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.' " Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 1677, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 1935, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)). In this case, the definition of "widow" in 30 U.S.C. Sec. 902(e) is as follows:

The term "widow" includes the wife living with or dependent for support on the miner at the time of his death ... who is not married.

(emphasis added.) Petitioner makes a "plain meaning" argument that because no provision is made for "suspension" of eligibility, the Act must mandate a permanent termination of eligibility.

We cannot accept the argument that because the language neither prohibits nor permits resumption of eligibility, it must prohibit resumption. As the Director points out, the language defines a widow's marital status in praesanti; thus, its plain meaning is that a widow is eligible as long as she currently is not married.

B. Legislative History

Although statutory language is the best evidence of Congressional intent, "[t]he legislative history of an act must be examined in order to ascertain Congressional intent, even though the statutory language appears to be plain." United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 684 F.2d 1174, 1183 (6th Cir.1982). The original Black Lung Act of 1969 defined the term "widow" as a "wife living with or dependent for support on the decedent at the time of his death ... who has not remarried." Pub.L. 91-173, Sec. 402(e), 63 Stat. 742, 793 (1969) (emphasis added); H.Rep. No. 563, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2503, 2543. The 1969 Act's plain language permanently excluded from coverage a widow who had remarried. In the 1972 amendments to the Act, Congress redefined the term "widow" in 30 U.S.C. Sec. 902(e) "to conform to the Social Security Act definition." S.Rep. No. 743, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2305, 2332. The Social Security Act (SSA) defines "widow" as an individual who "is not married." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 402(e)(1)(A). At this point, the history of the SSA definition becomes relevant.

In 1965, Congress amended the SSA, replacing the phrase "has not remarried," with the phrase "is not married." Pub.L. 89-97, Sec. 308(b)(1), 79 Stat. 286, 376 (1965). The legislative history of the SSA indicates that Congress intended that a person who was not married at the age of eligibility was to retain "whatever rights to benefits she has ever had, regardless of intervening marriages which have ended in death, divorce, or annulment." S.Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1943, 2048. See also id. at 1957-58. Petitioner argues that the SSA's legislative history is irrelevant to determining congressional intent with respect to the Black Lung Act. We cannot agree. Congress expressly "conformed" the SSA definition to the Black Lung Act. Congress was presumably aware of its own expressed intent with respect to the SSA definition when using it to conform the Black Lung Act. Moreover, there was no other reason for changing the former statutory language other than to allow a resumption of eligibility. We cannot accept Petitioner's suggestion that Congress "conformed" the language for its own sake. The legislative history makes it clear that Congress intended 30 U.S.C. Sec. 902(e) to be construed in the same manner as the SSA definition, allowing a resumption in eligibility.

C. Regulatory Language

Petitioner also asserts that the plain meaning of the implementing regulations prohibits a resumption of eligibility after remarriage. Although we agree that the regulations are somewhat ambiguous, this ambiguity does not prevent the resumption of eligibility for two reasons. First, although the...