Wolf v. Coca-Cola Co.
| Decision Date | 13 November 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 1:96-CV-0562-GET.,Civ.A. 1:96-CV-0562-GET. |
| Citation | 82 F.Supp.2d 1366 |
| Parties | Sheila WOLF, Plaintiff, v. THE COCA-COLA COMPANY, Eileen Hilburn, Joe Fortune, Ben Hilburn, Tammy Johnson, and Robert Max, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
E. Ray Stanford, Jr., Irvan Stanford & Kessler, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.
Elizabeth Finn Johnson, The Coca-Cola Co., Michael Wayne Johnston, King & Spalding, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.
The above-styled matter is presently before the court on defendants' motion for summary judgment [docket no. 61-1] and plaintiff's motion for conditional stay [docket no. 64-1].
Plaintiff Sheila Wolf ("Wolf") originally filed this action on March 4, 1996 alleging that defendants, through their conduct, were liable to plaintiff for the following: 1) intentional infliction of emotional distress; 2) tortious interference with employment with defendant The Coca-Cola Company ("Coca-Cola"); 3) tortious interference with employment at Access, Inc. ("Access"); 4) breach of pension and welfare plan, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., ("ERISA"); 5) failure to provide continuing health and medical coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq., ("COBRA"); 6) retaliatory discharge under ERISA; 7) failure to pay overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., ("FLSA"); 8) retaliation under the FLSA; 9) breach of contract with Coca-Cola; 10) breach of contract with Access; and 11) compensation owed for non-ERISA benefits.
Plaintiff's motion requests that, in the event the court grants plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment [docket no. 63-1] on the issue of her employment status, the court stay the proceedings with respect to count IV (ERISA), count V (COBRA) and count XI (non-ERISA benefits) of the complaint. According to plaintiff, at that point, the remaining issues involved in these claims would be best resolved through mediation or other informal means.
Because the court denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment [docket no. 63-1] in an oral hearing on October 26, 1998, plaintiff's motion for conditional stay [docket no. 64-1] is also DENIED.
Defendants have moved for judgment as a matter of law on all plaintiff's claims.
Courts should grant summary judgment when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact ... and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party must "always bear the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis of it motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). That burden is "discharged by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also U.S. v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991).
Once the movant has met this burden, the opposing party must then present evidence establishing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (11th Cir.1991). The nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and submit evidence such as affidavits, depositions and admissions that are sufficient to demonstrate that if allowed to proceed to trial, a jury might return a verdict in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If he does so, there is a genuine issue of fact that requires a trial. In making a determination of whether there is a material issue of fact, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc. 833 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.1987). However, an issue is not genuine if it is unsupported by evidence that is "merely colorable" or is not "significantly probative." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Similarly, a fact is not material unless it is identified by the controlling substantive law as an essential element of the nonmoving party's case. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Thus, to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial, the party opposing the summary judgment must come forward with specific evidence of every element essential to his case with respect to which (1) he has the burden of proof, and (2) the summary judgment movant has made a plausible showing of the absence of the necessary element. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
For the purposes of the summary judgment motion only, the court relies on the following findings of fact which, unless otherwise indicated, are not disputed.
Plaintiff Wolf is a citizen of Florida currently residing in Broward County. Defendant Coca-Cola is a corporation incorporated in the State of Delaware with its principal place of business in the State of Georgia. Coca-Cola is involved in the business of developing, marketing and distributing soft-drink syrups and concentrates throughout the United States. Access is a staffing company located in Atlanta, Georgia which provides computer programmers and analysts to companies throughout the Southeast. Access is a separate entity from defendant Coca-Cola.
Plaintiff began performing services as a computer programmer/analyst for Coca-Cola beginning in February 1988 until she was terminated in March 1994. Plaintiff originally heard of the position after answering an advertisement placed by Access. Generally, Access places advertisements seeking individuals to fill certain positions. If Access determines that an applicant meets certain criteria established by Coca-Cola, the applicant is then interviewed by Coca-Cola employees who make the ultimate decision as to whether applicant will be used. In this case, before plaintiff commenced work, she met with Coca-Cola employees, Eileen Hilburn ("E.Hilburn") and Tom Leaming ("Leaming"). Coca-Cola provided her with a desk, office space, computers and other materials needed to perform her work.
Plaintiff did not meet with a representative from Access until after she had been working at Coca-Cola for a few days. Lance Herndon ("Herndon"), an Access representative, met with plaintiff and asked her to sign the one and only agreement she ever signed with Access. Plaintiff was referred to as an "independent contractor" in the agreement. Access never promised plaintiff that she would be employed by Access for any period of time or that her services could not be terminated except for cause. Furthermore, plaintiff had no agreement, written or oral, with Coca-Cola regarding her status. Plaintiff's employment was governed by a series of annual agreements between Access and Coca-Cola, known as Master Agreements and Statements of Work ("SOWs"). The SOWs provided rates of compensation and lengths of employment for plaintiff's work at Coca-Cola.
Regarding payment, plaintiff recorded her hours on a weekly basis and submitted them to defendants for confirmation. Plaintiff contends that Coca-Cola would make payments to Access, who in turn, remitted payments to plaintiff. Defendants allege, however, that plaintiff was paid directly by Access, who then invoiced Coca-Cola for the payment.
Sometime in 1992, plaintiff was assigned to the ICS project ("ICS"). ICS is a group of computer programs which run on the AS/400 computer, a mid-sized computer system. According to defendants, the ICS project began in the late 1980s and was originally intended to provide a short term computerized solution to Coca-Cola's need to track the whereabouts and status of fountain equipment. Around that same time, Coca-Cola began development of the Fountain Equipment Tracking System ("FET"). FET, which is much more complex than ICS, was designed to be the long term computerized solution to the need to track fountain equipment. Sometime in the early 1990s, Coca-Cola decided to integrate ICS and FET, which meant that ICS had to be upgraded and converted to a permanent system.
Plaintiff's duties with ICS included: 1) analyzing and programming system enhancements; 2) assisting ICS users in resolving day-to-day problems with the system; and 3) working with the Mid-range Computer Support group (the "MCS group"). Plaintiff also assisted in screening new employees for Coca-Cola. While working on the ICS project, plaintiff was supervised by Paul Riley ("Riley") and Robert Harper ("Harper"). Riley reported to defendant Joe Fortune ("Fortune"), who reported to defendant E. Hilburn, Coca-Cola's director of application development.
The MCS group consists of computer programmers, operators and support personnel responsible for maintaining the hardware and operating systems for the various AS/400 computers. The MCS group was managed by defendant Ben Hilburn ("B.Hilburn"). Defendant Robert Max ("Max") was the manager of the MCS group, reporting to B. Hilburn.
In February 1991, Coca-Cola's audit department conducted an audit of the AS/400 environment at Coca-Cola. The audit turned up numerous operational and security deficiencies. MCS was directed to correct these deficiencies in order to secure the AS/400 environment. As a result, MCS took steps to limit the authority that applications support personnel, such as plaintiff, had to affect the internal operations of the AS/400s. The MCS group's efforts to secure the AS/400 environment created tension between the MCS group and the ICS group. Plaintiff alleges that the MCS group's actions were intended to harass plainti...
To continue reading
Request your trial