Wolf v. Cook Cnty.

• Court: U.S. Supreme Court
• Citation: Wolf v. Cook Cnty., 140 S.Ct. 681(Mem), 206 L.Ed.2d 142(Mem) (2020)
• Decision Date: 21 February 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19A905,19A905
• Parties: Chad WOLF, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, et al. v. COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, et al.

140 S.Ct. 681 (Mem)

206 L.Ed.2d 142

Chad WOLF, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.

v.COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, et al.

No. 19A905

Supreme Court of the United States.

[February 21, 2020]

The application for stay presented to JUSTICE KAVANAUGH and by him referred to the Court is granted, and the District Court's October 14, 2019 order granting a preliminary injunction is stayed pending disposition of the Government's appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and disposition of the Government's petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought. Should the petition for a writ of certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court.

Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Kagan would deny the application.

Justice Sotomayor, dissenting from the grant of stay.

Today's decision follows a now-familiar pattern. The Government seeks emergency relief from this Court, asking it to grant a stay where two lower courts have not. The Government insists—even though review in a court of appeals is imminent—that it will suffer irreparable harm if this Court does not grant a stay. And the Court yields.

But this application is perhaps even more concerning than past ones. Just weeks ago, this Court granted a stay of a different decision involving the same administrative rule at issue here, after the Government professed urgency because of the form of relief granted in the prior case—a nationwide injunction. The Government now uses that stay—of a nationwide injunction—to insist that it is entitled to one here. But the injunction in this case is limited to one State, Illinois. The Government cannot state with precision any of the supposed harm that would come from the Illinois-specific injunction, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has scheduled oral argument for next week. The Government's professed harm, therefore, boils down to an inability to enforce its immigration goals, possibly in only the immediate term, in one of 50 States. It is hard to say what is more troubling: that the Government would seek this extraordinary relief seemingly as a matter of course, or that the Court would grant it.

This case concerns a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that renders inadmissible any noncitizen who "is likely at any time to become a public charge." 8 U. S. C. § 1182(a)(4)(A). The provision instructs immigration officers to consider, "at a minimum," a person's "age; health; family status; assets, resources, and financial status; and education and skills" in determining inadmissibility on this "public charge" basis. § 1182(a)(4)(B). For the last 20 years, field guidance has defined "public charge" as a person "primarily dependent on the government for subsistence." 64 Fed. Reg. 28689 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Per that guidance, immigration officers were not to consider non-cash public benefits in deciding whether a noncitizen met that definition.

In August 2019, the Department of Homeland Security issued a regulation that changed this longstanding definition. This new regulation (the public-charge rule) now defines a "public charge" as "an alien who receives one or more designated public benefits for more than 12 months in the aggregate within any 36-month period (such that, for instance, receipt of two benefits in one month counts as two months)." 84 Fed. Reg. 41292, 41295. The regulation also expands the type of benefits that may render a noncitizen inadmissible, including non-cash benefits such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly food stamps), most forms of Medicaid, and various forms of housing assistance. Ibid.

Several lawsuits followed, one of which reached this Court last month. See Application for Stay of Injunctions in Department of Homeland Security v. New York , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 599, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2020) (New York cases). The Government in no small part insisted that it was entitled to a stay because of the scope of relief awarded below: The District Court in the New York cases imposed a nationwide injunction that "rendered effectively academic" the Government's successful litigation on the public-charge rule elsewhere. Id. , at ––––, 140 S.Ct. 599, ––– L.Ed.2d ––––. The Government's unquestionable focus was the scope of that injunction: Its stay application used the word "nationwide" 34 times.

Over the dissent of four Justices, this Court granted the Government's application for a stay. Department of Homeland Security v. New York , 589 U. S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 599, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2020). Two Justices concurred in the grant of the stay, emphasizing—as the Government did—the "equitable and constitutional questions raised by the rise of nationwide injunctions." Id. , at ––––, 140 S.Ct. 599, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– ( GORSUCH , J., concurring in grant of stay) (slip op., at 5). No Member of the Court discussed the application's merit apart from its challenges to the injunction's nationwide scope.

In the meantime, other courts considered the public-charge rule, and one—the District Court in this case—ruled much more narrowly. The District Court concluded that the plaintiffs in the case before it were entitled to a preliminary injunction, based on self-described "dry and arguably bloodless" legal analysis. Cook County v. McAleenan , ––– F. Supp. 3d ––––, ––––, 2019 WL 5110267, *14 (ND Ill., Oct. 14, 2019). But it did not award nationwide relief as the New York court had: It merely prevented the Government from enforcing the public-charge rule in Illinois, where the " ‘nearly 100 nonprofit organizations and social and health service providers’ " represented by one of the plaintiffs were located. Ibid.

After the District Court declined to stay enforcement of its injunction pending appeal, the Government asked the Seventh Circuit to intervene and stay the injunction itself. On December 23, 2019, the Seventh Circuit declined, and instead set an expedited briefing schedule to ensure prompt consideration of the issue. As part of that expedited schedule, the Seventh Circuit set oral argument for February 26, 2020—five days from now.

Notably, the Government initially chose not to appeal the Seventh Circuit's decision denying a stay. Instead, while letting the normal appellate process play out in this case, it urged this Court to review a later issued decision granting a nationwide injunction—in no small part because it was a nationwide injunction. Yet now that this Court acceded to that request, the Government wants more: It asks this Court to grant a stay of the District Court's considered—and considerably narrower—order below.

One might wonder what the trouble is with granting a stay in this case. After all, by granting a stay in the New York cases, the Court effectively has already allowed...