Wolf v. Solem

• Decision Date: 09 June 1960
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 11314
• Citation: 26 Ill.App.2d 262,167 N.E.2d 820
• Parties: Elvis WOLF, Marcella Wolf, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Bjarne SOLEM and Sophia Solem, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 820

167 N.E.2d 820

26 Ill.App.2d 262

Elvis WOLF, Marcella Wolf, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Bjarne SOLEM and Sophia Solem, Defendants-Appellees.

Gen. No. 11314.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, First Division.

June 9, 1960.

Sears, Streit & Tyler, Aurora, for appellants.

Robert E. Dolph and James E. Cheatham, Aurora, for appellees.

McNEAL, Presiding Justice.

An automobile collision, involving vehicles driven by Marcella Wolf and Sophia Solem, occurred on June 15, 1956. Both vehicles were insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. A Company adjuster made a settlement with the Solems for their property damages and personal injuries and took instruments purporting to be releases from them. On April 22, 1958, the Solems filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Kane County against Marcella Wolf to recover damages for personal injuries and loss of consortium. Marcella Wolf moved to dismiss the complaint by reason of the releases and supported her motion by affidavit. Counter-affidavits were filed by the Solems. The Court denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice to the right to plead the releases in answer to the complaint.

On January 13, 1959, and prior to the time Marcella Wolf was ruled to answer the complaint in the original action, she and her husband, Elvis, who was also named in the releases, and the Company commenced another action in the same court by filing their verified complaint for a declaratory judgment against the Solems. In the latter action they sought a declaration that the Wolfs were not obligated to the Solems, and a stay of all proceedings in the former suit pending this action. Copies of the policies issued by the Company and the purported releases were attached to the complaint.

The Solems filed a motion supported by affidavit to dismiss the complaint for declaratory judgment. They asserted that Marcella Wolf had filed an answer denying liability in the damage suit, which was then at issue and on the trial calendar; that no controversy existed between the Solems and the Company or between them and Elvis Wolf; that the Company could not become involved in any such controversy until Marcella Wolf was legally obligated to pay a judgment to the Solems; and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. A counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of Marcella Wolf. All of the foregoing facts with reference to the pendency of the first action appear on the face of the complaint for declaratory judgment and attached exhibits, in the affidavit in support of the motion to dismiss, or in the counter-affidavit. The trial court dismissed the complaint for declaratory judgment and gave the Solems judgment for costs. This appeal followed.

Appellants contend that they will be prejudiced if the insurance question is raised before a jury in the first action, and that prejudice will be avoided if the validity of the releases is determined in this proceeding for declaratory judgment. However, plaintiffs filed a demand for a trial by jury in this action for declaratory relief, rather than a trial by the court. It is difficult to understand how it would benefit plaintiffs to avoid alleged prejudice in the first action and demand similar prejudice in this action. It cannot be said that the matter of insurance will necessarily be disclosed in the first action, and, if disclosed, that such disclosure would necessarily prejudice plaintiffs. Their demand for a trial by jury in this action for declaratory judgment materially weakens their contention with reference to avoidance of prejudice.

The granting of declaratory relief is clearly within the discretion of the trial court. Section 57.1 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, Chap. 110, par. 57.1) provides, in part, as follows:

'(1) No action or proceeding in any court of record is open to objection on the ground that a merely declaratory judgment, decree or order is sought thereby. The court may, in cases of actual controversy, make binding declarations of rights, having the force of final judgments, whether or not any consequential relief is or could be claimed, including the determination, at the instance of anyone interested in the controversy, of the construction of any statute, municipal ordinance, or other governmental regulation, or of any deed, will, contract or other written instrument, and a declaration of the rights of the parties interested. The foregoing enumeration does not exclude other cases of actual controversy. The court shall refuse to enter a declaratory judgment, decree or order, if it appears that the judgment, decree or order, would not terminate the controversy or some part thereof, giving rise to the proceeding.'

In Kitt v. City of Chicago, 415 Ill. 246, 252, 112 N.E.2d 607, 610, the Supreme Court, in referring to the declaratory provisions of the Civil Practice Act, said that 'The act, by its terms, is permissive.'

In Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. City of Freeport, 5 Ill.2d 85, 90, 125 N.E.2d 57, 59, defendant moved to dismiss a complaint for declaratory judgment on the grounds that the county court had assumed jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the same parties were litigating the matter in the county court. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss and after defendant answered, the court heard the matter and declared unconstitutional certain sections of the Revised Cities and Villages Act, Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, c. 24, §§ 7-1 to 7-6.1, pertaining to annexation of territory contiguous to a municipality. The Supreme Court said:

'Moreover, it is clear that this issue is one that may be and was raised in the county court. Therefore, to this extent at least, at the time the complaint for declaratory...