Wolf v. Coca-Cola Co., COCA-COLA

Citation200 F.3d 1337
Decision Date18 January 2000
Docket NumberCOCA-COLA,No. 98-9608
Parties(11th Cir. 2000) SHEILA WOLF, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.COMPANY, EILEEN HILBURN, et al., Defendants-Appellees
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Before BLACK, Circuit Judge, GODBOLD and FAY, Senior Circuit Judges.

BLACK, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Sheila Wolf filed suit against Appellee Coca-Cola Company (Coca-Cola) and a number of individual defendants after being terminated from working at Coca-Cola as a computer programmer and analyst. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on all of Appellant's claims. On appeal, Appellant challenges only the summary judgment on her claims against Coca-Cola for benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461, benefits under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), 29 U.S.C. 1161-1169, retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-219, and retaliation under ERISA. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant worked as a computer programmer and analyst at Coca-Cola from February 1988 until she was terminated in March 1994. Appellant obtained this work by answering an ad placed by Access, Inc. (Access), a staffing company independent of Coca-Cola. Appellant's only employment contract was with Access; it provided that Appellant was an "independent contractor" of Access. Appellant performed services at Coca-Cola pursuant to contracts between Access and Coca-Cola. These contracts were one year in length and were renewed annually. The contracts governed the rates of compensation and length of employment for Access workers working at Coca-Cola, including Appellant. Appellant never obtained any written or oral agreement concerning her status at Coca-Cola.

In 1992, Appellant began working on a software project known as the ICS project. Tensions developed, however, with the hardware employees at Coca-Cola, known as the MCS group, over access rights and disk space on the computers. On February 24, 1994, Appellant and her counsel met with a human resources officer and a labor counsel from Coca-Cola (hereinafter "the Feb. 24 meeting"). At the Feb. 24 meeting, Appellant presented allegations that MCS employees were sabotaging the work of the ICS project. In addition, Appellant's counsel stated in his deposition that at the Feb. 24 meeting he "at some point . . . raised the issue that [Appellant] appeared to be an employee and had claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, under ERISA. I can't remember if I used the words Fair Labor. I may have used Wage Labor Hour or something like that. Then I don't remember." The evidence is undisputed that this meeting is the only time prior to Appellant's termination at which she may have asserted ERISA and FLSA claims to Coca-Cola. On March 7, 1994, Appellant was terminated when Access was told that Appellant's services were no longer needed at Coca-Cola.

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo an order granting summary judgment, applying the same legal standards as the district court. See Mitchell v. USBI Co., 186 F.3d 1352, 1354 (11th Cir. 1999). We will affirm the summary judgment for the moving party if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Crawford v. Babbitt, 186 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 1999).

A. Claims for Benefits Under ERISA and COBRA.

To assert a claim under ERISA, the plaintiff must be either a "participant" or a "beneficiary" of an ERISA plan. See 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1). Appellant asserts she is a participant in Coca-Cola's ERISA plan because she is a former employee who may be entitled to benefits from the plan. A participant is defined as "any employee or former employee of an employer . . . who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from" the ERISA plan. Id. 1002(7) (emphasis added). ERISA thus imposes two requirements for participant status. First, the plaintiff must be an employee. Second, the plaintiff must be "according to the language of the plan itself, eligible to receive a benefit under the plan. An individual who fails on either prong lacks standing to bring a claim for benefits under a plan established pursuant to ERISA." Clark v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., Inc., No. 95-2845 (4th Cir. Jan. 9, 1997), 105 F.3d 646 (table).

The first prong-whether the plaintiff is an employee-is an independent review by the court of the employment relationship. The Supreme Court held in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 319, 112 S. Ct. 1344, 1346 (1992), that the term "employee" as used in the ERISA statute refers to the common law analysis, which distinguishes between employees and independent contractors by examining at least 14 factors.1 Under the common law analysis, how the employment relationship is described by the parties and the employment documents is considered but is not dispositive. For example, in Daughtrey v. Honeywell, Inc., 3 F.3d 1488 (11th Cir. 1993), this Court concluded that the district court had relied too heavily on the parties' contract, which described the ERISA plaintiff as an independent contractor, in determining that the plaintiff was not an employee. See id. at 1492-93. Despite the wording of the contract, the plaintiff had introduced sufficient evidence to raise a dispute of material fact over whether she was a common law employee under the full multi-factor Darden analysis. See id. Thus, if the plaintiff is a "common law employee" of the company, the first prong is established.

The second prong-whether the plaintiff is eligible for benefits-is an examination of the terms of the company's ERISA plan. The plaintiff must be eligible for benefits under the terms of the plan itself. This requirement is necessary because companies are not required by ERISA to make their ERISA plans available to all common law employees.2 See Abraham v Exxon Corp., 85 F.3d 1126 (5th Cir. 1996); Bronk v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., Inc., 140 F.3d 1335 (10th Cir. 1998). For example, the terms of the ERISA plan in Abraham excluded "leased employees" from coverage. See 85 F.3d at 1128. The Fifth Circuit concluded that although the leased-employee plaintiffs were common law employees, see id. at 1129, they were excluded by the plan and therefore had no ERISA claim. See id. at 1130-31. Similarly, because the ERISA plan in Bronk covered only "regular employees," see 140 F.3d at 1336-37, the Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs, who were leased employees, could not prevail, despite their status as common law employees, because the plan specifically excluded them. See id. at 1338.

Appellant asserts two recent Ninth Circuit cases stand for the proposition that all common law employees are entitled to ERISA benefits. Those cases are distinguishable from this case, however, because of important facts relating to the second prong of ERISA standing. In Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), the Ninth Circuit held that Microsoft's computer programmer "freelancers" were common law employees, notwithstanding that their contracts specifically described them as independent contractors without eligibility for benefits. See id. at 1009-13. Microsoft's ERISA plan, however, expressly made eligible for benefits any "common law employee . . . who is on the United States payroll." Id. at 1010. Thus, once the Ninth Circuit held that the first prong was met, under the terms of Microsoft's plan the freelancers were eligible; the court remanded for a determination whether the freelancers were on the United States payroll. See id. at 1013. Similarly, in Burrey v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 159 F.3d 388 (9th Cir. 1998), the plaintiffs were leased employees. See id. at 390. The ERISA plan excluded leased employees as defined in I.R.C. 414(n). See id. at 391. That section of the I.R.C. defines a leased employee as a person who is not an employee and who meets certain other criteria. See id. at 392. The Ninth Circuit held that the I.R.C., like ERISA, refers to the common law definition of employee when it uses the word "employee." See id. at 393. The court therefore reasoned that if a person is a common law employee, he or she is not a leased employee under I.R.C. 414(n). See id. Accordingly, because the employer's plan incorporated the definition of leased employee in I.R.C. 414(n) for determining who is excluded, the plaintiffs were not excluded as leased employees, under the terms of the plan, if they met the standard for common law employees.3 See id. at 394. Thus, contrary to Appellant's argument, neither Vizcaino nor Burrey holds that a person meeting the common law employee test must be given ERISA benefits. Rather, Vizcaino and Burrey simply clarify that if the plan makes all common law employees eligible, then meeting the first prong also will satisfy the second prong. When the plan affirmatively excludes certain workers from coverage, however, then meeting the first prong is not sufficient because, as Abraham and Bronk hold, failing the second prong denies the plaintiff ERISA standing.

In this case, although Appellant may have a legitimate argument that she was a common law employee of Coca-Cola, her claim for ERISA benefits fails the second prong because she is specifically excluded from eligibility by the terms of Coca-Cola's ERISA plan. The plan includes regular employees and excludes temporary and leased employees. The terms of Coca-Cola's ERISA plan include the following language:

You're eligible for coverage under the plan if you're a regular employee of The Coca-Cola Company or one of its participating subsidiaries. You're not eligible for coverage under the plan if you're a temporary employee or seasonal employee, as defined by your...

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